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CENTRAL AMERICA

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN

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(II)

CONTENTS

Hearing days:	Page
December 14, 1981-----	1
December 15, 1981-----	39
February 1, 1982-----	83
 Statement of—	
Enders, Hon. Thomas O., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs-----	4, 84
Ikle, Hon. Fred C., Under Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense, accompanied by Nestor Sanchez, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs, and Robert F. Turner, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy-----	40
Lagomarsino, Hon. Robert J., a Representative in Congress from California-----	99
Neier, Aryeh, professor of law, New York University, and vice chairman, Helsinki Watch, New York, N.Y.-----	105
Penniman, Prof. Howard, Georgetown University, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.-----	118
Scammon, Richard, Elections Research Center, Washington, D.C.-----	117
 Insertions for the record:	
State Department's responses to additional questions submitted for the record-----	32
Response of Fred C. Ikle concerning Fidel Castro—reprinted from the Congressional Record, August 11, 1982-----	70
Defense Department's responses to additional questions submitted for the record-----	71
Prepared statement of Aryeh Neier-----	106
 Appendix:	
Cuba's renewed support for violence in the hemisphere—a research paper by the Department of State-----	125

CENTRAL AMERICA

MONDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1981

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m., in room 4221 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Helms, Hayakawa, Kassebaum, Pell, and Dodd.

OPENING STATEMENT

Senator HELMS. The subcommittee will come to order. Today the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs begins the first in a series of public hearings on U.S. relations with and policy involving the multitude of nations in this hemisphere.

The subcommittee's witness today is the distinguished Ambassador Thomas Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Tomorrow the subcommittee will hear from Dr. Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

This past week, on Thursday, the subcommittee received classified briefings on the security situation in Central America from the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] and the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]. Those briefings, I might emphasize, were as thorough as this Senator has received from the CIA or the DIA during the past 9 years.

The hearings today and tomorrow will focus on the political and security situation in the Central American and Caribbean Basin region. Later hearings of the subcommittee to be scheduled early in 1982 will focus on a number of other topics of interest in this hemisphere, including United States relations with Mexico, United States economic policy toward Latin America in general, the insurgency problem in South America, United States relations with the diverse nations of Canada, such other topical subjects that might arise.

Serious concern has been expressed to this Senator by a number of individuals interested in hemispheric affairs, that the United States has no coherent policy toward its neighbors. Whether this criticism is justified is certainly one topic of inquiry for this subcommittee in the coming months. Perhaps at the conclusion of these hearings there will be a U.S. policy for this hemisphere, a policy that reflects the best efforts not only of the Reagan administration but of the Senate as well.

There are few problems more perplexing for the United States in its relations with the hemisphere than the problem of the Cuban and Soviet-backed insurgency in Central America has not provoked. We have seen a small and ineffective insurgency in Nicaragua grow into a well-coordinated guerrilla war that overthrew the government of that country. In Nicaragua the key element to the victory of the Sandinistas was Soviet- and Cuban-backed insurgency.

We continue to watch what Cuban, Soviet, and now Nicaraguan backing have meant for a similarly small and ineffective guerrilla band in El Salvador as the leftist terrorist insurgency there attempts to bring a coalition government to it knees. Again, the key element in what successes the guerrillas have had in El Salvador has been backing from Cuba and its surrogate, Nicaragua, and the Soviet bloc.

In Guatemala the process has already begun and destabilization of that country is imminent. In Costa Rica, a nation held up by the last administration as a model for other Latin Americans to emulate, lack of a strong defense force and internal corruption and failed economy have left that country ripe for insurgency. Already, terrorist attacks have begun, some directed at American citizens. How soon it will be before we are faced with yet another insurgency in Central America, who knows. How long would it take before we see the fine hand of Cuba or the Soviet Union in the destabilization of yet another country?

Perhaps the most hopeful event in Central America was the free elections that were held this month in Honduras. That nation moved from more than a decade of military rule to civilian control.

Yet even so happy an event as free elections in Honduras was marred by the dark and menacing presence of Cuba and Nicaragua. Just 2 days before the election in Honduras a "safe house" was found in the capital of Honduras. Inside that house was found a large cache of weapons, including United States made M-16 rifles, grenades made in Israel, propaganda leaflets, and, rather ominously, Honduran military uniforms. Nicaraguan citizens were captured, and one Uruguayan was killed.

On the day before the election, two other such "safe houses" were found in other parts of Honduras. Whether the equipment in those houses was to be used to destabilize the Honduran election process is something, thank goodness, that we will never know.

But the signs are clear. Honduras also has been targeted for a leftist guerrilla insurgency. The hand of Nicaragua has already been seen in the Honduran insurgency that is mounting; how soon would it be before we will see Cuba and its Soviet-bloc friends at work there as well?

The subcommittee has invited Ambassador Enders to come today to address that issue, among others.

Secretary Enders, we will have an opening statement if you wish in just a moment. But I would inquire of the distinguished Senator, ranking member of the committee, Mr. Pell, if he has a statement.

Senator PELL. I do. And I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have been a guest of your subcommittee, although I guess an ex officio member, too.

Senator HELMS. That is right.

Senator PELL. I am very pleased that you are holding these hearings, and I congratulate you on doing so. Since the full committee held hearings on El Salvador in March and April of this year, we have seen a proliferation of issues which have presented a very complex set of problems for American policymakers and deep concern of the Congress and the American people.

We trust that Secretary Enders and Secretary Ikle will be responding to these concerns by providing us with frank, substantive commentary on administration policy. Through these hearings we hope to understand where United States policy is in the issue of a political summit in El Salvador. We would like to know what is behind the recent increasing rhetoric on Cuba and El Salvador. We would like to know what is happening with regard to the options on Cuba in Nicaragua. We would like to know if there is anything behind the speculation with regard to rapprochement with Cuba and Nicaragua.

And I would add here that my own interest is fairly intense in this subject. I was the last Senator to go to Cuba after Castro took over and the first Senator, with Senator Javits, in 1974, to return to Cuba after 14 years of the Castro regime. I remember at the time when I first went there coming back and saying that the people who opposed the regime are either dead, in jail, or have fled, and it would be a mistake to try violence because the people will not rise. I was so far down the totem pole in the Senate that that advice was ignored.

I also hope we can touch on the question of the nuns and their murder. I see in the New York Times today a very interesting article where the brother of one of the nuns, by coincidence a lawyer in the firm of former President Nixon and former Attorney General Mitchell, is very concerned and very exercised. And we really have received no answers. I hope the Secretary will focus very directly on what can be done to bring those murders to justice.

I realize in these 2 days we will barely be able to touch the surface of many of these issues, and I am very glad, as I said earlier, that Senator Helms is going to continue these hearings in the next session. I look forward to hearing Secretary of State Haig very early in the next session to specifically address our concerns about American policy in Central America and the Caribbean.

Secretary Enders knows we had very much hoped to have him up here at this time before the recess. And also I would be remiss if I did not ask you to say something about the ouster of President Viola in Argentina. The reason I say that is because this very afternoon we go into conference on legislation involving Argentina and part of the attitude of the Senate side in the conference is based on the assurances we received that they are moving in more of a democratic direction and with some greater regard for human rights. And now over the weekend that apparently has been turned around.

So that is why although outside the mandate of this committee, the committee's hearing today, I would appreciate if you could touch on it, because we have to wrestle with the problem this afternoon.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Again, Mr. Ambassador, we welcome you. And you may proceed with any statement that you may have.

**STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS O. ENDERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS**

Mr. ENDERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Pell.

The question you posed to us in your opening remarks was the description of the strategic situation in Central America and in the Caribbean. And it seems to me that there are four major developments if you look at it analytically that have come together to create what can only be described as a state of danger in the Caribbean Basin.

One is the new Cuban strategy for uniting the left in the countries of the region, committing it to violence, arming it, training it in warfare, and attempting to use it for the destruction of existing governments.

I say "new," because it was only 3 years ago that the policy was adopted. Prior to 1978 and for some 10 years since Che Guevara died on an Andean hillside, Cuba has made a sustained effort to portray itself as a member of the international community not unlike others, carrying on state-to-state relations through embassies, emphasizing trade and cultural contacts.

Observing this pattern, many in this and other countries in the hemisphere began to hope that revolutionary Cuba was on the way to becoming a status quo nation. The 1970's, of course, were marked by Cuban intervention in Africa on a continentalwide scale. But it was argued Africa was a special case. The turn came in 1978 when Cuba decided to back the insurrection in Nicaragua with arms and other support. And at first it was not apparent perhaps to many that a new strategy was in operation, for Nicaragua seemed like a case all of its own. But then the same thing was tried in El Salvador, and later in Guatemala. Earlier this year it was tried in Columbia, and now, as you remarked, Mr. Chairman, it is being tried in Honduras.

We have attempted to identify and illustrate the full scope of this new Cuban strategy in a research paper which I would like to submit to the committee, if I may, for its study. This paper is based on public and intelligence sources. It is not written to make sensational revelations, and it does not.

But I wonder how many Americans have any idea at all of the sweep and the sophistication of what is going on and what they are up against. In fact, in many of the countries of the region Cuba is attempting no less than to construct a machine to destroy the established governments.

The pattern is always the same. You remember that for years the radical left in the area has been divided by disagreement over tactics. The old-line Comintern parties argued for patience under instructions to from the Soviet Union. You had only to wait for the famous objective conditions that Marx spoke of to emerge and then the revolution would occur as if by magic.

And there were other factions which were for setting up Che Guevara-style "focos" putting some armed guerrilleros in the countryside in the theory their mere presence would radicalize the peasants.

Still others were for the "guerra prolongada," the idea of wearing down and discrediting a regime by hitting at the economy. Still others advocated spectacular kidnappings and assassinations as the route to power.

Under the new strategy adopted by Cuba, Havana approaches each of these groups. Sometimes it calls them to Cuba. It offers to supply arms and training or to arrange for the supply of arms and training.

But it poses conditions: The left must unite, must create a single directorate for command and control. It must commit to a single strategy which is often written out and approved by Castro personally. And the strategy is always the same: armed struggle against the established government.

It is important, I think, to be clear about the effects of this process. Clearly, it enhances Cuba's role as the guide and sometimes as the arbiter of each revolutionary movement.

It increases the pressure on democratic movements of the left to make common cause with the men who have the guns rather than face blame as the obstacle to the unity of the left. In other words, it is a way of getting the nonviolent left parties to join in supporting the men with the guns.

And once unity on the left has been created, of course, democratic socialists in this hemisphere and in Europe face the dilemma of whether or not to support it. Many have supported such movements only to learn with bitterness that their money and their political backing are welcome but their ideas are not.

Now, this is not only history. The process goes on. In Honduras, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, Cuba is just now completing the same unification process. Parties have been joined together in a national directorate committed to armed struggle and a new attempt to overthrow an established government by force appears to be underway.

The democracies of the hemisphere have had to break, suspend or downgrade relations with Cuba, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador.

The second development is the economic and social crisis in the region. It also began in 1978 just as Castro was launching on his new policy of intervention. As you know, for the past two generations, most of the Central American countries and many of the islands compiled an enviable record of economic and social change.

But in 1978 a serious deterioration began. Prices for export commodities—coffee, sugar, cocoa—began to decline sharply. Prices for imported oil and imported capital kept going up. And with slowed growth in the industrial world, tourism stagnated. Credit crunches resulted. Some countries went bankrupt. Others are threatened with bankruptcy. And in two of them Cuban-assisted insurrections are destroying powerplants, bridges, and crops and attempting to disrupt the tourist trade.

The result is a grave general economic crisis, bringing with it misery and despair for many millions of people in the region. Coinciding as it does with the Cuban drive to unify the left and commit it to violence, economic crisis creates great potential political vulnerability throughout the area.

The third factor is the developing role of Nicaragua as a platform for intervention throughout Central America. We have watched with deepening concern as Nicaragua has moved away from pledges of political pluralism toward a repressive one-party state. At the same time, it is greatly expanding its army and building up an inventory of heavy arms. It continues to be deeply involved in logistics and other support. For example, the propaganda radio and the command and control apparatus of the insurgency in El Salvador are on Nicaraguan soil, heavily involved in the insurgency in El Salvador.

The United States and a number of other countries have tried to provide an alternative to these trends, notably by providing economic assistance but also by maintaining political contacts. Since 1979 the United States alone gave \$120 million in assistance.

Recently, we tried by diplomatic means to achieve a rapprochement with Managua, and we do not close the door on future attempts. But frankly, there is little to show for our efforts. Indeed, I wonder whether any of the democratic countries that have supported Nicaragua can claim to have slowed down, much less stopped, the negative trends. There are more than 1,500 Cuban military and security advisers in Nicaragua now, approximately twice as many as there were at the start of the year. More tanks are reported to be on their way. And quite clearly, preparations for the receipt of Migs are well advanced.

A final factor that I would like to point to, Mr. Chairman, is the special importance of the struggle in El Salvador for the future of the area. El Salvador is the second largest Central American state in population, and in the past it has achieved a relatively high level of economic development.

But El Salvador is important not only for itself. There are underway there two critical experiments in reform, one in land tenure, the other in the creation of democratic institutions and strengthening of the political center. If these reforms are defeated by arms, prospects for change elsewhere will be seriously set back.

There is something else, however. If after Nicaragua, El Salvador is captured by a violent minority, what state in Central America will be able to resist? How long would it be before the major strategic U.S. interests in the area, the canal sea lanes, oil supplies, were at risk?

To meet and overcome these challenges, the United States must also have a comprehensive strategy. You called for it in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman.

Let me summarize briefly the lines of action we are now developing. First, we must make sure that our friends have the means to defend themselves. El Salvador and Honduras are the two most threatened countries. The buildup in Nicaragua menaces both. Targeting of El Salvador's economy by Nicaraguan-supported insurgents creates a situation of emergency in that country.

Both need more resources, above all, economic, but military as well. We will be consulting with the Congress on how we can best provide help.

Second, we must join with others to help provide the Caribbean Basin countries the opportunity to achieve long-term prosperity. President Reagan is preparing for submission to the Congress early next year a far-reaching package of proposals, including proposals for one-way free trade arrangements and for investment incentives.

And at the same time, we will present proposals for emergency financial assistance to tide countries over until they can take advantage of the new opportunities to begin earning their own way.

Third, we must not, we believe, falter in our pursuit of democratic values, for they assure the legitimacy of the governments we hope to help. In a free, open election with broad participation, Honduras chose a new government last month. Costa Rica, whose deeply rooted democratic institutions are helping it to weather a brutal economic crisis without violence, goes to the polls in February. El Salvador will follow with elections for a constituent assembly, the first step in creating representative and constitutionally bound government in that nation.

In Central America only the Nicaraguan Government refuses to go before the people. Let me in this regard make a remark in answer to a question by Senator Pell on the subject of proposals for negotiation between the government and insurgents in El Salvador.

Members of the Frente Democratico Revolucionario [FDR], say they want to talk about restructuring the army and establishing a new order. In their view, such changes are conditions precedent to elections. But the establishment of a new order and the status of the army are among the subjects for the constituent assembly to be elected in March. Why should they be debated only and decided only with the insurgents and not with the campesinos, the labor unions, and the political parties? Why should not the FDR have and only have the representation in the assembly it can get by campaigning?

In July the United States said that it would facilitate contacts and discussions on election issues. In September we sent a group to El Salvador to do that and talked to all interested in talking to us, including the MNR, a member of the FDR coalition. A representative of another member of the FDR has asked to see us in Washington this week, and we are receiving him on the same basis.

If there are opposition elements that believe in democratic solution, we will help them to participate in the electoral process. But it would be wrong to assist those in negotiations or otherwise who are committed to the destruction of democracy.

Fourth, we must continue the pursuit of justice for the countries in the area. Lawlessness from both the left and the right has been a major weakness in El Salvador. But the government is making progress in bringing it under control. Violent deaths other than in combat, as reported each week by our Embassy in San Salvador, are down by more than a half since last year.

I do not want to give you the impression that our weekly figures are complete, but the trend is significant. And I wonder whether the insurgents have made any contribution to this process at all, for they claim that their violence is justified by a higher goal.

In this regard, Senator Pell, let me say that, as you know, with regard to the murder of the churchwomen, six guardsmen have been arrested in April. The government there has circumstantial evidence against them. A new effort to build a case is underway, and the United States has assigned a legal attaché, an FBI expert, to the Embassy in San Salvador, who is working very closely with the Salvadoran Government and getting very good cooperation in the effort to develop the case against the six accused.

Fifth, our emphasis in approaching this area should be on collective action. Last week the Organization of American States voted 22-3 with four abstentions in support of free elections as a means to a political solution in El Salvador. This is indicative of the very broad support in the hemisphere for the concept.

In the same forum Secretary Haig suggested that all countries in Central America should address the arms race that now threatens there as a result of Nicaraguan imports of heavy weapons and the Cuban military adviser presence in Nicaragua. You know there are some 1,500 Cubans in Nicaragua. Right at the moment there are 32 American military instructors in El Salvador. Should in the future more serious threats emerge, it is in collective security that we should seek solutions.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we must communicate to Cuba that the cost of escalating their intervention in the region will be very high. We have readied measures to prevent another Mariel sealift, should Cuba again seek to harm this country by exploiting the longings of its own citizens. We are tightening the economic embargo. We are preparing creation of a radio devoted to Cuban news and beamed to the island so that Cubans can be better able to hold their government accountable for its actions.

Our underlying message is clear: We will not accept, we do not believe the countries of the region will accept, that the future of the Caribbean Basin be manipulated from Havana. It must be determined by the countries themselves.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

CUBAN MILITARY AND SECURITY ADVISERS

In your comments I noted that you said there are more than 1,500 Cuban military and security advisers in Nicaragua.

Mr. ENDERS. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. That does not, of course, include the hundreds or thousands of other Cuban personnel who are there?

Mr. ENDERS. That is correct, sir.

Senator HELMS. And I find that a little bit analogous to what is going on in the United Nations, which is a hotbed of espionage, according to all credible sources.

I was in High Point, N.C., a week ago Saturday night, and one of the subjects that came up in a sort of "town meeting" affair was the Cuban efforts, with Cuba as a surrogate of the Soviet Union, to subvert this hemisphere. And a question was asked of me by a person at that meeting which I will pass on to you.

He said, "Why don't we hear about this in the United States? Why doesn't the administration say something about it?" And my response to him was, "Sir, the administration is saying something about it, maybe not as much as you and I would like." He said "Well, I don't hear anything. And I could tell you that, however much is being said, it is simply not being reported."

CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

Mr. Enders, do you agree that the American people are virtually uniformed as to the extent of the Cuban involvement in Latin America?

Mr. ENDERS. I think that is substantially correct, Senator. The number of—I think that most Americans tend to believe that Cuba is engaged in some subversive activity, but the full scope of the effort, the fact that it is actually a campaign on a very large scale, I think escapes most people.

That is precisely the reason we put together the paper that we have submitted to you. We wanted to show the overall outline and the strategy that was being employed which is now very well established. Frankly, I think that there were a number of people in this administration who were not aware of the full scope of the activity, which is why we did the paper.

Senator HELMS. Maybe they will be after these hearings, Mr. Ambassador, because I intend to draw you out as best I can not only in terms of the solution but the extent of the problem.

Let me give you an example. These are two newspaper articles that mention the weapons that were seized the day before the election in Honduras. Maybe you have seen some report of that, but I have not, not until these foreign newspapers came to me this morning.

This is a perilous thing that the American people are not even being made aware of; there is a horrendous potential for a takeover of this hemisphere by leftist forces like the over-promoting this kind of violence.

I ask you again, do you have any satisfactory idea of why there seems to be a blanket thrown over the news of the extent of the Cuban involvement in this terrorism?

Mr. ENDERS. I think it is very hard for many Americans to understand the Cuban Government. We think in terms of a government which is designed to promote and support the well-being of our own people. That is a government which has achieved annual per capita negative economic growth of a little more than 1 percent over a 20-year period and which does not regard that as a bad result.

It is a government which is more dependent, or a country which is more dependent, now on sugar than it was 20 years ago, heavily dependent upon aid from the Soviet Union. The equivalent of no less than a quarter of the gross national product of that country is supplied each year in foreign assistance by the Soviet Union. And yet instead of concentrating on the development of the country, Cuba's Government is devoting all its energies, all its best talent, a great deal of its resources, to a campaign of subversion around the hemisphere.

It is very hard for Americans to understand that, because it is so foreign to the way in which we look at our own government, our society. And yet we have to realize that this is a major threat mounted on very significant scale. I think that we will have to do a lot more work, Mr. Chairman, in order to get this message across.

Senator HELMS. Gentlemen, today we will operate on the 10-minute rule, with 10 minutes to each side. We will alternate. I believe I have already taken 3 or 4 minutes.

BATISTA VERSUS CASTRO

Mr. Ambassador, this whole scenario is reminiscent of the days when Castro was out there in the hinterlands, and the psychology in the United States was to put down Batista. Batista may not have been your and my cup of tea, but he was better than whatever was in

second place. I remember reading many articles and hearing many television and radio commentaries that Castro was not a Communist, that he was just an agrarian reformer. Nevertheless, just as soon as he took over, he said, "I am a Communist. I have been a Communist. And I am going to be a Communist as long as I live."

How many times are we going to be misled in this country about what the Communists are up to? That is the question underlying these hearings.

Mr. Ambassador, how would you respond to those who argue that the United States Government is focusing too much attention on Cuba? I often hear that economic and social inequalities and political repression are the fundamental cause of revolutions in—the region, but I seldom hear Cuba discussed.

Mr. ENDERS. I think it would be wrong, an error of analysis and an error of policy to focus only on the Cuban threat. But it has been underestimated. It must be judged as a major threat. Clearly there are very serious economic and social problems in the area. These are small countries, small markets. Usually investment in staples only is attractive. Clearly, a new structure is required in order to provide long-term economic opportunities for the area.

After all, in order to attract investors into light manufacturing in these countries, you will have to be able to assure a broad market, and that is one of the reasons why we have looked at the concept of one-way free-trade arrangements between the United States and the countries of the area. Some 60 percent of their exports go to the United States at the present time. They have a lot of skilled labor. Relative to other countries, quite a lot of it is not very expensive. We ought to be able to find a new structure of our relationship which could present opportunities on a large scale. We would have to have some provision to prevent abuses but we ought to make sure that we do this with other countries, such as Mexico and Venezuela and Canada and the European countries. We have a partnership going with those countries. Mexico and other countries are now looking at the trade questions themselves, and we are hopeful that a group of countries can present some far-reaching trade proposals along with President Reagan up here clearly in the next year.

No, it is absolutely right that you have to look at the underlying social and economic circumstances.

Senator HELMS. You mentioned the paper that you are delivering to the committee today; what is the difference between that paper and the confidential telegram on Cuban covert activity which the media have already reported?

And, by the way, I would say to the media that we are having some additional copies made of the paper to which the Ambassador referred, and we will be passing those out if you do not already have one.

Mr. ENDERS. Mr. Chairman, it is essentially the same paper. We have updated it to a certain degree from the time that that cable was sent out to our embassies, which was about a month ago. We have made some minor changes and declassified it. Some information has been summarized or left out. But it is essentially the same paper.

Senator HELMS. What is the main conclusion that you would draw from the paper?

CONCENTRATED ATTEMPT UNDERWAY BY CUBA

Mr. ENDERS. The main conclusion is that there is a concentrated attempt underway by Cuba to draw together the leftist forces in each country under guidance from Cuba to commit it to a violent struggle—often there are many elements of the left in countries of Central America and the region that are not so committed—commit them all to the left, and then to arm it and to train its men in order to destroy the governments of the area.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Ambassador, is Cuba's renewed campaign of violence directed only at governments and security personnel? In other words, is Cuba engaged in promoting acts of terrorism or taking the lives of innocent civilians?

Mr. ENDERS. Well, there are two things to be said about this. One is that as is well known, many of the violent insurgent movements of Central America use attacks against civilian populations as a way of provoking military reaction.

For example, insurgents will go into a village, take people with them, often under duress, when they withdraw. And then the obvious purpose of this is to not only provide you some logistic support but to compromise the village in the hopes that the government forces will respond by attacking the villagers themselves as part of the guerrilla apparatus, causing an incident and a reaction.

In addition to that, there are many instances of individuals being caught up in the terror tactics in which the unified left now engages. Kidnappings, of course, bombings. Terror is always directed against individuals, Mr. Chairman. It can affect governments, but it is always against people.

Senator HELMS. Terrorism comes in all sorts of packages. I was driving to work early this morning and heard a radio report on one of the stations talking about the Poland situation. While obviously reading copy without having looked at it before, he ran across a sentence which reported that Polish workers faced execution if they went on strike. And the reporter paused and said, "Hmmm." Maybe he was learning for the first time.

So, Mr. Ambassador, are you saying that Cuba is without question attempting to destabilize democracies in the Central American region?

Mr. ENDERS. Yes, sir. I think that many of our perceptions about Cuba stem from the period of the 1970's when it was not actively engaged in this policy and we did not catch up with the change that occurred in 1978 until relatively recently.

Now we have a long ways to go to make our perceptions of what Cuba is doing match the reality.

SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD CUBA

Senator HELMS. What can you tell me about the Soviet Union's attitude toward Cuba?

Mr. ENDERS. The Soviet Union's attitude has changed also. Prior to 1978, Cuba and the Soviet Union clearly had differences over the policy of exporting revolution. As far as we can tell, the Soviet Union was counseling the Communist parties in Central America to be patient. But since that time, as far as we can tell, the Soviet Union

has supported Cuba's policy of promoting revolution and has encouraged the process of uniting the left, discretely but through its own contacts. This is an important change in Soviet policy. The Soviet Union, of course, is fully behind Cuba in the sense of providing it with massive economic and military aid.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Ambassador, the next question that I have would require more than the time remaining, so I will wait until the next round.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ARGENTINA

And if you will forgive me, I do want to get off the specific area we are in and onto the question of Argentina for a moment, because we do have this conference this afternoon with the House on the foreign aid bill.

You know, there are two different versions of the bill with regard to Argentina. Does this change in your view mean a step backward in the movement that Argentina has been making lately in the direction of improvement of the regime and improvement of human rights?

Mr. ENDERS. I have no reason to believe that, Senator Pell. Of course, General Gaultieri will not formally take over the responsibility for the Government until the end of the year. Since we do not know very much about what policies he will adopt, I will not attempt to assess how his assumption of the Presidency will affect Argentina policies.

However, the moves that we have seen in Argentina toward improvement in the human rights situation represent the policy of the junta, which has governed and governs now Argentina, rather than the policies of an individual person. The disappearances, the worst violation of human rights in Argentina, ceased a half year before General Viola became the President. The process of freeing the so-called "PEN" prisoners, the state-of-seige prisoners, people who are imprisoned without charge, began some three years ago, and the number has been reduced from some 6,000 down to what we think is about 800 at the present time.

This process has continued under General Viola, I think, in a very effective manner, but I would not say it is a personal policy only.

In a word, I believe that the Argentine junta under its new leadership will continue to pursue policies in this field—I have no reason to believe it will not—similar to the ones that it has pursued.

Senator PELL. I realize that although I should point out that what General Videla said to me in the committee, the meeting we had, the so-called coffee we had with him here in Washington recently, appeared different from what he said when he went back to Buenos Aires, which led me to believe that his views may have been a little more democratic than those of the junta.

RADIO SWAN/VOICE OF AMERICA

I appreciate the newness of this change, and we will do our best this afternoon. In connection with the radio program you mentioned, there was another program some years ago, you may recall it, called

Radio Swan, which had very much the same idea. It was supposed to be a destabilizing or whatever you want to call it——

Mr. ENDERS. I would not call it that, sir.

Senator PELL. Radio Swan?

Mr. ENDERS. I would not call it destabilizing.

Senator PELL. Radio Swan certainly was. This program you would not call destabilizing. But what would be the difference between this new program from a policy viewpoint and the normal Voice of America or the normal news they would be getting from Miami?

Mr. ENDERS. The Voice of America is a worldwide service. Its Spanish language programs can be heard everywhere in Cuba. But its broadcasts are not tailored to Cuban audiences. It concentrates on international news. It also does a number of features and other reports on the United States. It periodically carries Cuban news when there is something of worldwide interest, but it is not devoted to Cuban news.

Now, what we are interested in is putting together a responsible and professional radio that is very much like Radio Free Europe that would provide a sustained flow of information of interest to Cubans, including commentary about life in Cuba itself.

We are not at all sure that the Cuban people know what is going on. Do they know that the World Bank, for example, finds that they are substantially poorer now than they were before the revolution? Do they know that while they have grown poorer, their government has devoted massive amounts of money and talent to the support of insurgency and terrorism abroad? That is what we would like to communicate.

Senator PELL. I would like to draw you out on that question, because I guess I am one of the few people in this world that can say this, I was there in 1960, I was there in 1974. And while the lot of some people was much worse—the poor devils were in jail—I had the feeling that the majority of people, what I could see as I drove through the countryside, were living a little bit better than they were in 1960. You would disagree with that?

OVERALL RESULT IS FAILURE

Mr. ENDERS. I have never been to Cuba, so I cannot match personal impressions with you, Senator. It seems to me that it is very hard to argue with the kind of objective assessment the World Bank has put together, though. Their conclusions are striking. There has been a population increase, but Cuba has been amazingly unsuccessful in developing its own production during this period, partly because so many resources have been diverted to other purposes.

The World Bank says that over the last 20 years, Cuba has experienced a per capita annual growth rate of minus 1.2 percent and a similar decline in per capita income. That has to tell over time.

I do not mean to say by that that there have not been some improvements in literacy, although this was a highly literate island already, that there have not been some improvements in the delivery of social services like health services in areas where there was none before. I do not question that.

But the overall result has been one of failure.

Senator PELL. I was startled, too, because Castro has been brought around in a Jeep with no security at all. I was wondering how many chiefs of government in the world today are able to drive around without any security. How do you account for that?

Mr. ENDERS. One of the characteristics of a totalitarian state is that the whole society is regimented. Security is everywhere. So the chief of state does not have to be surrounded constantly with large numbers of bodyguards.

Senator PELL. You are probably right, although I notice that in Eastern Europe, when those chiefs of government move around, they have a great deal of security.

Mr. ENDERS. The Russians are fond of telling you that the safest place in the world is central Moscow. Nobody would have to have a bodyguard there.

Senator PELL. In connection with the paper that is being circulated here, the report on Cuba's activities, the charges you are making in this, do they represent a significant upsurge? In other words, you said since 1978 there has been an upsurge. What happened in 1978 to contribute that, in your view?

CHANGE IN STRATEGY

Mr. ENDERS. Well, there was a change in Cuban strategy. The Cuban Government came to the conclusion that the left in Central America and in other countries as well, was ripe for exploitation, and that Cuba could in fact support insurgent movements with relative impunity. Once this decision was made, Cuba was committed to a new course on a very large scale.

I think it is significant at this point to mention that the United States began a series of meetings with Cuba in 1977, during which, the Cubans put forward their agenda. They called for the return of Guantanamo, for an end to the economic embargo, and they sought to deal with the overflight issue.

Our representatives put forth the United States agenda. We wondered why the Cubans had to be in Africa in such large numbers. We wondered why after the civil war in Angola there had to be a standing Cuban presence. And we began to raise questions about activities throughout this hemisphere, although this was a secondary matter in the discussions.

I think it is noteworthy that in the course of these discussions two things happened. One, the Cubans decided to go into Ethiopia, precisely after we had already begun discussions about whether they should not leave Angola. That was their first answer.

And their second answer was to launch their campaign in Central America. And indeed, there was a third answer, was there not? While these discussions were still going on, the Mariel boatlift was launched.

An extraordinary record, I think, of defiance by Cuba, based, in part, on the kind of confidence and strength that you referred to at the political level but not at the economic and social level.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DIPLOMATIC APPROACH TO MANAGUA

Mr. Ambassador, I would like to go back to the statement that you made in your opening remarks regarding a diplomatic approach to Managua recently, I would like for you to expand on that a bit.

Mr. ENDERS. Well, we had watched, as I think we all had, the deterioration in Nicaragua, being concerned about three things in particular: The intervention in El Salvador, the heavy militarization and the Cubanization of the country, and the trend toward suppressing pluralism. We were well aware of the fact that our efforts and those of other countries providing economic assistance to offset this trend had not worked effectively.

But we recognized also this summer, when this attempt was made, that important elements of a pluralistic society still exist in Nicaragua. These include the church which, in contrast to Cuba before the revolution, is a very strong and broadly based institution, with the archbishop who is perhaps the most popular and authoritative figure in Nicaragua; La Prensa, the famous newspaper; a private sector strongly organized and patriotic and recognized as such; and independent trade unions. In addition, we knew that the Sandinistas did not enjoy very broad popular support. Indeed, the indications available would suggest that they have been losing popular support as a result of a deteriorating economy and internal suppression of freedom.

Under the circumstances, it seemed to us that we should make a further attempt to reach the leaders of the Nicaraguan Government. So I went down there and had talks with the members of the junta and with the national directorate and told them of our three concerns.

ATTEMPT TO ADDRESS CONCERNS

They responded by saying the reason they are building up their armed forces, the reason they feel they must support their brothers in El Salvador and maybe—although they did not say it—the reason that they have to tighten up on security in Nicaragua is that they fear invasion by the United States.

At the end of our meetings, I told them that we would attempt to address their concerns if they were willing to address ours. And subsequently, we did several things. We studiously avoided speaking about Nicaragua in public for a period of 2 months, as I promised them we would.

We prepared and submitted to them several proposals. We told them that if they stopped their intervention in El Salvador, found some way to reverse the trend toward militarization and Cubanization of their country and maintained pluralism, then we, in the United States would be willing to enter into a mutual and formal commitment under the Rio Treaty barring either party from interfering in or attacking the other, it would be something designed at the political level to deal with the fear that they had expressed of an American attack or invasion.

We made some other proposals and prepared still further ones. But we got a fairly quick answer. After what appeared to have been a brief debate of 2 or 3 weeks in Managua, when in early September the country mobilized against the United States. Actual mobilization of the whole country occurred. And then at the end of the month Daniel

Ortega, the coordinator of the junta, went into the United Nations and made a violent denunciation of the United States.

Some 2 weeks after that we received a letter from an official in Managua that said that the Government of Nicaragua did not like our proposals. They thought them sterile and rejected them. They had no proposals of their own to make. However, they expressed an interest in continuing the dialog. Apparently, you can continue the dialog without actually saying anything of substance, according to this view.

And immediately after that Nicaragua Security Forces went out and picked up four private sector leaders and put them in jail on charges that they had signed a manifesto. So clearly, the hardliners were still in the ascendancy.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Are they still in Jail?

Mr. ENDERS. They are still in jail. Three of them are still in jail. We have some hope that they will not be in jail for the full 210 day period of their sentence.

INTIMIDATION TACTICS

Let me say that characteristically, as we have proceeded along this track, the Sandinista government has continued to harass opposition groups. It has not actually closed down La Prensa altogether. It closes the paper down for 3 or 4 days, and it is using a variety of other harassment tactics, such as trying to discourage advertisers and so forth. La Prensa continues to be subjected to substantial pressure.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Do you still have some hope that uniting and lending support in some appropriate manner to the democratic forces and voices still at work in Nicaragua would have some positive result? Do you see Venezuela or Mexico playing a role in this effort?

Mr. ENDERS. Well, both Venezuela and Mexico are among those countries that have provided substantial assistance to Nicaragua since the revolution, and we very much hope that they will use their influence in the way you indicate. I think that the members of the Nicaraguan opposition would be the first to tell you that they want to do it on their own. They are not acting on behalf of foreign powers, and so it would be inappropriate and wrong, I think, for the United States and others to suggest that we should directly help them.

But in answer to your first question, I do not think all hope is lost. We will go on trying. There may be other openings for attempts at negotiation, and we will seize them if there are. But it does not look good.

DIRECT HELP WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE

Senator KASSEBAUM. I am puzzled by your saying that directly helping them would be inappropriate. Do you mean the democratic forces in Nicaragua? I was not suggesting any sort of improper interference in internal Nicaraguan affairs.

Mr. ENDERS. That is right. In other words, the last thing that the people in COSEP or others need is for them to appear as the representatives of a foreign power. And I am sure they do not want to do that.

Senator KASSEBAUM. We have made a determination in El Salvador, and it seems to me that it is important for us to have a policy that is

consistent with assistance to the centrist forces in all of Central America.

Mr. ENDERS. Our support is primarily political at this point. Should we ever be in a position to provide additional assistance or to recommend that to the Congress, that could only be the case if the intervention in El Salvador—

Senator KASSEBAUM. I am not saying we should provide military assistance in Nicaragua; I mean political support for Centrist parties.

Mr. ENDERS. Even economic assistance, should we ever be required to do that, then I think there would be a consensus up here—certainly, it would be the view of the administration—that that assistance should go to the private sector. I quite agree. Otherwise, I think it is essentially political, as you suggest.

Senator KASSEBAUM. You made the comment that the Soviets have been uniting the leftist forces in these countries or been behind encouraging Cuba in these efforts. And I think we have a role to play, it seems to me, as obviously we are, in uniting those forces for moderation and lending support to them in some sort of consistent policy for the entire area.

Mr. ENDERS. I agree with that.

TIGHTEN EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA

Senator KASSEBAUM. I am about to run out of time. If I can work one quick question in on your mentioning tightening of the embargo against Cuba. Have there been plans drawn on tightening this embargo in proposals that you can enunciate at this time?

Mr. ENDERS. As you know, it is an old embargo. It has been in place for 20 years. And it has not been vigorously enforced. Our first effort is at enforcement: that is to say, better intelligence on violations of it, use of third countries to violate it, and effective monitoring of our exports and imports in this regard, all of which is quite a big order.

But second, I would have to say that we are looking at various ways in which the embargo could be extended from its present effect. I am not ready to put those on the table, but we are working actively on it.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Senator.

I would advise all Senators on the committee that at noon there will be a code-level meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee in S-116 on the Poland situation.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your being here.

Before any specific and direct questions, Mr. Chairman, I want to note the fact that on November 7 I had asked for hearings from the chairman of the full committee, Senator Percy, in which he concurred, to have the Secretary of State or someone come up and brief the committee on the situation in Central America. I am delighted we have the opportunity today, and I appreciate that.

TOO BUSY TO BRIEF COMMITTEE

But I would be remiss if I did not say, Tom, to you this mornine how disappointed I have been that over the past 6 weeks we havg been told time and time again that the Secretary has been too busy or others have been too busy to come and brief this committee on what has been by a mild estimation a flurry of activity in the media with regard to our options and possible moves we may make in the area. And frankly, I find the excuse that you have not had time to be somewhat weak.

In the meantime, the Secretary appears on the David Brinkley Show, finds time to talk to Mr. Reston and Hugh Sidey, manages to speak to the Foreign Minister of Mexico and Mr. D'Escoto of Nicaragua and a number of others, but he just cannot find the time to come up here and talk to the Foreign Relations Committee, despite the commitment he made back in March when he then announced that he was prepared to go to the source in dealing with the problems of Central America and told this committee that it was not only a matter of courtesy but a matter of law that before options be given serious consideration, that this committee be fully briefed on those matters.

The fact that we have had to wait almost 6 weeks, Mr. Chairman, to get this meeting is something that I find very disappointing.

So I hope that this will not be repeated in the future. It is a little difficult to formulate policy in a bipartisan fashion, which the Secretary promised this committee during his confirmation hearings, when I have to rely upon reporters from the national media to find my facts and get my information and not get it from people within our own State Department.

As I said earlier, I hope this will not go on. I think it is disappointing. I think it is bad policy in terms of trying to work together when we are dealing with a highly volatile situation in our own hemisphere, the most dangerous situation we have had faced in 20 years, and we have to wait 6 weeks to get some answers.

POLICY STATEMENT

Tom, let me address your statement this morning. Am I to understand now that this is the definitive policy of this administration with regard to, at least as of the moment, Central America and the Caribbean Basin?

Mr. ENDERS. No; I did not attempt to make a definitive policy statement here, but rather to summarize where we are at the moment. You will find a definitive policy statement made by Secretary Haig at St. Lucia at the Organization of American States meeting.

Senator DODD. That is where I can find out our policy is what he told our friends at St. Lucia? Well, I read this, and you just pointed out that we have had an embargo on Cuba for 20 years. So after all this talk of going to the source, of possible military action, naval blockades, embargoes, all sorts of other things, what we basically come down to is a radio station. That is what I see here.

I read this, and I see the four answers to the problems we have. And there are some wonderful points here; I do not disagree with any of them: economic assistance, a Caribbean Basin policy, pursue democratic values, pursue justice, and then a radio station.

Mr. ENDERS. Do you want to have a naval blockade, Senator?

Senator DODD. No. I read the reports in the newspapers now, and again I have to rely upon them. I apologize for that. But Leslie Gelb reports on November 5 that the Secretary had asked the Pentagon to examine possible military action in El Salvador and against Cuba and Nicaragua and they listed a bunch of options, including invasion by American and possibly Latin American forces punitive strikes against Cuba and Nicaragua.

In other words, I can just disregard all of those stories, but basically what it comes down to is a radio station?

Mr. ENDERS. Well, I would make three comments on that.

One is that as you know, governments often develop options as they consider what is going on, and this government does too.

Two, the game is not over. There are a lot of new challenges to be faced. As you yourself said, we face an unprecedentedly dangerous situation, and I would not take the statements which have been made by the Secretary at St. Lucia as the last word that this administration will say on Central America and the Caribbean. I am sure he did not intend it as that. As of the moment, that is our policy.

And third you do not necessarily have to believe everything you read even in the New York Times.

Senator DODD. I was not suggesting that. I just said I did have few other options: that that was my only source of information.

FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS

Let me ask you specifically, let's try to draw some of these out. I asked in March whether or not we had any specific military plans at all against Cuba, or direct military intervention in El Salvador and Nicaragua today. I am not talking about some vague notion in the back of our mind now: I am talking about whether or not we have drawn up any specific plans for that purpose.

Is that a viable foreign policy option that has been placed on paper, has been discussed and is being narrowed down to specific steps that would be taken?

Mr. ENDERS. You noted, I am sure, Senator, that President Reagan said some 2 weeks ago that we have no plans to send American troops to Central America or, for that matter, anywhere else in the world. And that I think is the answer to that part of your question.

As regards any other contingency plans, I would prefer not, if I might, to address it here.

Senator DODD. Now, wait a second now. That is the President. We have the Secretary, and I am going to—let's just forget this caveat beforehand. All of my information I am giving to you, Tom, is what I have had to pick up from the newspapers, particularly in the last 5 or 6 weeks.

Mr. ENDERS. Senator, you have me a little embarrassed by what you said in your opening remarks. I cannot speak for the Secretary of State on this. He does have a very busy schedule, that is quite true. But I was available during this entire period. As I say, it is embarrassing for me that you do not find me an adequate interim response, but I was available.

Senator DODD. Well, Tom, I find you adequate.

Mr. ENDERS. Thank you. [Laughter.]

Senator DODD. When I had the option of getting the architect, with all due respect.

Mr. ENDERS. OK.

MILITARY OPTIONS BEING CONSIDERED

Senator DODD. Let me ask you, on November 6, the Secretary, in a story talking about ways to cut off the arms supply to El Salvador, and in that report he directly confirms the substance of a report which disclosed that he had asked the Defense Department to examine measures for action against Cuba. Now, this is November 6.

Is that story totally inaccurate, or, in fact, have we asked the Pentagon to examine some possible military actions, direct military actions, against Cuba?

Mr. ENDERS. Well, contingency planning has been going on actively since the start of this administration, including on this subject, Senator. No question about it.

Senator DODD. So military options are being considered, then?

Mr. ENDERS. I will not exclude any options from that in terms of the planning.

Senator DODD. Why don't we say they are being considered; military plans are being considered.

Mr. ENDERS. No, I made a different statement. I said that contingency planning had been undertaken, is being undertaken on an active basis on a number of options, and not confined to the ones which have been adopted. Whether they are being considered in the sense that they are about to become policy. I'd rather not say.

Senator DODD. Can we just maybe run down some of the options that apparently—

Mr. ENDERS. Do you favor these options, Senator?

Senator DODD. I am just trying to find out what our policy is. I do not want to be confronted up here some morning by a headline in the newspaper that has the United States committed to a military line of action. We were caught flatfooted. That is the danger we run into in this committee, which is supposed to have the responsibility of dealing with the executive branch and at least helping formulate foreign policy initiatives, and I find it awkward, indeed, to be in a situation where there is such a gap the likes of which exist between the executive branch and the legislative branch in this matter.

The Secretary said it accurately. It is not a question of courtesy; it is a matter of law. And in fact, if military plans are being considered, then you are flirting with violation of the law, in fact, if you pursue a military plan and Congress is not informed of that matter. And so I suggest that it is just not a matter of niceties but something that the law requires in this regard.

LIST OF OPTIONS

Let me go down some of these options because I—you just tell me yes or no, or they are under consideration.

Now we are talking about the military assistance now, what direct—

Senator HELMS. Without objection, we will let you have 2 extra minutes so you can go down your list.

Senator DODD. Let me just run down the list. Direct U.S. military involvement in El Salvador. I am talking U.S. forces in a combat situation? The President has rejected that entirely, is that correct?

Mr. ENDERS. That would suggest in your formulation that it has been proposed to him. The President has made the statement that I quoted to you earlier.

Senator DODD. That option is not——

Mr. ENDERS. Is not on as of the moment.

Senator DODD. Increasing U.S. economic and military assistance that is one we are considering, I gather.

Mr. ENDERS. Yes, sir.

Senator DODD. Invasion by American and possibly Latin American forces in El Salvador or in Cuba. Is that out?

Mr. ENDERS. Well, I think that if you attempt to go down a list of hypothetical policy options, Senator, you will find they are hypothetical, nothing more.

Senator DODD. It is not my list, though; it is the list that is being considered at the Pentagon.

Mr. ENDERS. The list from Lesley Gelb, I gather.

Senator DODD. I am told it was a list from the State Department. It was reported in ——

Mr. ENDERS. I think that you get me onto some pretty hypothetical ground when you go beyond your first two points.

Senator DODD. Is the list not accurate? In other words, there was no such list prepared?

Mr. ENDERS. I do not really think that I need go into this at this stage——

Senator DODD. Is this a State Department list, Tom, or is this Lesley Gelb's?

Mr. ENDERS. This is a report in the New York Times that I really do not want to address because once you get to the point of saying there was this or that or there was not this or that or the other thing, you get into the question of what has and has not been discussed on a contingency basis. And I would prefer not to address that, sir.

Senator DODD. My time really has expired. I will come back in a minute.

Senator HELMS. Let me say in defense of the Ambassador, he has not pleaded that he was too busy at any time to come before this committee, and when he was invited he came. He was 2 or 3 minutes late this morning, but that is the only delay I know anything about. Senator Hayakawa?

ACCESS OF SEA LANES

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. May I ask a question about the sea lanes entering the Caribbean for access to this country? To what extent do our natural resources, including strategic minerals and petroleum, depend on these sea lanes?

Mr. ENDERS. I cannot give you a figure for our imports of raw materials, other than petroleum. For petroleum I believe it is 46 per cent.

Senator HAYAKAWA. How much?

Mr. ENDERS. Forty-six percent of our petroleum imports traverse the Caribbean.

Senator HAYAKAWA. That is quite a lot, isn't it? And what would be the effect on the American economy if we would have to defend the Caribbean sea lanes against hostile acts in the future?

Mr. ENDERS. Clearly, it could be quite substantial. The rerouting of petroleum or the loss of access to any sources of it, of course, particularly the loss of free access through the canal, should that extreme contingency occur, would have a major economic impact on the United States given the dependence we have on, for example, the canal for imports and exports to and from the Far East.

We have not made any attempt to quantify those figures, Senator. It would be very substantial.

Senator HAYAKAWA. The ships that come through the Panama Canal up through the Caribbean: Is that part of what you referred to in the 46 percent?

Mr. ENDERS. The 46 percent is the amount of petroleum which comes from the area to us plus that which comes from the Middle East that transits through the Caribbean.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF CARIBBEAN BASIN AND CENTRAL AMERICA

Senator HAYAKAWA. Yes. So the Caribbean basin and Central America are strategically important to the United States.

Mr. ENDERS. Yes, sir.

Senator HAYAKAWA. And therefore, do we have strategic defense plans, naval plans, for all that area?

Mr. ENDERS. Yes, sir, that is quite right.

Senator HAYAKAWA. And how do relations between Guatemala and the United States stand now?

Mr. ENDERS. We have made a sustained effort to build a new relationship with Guatemala in the past 10 months, but there is a lot of work to be done still. Guatemala is a country that is now in its 25th or 26th year of insurgency, and there have been three major waves; one is underway at the moment, and it is very serious. Guatemala is the largest country, and the one with petroleum reserves, in Central America. It is, I think, ultimately the chief target for Cuba and the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, it is also a country that has had a very substantial human rights problem, and we have made an effort to address both concerns in our dialog with the Guatemalan Government.

I would like to be able to say that more has been achieved, Senator, than has been achieved in the dialog, but we are not abandoning it because I think that both of these problems, the security issue in Guatemala and the human rights issue, are of overriding concern to us as well as to the Guatemalans.

HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

Senator HAYAKAWA. These human rights issues you speak of in Guatemala, do they have purely an internal impact or do they affect Guatemala's relationships internationally?

Mr. ENDERS. They affect Guatemala's relationships internationally. But I think it has been the view adopted by the American administration and by the American Congress for a number of years that human rights issues, in effect, are a concern of the international community. They are certainly of local concern as well.

Senator HAYAKAWA. What do these human rights violations consist of? Unjust imprisonment?

Mr. ENDERS. Well, in the course of the struggle against insurgency, there is no doubt that unjust imprisonment, physical violence or death have been the result of the action if not of government units, at least some acting in the name of or with the toleration of, the government, as well as by those acting from the left. And so there are important problems that we feel must be addressed.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Is Honduras in this respect much worse than other nations of the area?

Mr. ENDERS. It has suffered much less from this problem than Guatemala has, but the reason for that I think is that the challenge from the left in Honduras is new. The chairman pointed out how it was just beginning. We have information about Cuban efforts to unify the left and commit it to the arms struggle, which I mentioned. Then we will find probably that the tactics developed by the left in Honduras will result in human rights violations and in provocations designed to cause the government to engage in human rights violations.

GUATEMALA CLAIMS SOVEREIGNTY OVER BELISE

Senator HAYAKAWA. Does Guatemala not recognize Belise?

Mr. ENDERS. It claims sovereignty over Belise.

Senator HAYAKAWA. What is the historical reason for that, sir?

Mr. ENDERS. Well, it is a long-time dispute between Britain and Guatemala which goes back, in fact, two centuries. It is a very old claim. It is written into the Guatemalan Constitution. This issue is potentially a very sensitive one in Central America.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Belise is formerly British Honduras?

Mr. ENDERS. That is correct, sir. As you know, the British and the Guatemalans made a very substantial effort earlier this year to negotiate the issue, and a tentative agreement, the so-called heads of agreement, was reached. It was impossible, however, for a variety of reasons, to carry this through, but the solution of this problem remains an important objective of ours, as well as of the countries of the area. It could be very damaging if this dispute were allowed to continue.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Senator Hayakawa, will you yield just a moment? You asked about the human rights in Guatemala and what effect it had either internally or internationally.

I would just like to mention that a Catholic priest, Father Stan Rother, was murdered there, I believe about 6 months ago.

Mr. ENDERS. Less than that. That is quite right.

Senator KASSEBAUM. He has close family living in my hometown, and so it has been something that immediately is borne home when you do know of someone who has had that tragedy befall them. Thank you.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you.

ELECTIONS IN GUATEMALA

There are forthcoming elections in Guatemala?

Mr. ENDERS. There are.

Senator HAYAKAWA. How soon?

Mr. ENDERS. The elections are in March.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Who are the contending parties?

Mr. ENDERS. Well, there are a number of contending parties; the Nationalist party, there is a Government party, we expect that there will be a coalition of opposition groups as well.

Senator HAYAKAWA. And the opposition groups are?

Mr. ENDERS. Well, the Christian Democrats are one important element of it, but there are a number of smaller groupings, too. Exactly what the final groupings will be is not clear to us.

There are four major candidates for the Presidency at the moment.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Are any of them revolutionary parties?

Mr. ENDERS. No, sir.

Senator HAYAKAWA. They are not. So the election is likely to be conducted in relatively peaceful fashion?

Mr. ENDERS. I have no reason to believe it will not be a peaceful election.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I see. But will the election solve anything?

Mr. ENDERS. Well, it depends on what you mean by that statement. In this country, we are for democratic processes as an end in themselves. I wonder if you directed that question to the Americans as to whether a given election had solved anything, whether you would find that the answer is always yes. But we remain in favor of them as a means of distributing power, do we not? And a means of providing for popular participation in the government of our country. We should use every opportunity to strengthen that process in Central America.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Are you saying then that you are optimistic about the outcome of the election?

Mr. ENDERS. I think the elections will be held, and I hope very much that they will be held in conditions of order and openness.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

MANY IMPORTANT MEETINGS

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Senator. Because of the meeting at 12 o'clock, we will go on a 5-minute round now. Mr. Ambassador, during the past 2 weeks there have been a number of meetings important to the Latin American community and our interests there. The OAS at St. Lucia, Panama, SELA at Panama, the Christian Democratic parties from throughout the West, including Europe and Venezuela and so on.

How do you describe the role that the United States has played in and at these meetings?

Mr. ENDERS. Well, the most important of the meetings, of course, has been the Organization of American States meeting. There, it was very interesting to see that the proposal to support elections in El Salvador as a means to a political solution was presented by three nations in Central America committed to democracy: Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras. It was not presented by the United States.

We supported it, of course, but it was a 22-country majority developed out of Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole with our support, but not led by us or pushed by us.

I think that we are finding now that many countries are beginning to see the same dangers that we see in the Caribbean and Central America and are beginning to draw close together with us and other countries in an effort to stand up to them.

Senator HELMS. Well, looking at it from the point of view of the United States, what was done to further our interest in stabilizing and restoring freedom?

Mr. ENDERS. Well, I think this vote itself is significant. I would contrast that vote with the last time we had a major action by the OAS. You may recall that, Mr. Chairman.

The United States went 2 years ago to the OAS with some proposals on the transition from the Somoza government to its successor, and the vote was 25 to 1, 25 countries against the United States. This time, it was 22 to 3, and the majority was the other way around.

HONDURAS PATH TOWARD DEMOCRACY

Senator HELMS. Let me move over to Honduras for a moment. Looking in retrospect at the elections, what do you feel the hopes are for Honduras to continue the path toward democracy?

Mr. ENDERS. I think they are quite hopeful after this election. There were many people that were concerned that the election might not be held in open circumstances without fraud. I think most of the observers that have been down there believe it was essentially an honest election, one that openly reflects the people's view. The participation was very very large, almost 80 percent.

The dangers in Central America are so great that the pressures on any government, particularly any elected government, can be enormous, but we and other members of the international community should be behind this kind of development, I am sure you would agree, and with our support it probably will do well.

Senator HELMS. Well, Honduras is surrounded by three countries, two of which contain significant numbers of guerrillas hostile to the governments of those countries, as well as that of Honduras. The third country, Nicaragua, has had an increasingly hostile stance toward the Government of Honduras.

HONDURAS CAPABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF

I do not want to get into any classified information, but can you state publicly, for example, whether Honduras possesses radar capability, either ship-based or airborne, that could detect a shipment of weaponry or other contraband?

Mr. ENDERS. I would prefer not, if I may, Mr. Chairman, to get into details of this kind other than to say that Honduras faces a particular problem because as a neighbor of a country that has intervened by supplying war material in the affairs of other countries, it is a potential transit route of some importance to El Salvador and to Guatemala. And that efforts at interdicting these shipments, of course, are very high priority in order to make sure that the threat presented by Nicaragua to its neighbors is effectively contained.

Exactly how that is done, though, I would prefer not to address at this point.

Senator HELMS. Let me ask this question in another way. You may not wish to answer it this way either: Does Honduras possess the capability to defend itself?

Mr. ENDERS. Honduras has some limited armed forces. It has an air force with a number of planes that could be effective as inter-

ceptors. It has some infantry capability; however, its army is far less big than that which is being developed in Nicaragua, and it is far less well equipped than that which is emerging in Nicaragua.

Nicaragua has now heavy tanks, and may be getting more. It is going to have MIG aircraft and is preparing the facilities for them. It possesses a military establishment that is at least twice as big as that of Honduras, so that there is a growing disparity between the two. This is a source of very considerable concern, particularly in light of the information you cited, and which is also known to us concerning the beginnings of an insurgency in Honduras.

Senator HELMS. Senator Pell?

WEAPONS REQUEST FROM VENEZUELA

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Venezuela I think would be a country in the Caribbean Basin, would it not?

Mr. ENDERS. Yes, sir.

Senator PELL. I have read the proposal. We received the proposal for the F-16's to be sent there. To my mind, this is a dreadful mistake. It is a new level of sophisticated weapon. If we keep the level of sophistication low in an area, a geographic region, we are well advised to do so.

What is the rationale for adding this highly sophisticated weapons system into a Latin American region when nothing like it exists there now?

Mr. ENDERS. We are responding to a request by Venezuela. We did not try to promote the sale of the F-16, Senator.

It seemed to us that when a responsible democracy like Venezuela, one of our closest friends, one of the most stable countries in the hemisphere, comes to us and says, after reflection, that they wish to buy a new weapons system, that we should give that request some very serious consideration. And we have. I am sure you would agree with that.

In doing so, we looked at a couple of things. We looked at the experience we had in the course of several administrations in the sixties and early seventies, when we tried to tell the Latin American countries what kind of arms they should have. You will recall that in the late sixties we made a sustained effort to prevent the introduction of supersonic aircraft into Latin America, and we failed totally under a couple of administrations to do so.

Instead, they simply bought them from the British, Italians, the French, and the Soviets.

In this case, we have no doubt that Venezuela will acquire a weapons system of this type. The question is whether we are prepared to sell it or not. And in reaching that conclusion, we weighed the following things.

We noted that Venezuela is able to take on this burden economically. We noted that the first introduction of weapons of this kind was made by Cuba in the last 2 years, that MIG-23's, a squadron of MIG-23's, is already present in Cuba. Who knows how many squadrons of MIG-23's there will be 4 years from now when the main delivery of these proposed weapons for Venezuela is to take place? The fact that an airport is being readied in Port Salines in Grenada that could accommodate the MIG-23 gives it a much longer range than it would otherwise have. Migs flying out of Grenada could cover all of Venezuela.

The fact that we have seen this increasingly aggressive policy of Cuba in the area you have noted as we have, the very big arms buildup that has occurred in Cuba this year——

Senator PELL. But is there any thought in your mind that Cuba is going to invade Venezuela?

Mr. ENDERS. No; but do you wish to have a situation in which Cuba is the predominant military power of the area, and indeed, the only one? And one in which we would attempt to tell our friends no, you cannot modernize your air force? Frankly, I think that if we were to attempt to do that to the Venezuelans, they would choose another weapon and we would find ourselves simply taken out of the game.

I do not see how you can sustain long-term relationships on that basis. Could I make one more comment, sir? Excuse me.

I just want to assure you, sir, that we have thought very long and hard about the impact of this proposal on Venezuela's neighbors, and there are two outstanding border disputes in those areas, Guyana and Colombia.

But our judgment is that in fact, these border disputes will not lead to violence and that our provision of the F-16 will not, in fact, change that.

Senator PELL. I guess we have to agree to disagree. You talk about the only military power to match Cuba in the area. Cuba is 90 miles from the United States, and I think we can match Cuba in the area, too.

In any case, I think it is a poor idea, and as one Senator I would be inclined to vote against that proposal as, in my view, being irresponsible and adding to the possibility for violence in that part of the world.

SAN SALVADOR CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE

At any rate on another subject, on San Salvador, as you know, the bishop there, Bishop Rivera y Damas, accused government forces last week of waging a campaign of violence against the citizens in the nation's cities and referred to a massive level of repression in rural areas.

I am particularly conscious of this because every Thursday and Friday—Thursday I think it is—I get picketed in Rhode Island, especially on El Salvador. The feeling in my State is very intense, partly because of what Senator Kassebaum mentioned, that the nuns have a direct relationship between their sisters in Rhode Island. And I was wondering if you could talk for a moment on what, if anything, can be done to try to lower the killing, which is still going on. And I think we all agree the massive killing, the larger part of it, is done by the right wing guerrillas, not the left wing guerrillas, gangsters, whatever we call them. What can be done to lower that level of violence and death?

Mr. ENDERS. I do not know which portion of it is done by whom.

There is no doubt, as I mentioned earlier, that violence reached a very high level last year. Statistics submitted by our Embassy show that violence continues on a substantial level now although much, much below previous levels. And I insist on these figures, while they may not be complete, are reliable indicators of trends in the level of violence. And they reflect a trend toward a very substantial improvement.

I do not mean to suggest that any level of killing is something that either of us should accept. I do not. What can be done? Well, as we analyze the problem to the degree that there are violations on the government's side, they come primarily not from the army, whose discipline seemed to us to be well maintained; they come from vigilante groups, off-duty national guardsmen, members of some of the other military services, either on or off-duty, and it is a question of exercising command through the army and the government over the entire range of security forces either on or off duty.

The leaders of the army have made a major effort in the course of the last year to extend and consolidate their control over the various military services, and are getting the message across to those outlying areas.

Now, I think a word of background on this is important. As is the case of some other Central American countries, El Salvador has a tradition of lawlessness, a relatively high level of violence, so they have to overcome a tremendous historical drawback. It is also a country that by design had several military services that sort of checked and balanced each other.

But the central command of the military is, in fact, spending a lot of time trying to get the message across, and I think we are seeing in statistics the first results of that. We have a long ways to go.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Senator HELMS. Senator Kassebaum?

ADVOCATE DOMINO THEORY?

Senator KASSEBAUM. You mentioned, Mr. Ambassador, that if after Nicaragua, El Salvador is captured by a violent minority, what state in Central America will be able to resist. Do you advocate a domino theory for Central America?

Mr. ENDERS. No, no, no, I do not advocate a theory of that kind. I think we have seen that it is a different kind of a process. You may recall that during the struggle for Nicaragua, that a number of other countries were used as a base of operations.

Costa Rica, for example. There is a Cuban consulate in Costa Rica, and it became the center for substantial arms traffic to Nicaragua. This research paper we put out will give you some details on it. And indeed, I think there is some real question as to whether Nicaragua would have changed governments without this support through Costa Rica.

At the same time, Panama was also providing support for the Cubans. It was used in the same way. Well, you know, we have seen and very amply documented what Nicaragua is doing to its neighbors. I mentioned earlier that it is not just providing logistics support, but also hosts the command center, the radio station, training grounds, and so forth, for the El Salvador insurgency. If the insurrection in El Salvador succeeds, you then have two countries with radical governments and the pressure increases on the others. That is the point.

Costa Rica has no army. Honduras has an army, but it is much smaller than its neighbors' and it is vulnerable. For 25 years Guatemala has had to cope with insurgency, you know. El Salvador is one of the toughest nuts to crack by the tactics that we have been discussing. If the left is successful there, some of the others may be—at

least a couple of the others may be less tough and all of them will be threatened.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Yet the potential for change is there even in Nicaragua as you yourself have said and the door is not closed yet on the hope that the moderate forces there can prevail.

Mr. ENDERS. The game is not over.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I have great respect for Senator Dodd's understanding of affairs in Central America, but I would like to say that I think sometimes it is not terribly productive to always try and project the worst possible scenario, while I appreciate his not wanting to see us caught off base. I am concerned that we are not appreciative of a balance, evidently, that, I believe, is there in the administration's policy.

I am troubled by wandering too far afield in implied remarks, and yet, that is the danger that it seems the administration has placed itself in by the hint of a possible blockade while, at the same time, diplomatic negotiations are going on.

Now, that has the importance in and of itself, but as has been said earlier, I am not sure the public understands or that we do ourselves what is really going on. I do not know how we can formulate this policy and have a clear understanding of it, while on the one hand, we indulge in the fear of what might be and on the other, just make shrill rhetoric that obscures some positive efforts that I do believe lie in our policy.

PRESIDENT PREPARING TO SUBMIT PROPOSALS TO CONGRESS

You mentioned that the President is preparing to submit to Congress early next year a far-reaching package of proposals. Will those be economic proposals?

Mr. ENDERS. I believe they will include economic proposals, but we expect that the President's submission will address the whole range of our concerns including some of the security ones. Perhaps, Senator, I could comment on your remarks.

One of the things that we have been trying to communicate to Cuba and to other countries of the area is that an all-out campaign of the kind they have engaged in, if escalated and carried through, may well greatly increase the risks in the area. While I cannot say that this message has been effectively heard and assimilated, it has certainly been listened to. And I think it would be fair to say that we have the attention of the Cuban Government on these issues.

Senator KASSEBAUM. My time has expired.

Senator HELMS. Senator Dodd?

CUBAN PORTRAYAL AS MEMBER OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, your statement this morning is sort of a lynchpin, I suppose, in the proposal. Strategy has to do with the change in Cuban policy from the death of Che Guevara in Bolivia in 1967 up to, for a period of 10 years, up to 1978 according to your paper here, and then it has only been since 1978 forward really that we have seen this change. In fact, Cuba had made—quoting you here:

Cuba has made a sustained effort to portray itself as a member of the international community, not unlike others carrying on state-to-state relations through embassies, carrying on trade and cultural contacts.

I think if someone had made that kind of a statement about Cuba during the time of Mr. Allende's presence in Chile, support for the M-19 in Colombia, and the Poor People's Army in Guatemala, to mention just three, all the support for the Sandinistas prior to 1978—I think you might have run into some stiff arguments up here to suggest the absence of Cuban involvement in any of those four that I have just mentioned.

Maybe you would like to clarify what you mean by this because I think you are apt to get some arguments with some in regard to Cuban activities between 1967 and 1978.

Mr. ENDERS. Well, there is a very important difference. It is that the commitment to providing arms, military support by Cuba to these countries was not made. I do not mean to say that there was not political support, but there was not a lot of communication. The use of intelligence services——

Senator DODD. No arms were shipped?

Mr. ENDERS. But during this period, when Cuba was approached by leftist groups asking for support for their armed struggle, basically, as far as we can tell, Cuba did not commit itself to supply arms to them—at least on any significant scale. I do not mean to say that no arms were provided. What I am trying to say is that Cuba did not commit itself fully to any of these violent insurgencies during the period, nor as far as we can tell, was it seeking them out in order to do so.

Cuba had a kind of an ad hoc strategy characterized by less than total commitment. This changed in 1978, to something like a total commitment to promotion of terror and violence.

TWO OPTIONS

Senator DODD. You mentioned the two options; the economic embargo and then the creation of a radio station devoted to Cuban news. I gather the cost of that is around \$10 million; at least, that is what we have been told, anyway.

Mr. ENDERS. Approximately during the first year anyway.

Senator DODD. One of your earlier points was in reference to building closer communications and ties with our allies in the hemisphere. Are they going to share the cost of the radio or is it a unilateral——

Mr. ENDERS. It is a unilateral proposal.

Senator DODD. Mr. McPherson, your Director of AID, was in El Salvador recently. There was a report in the newspapers and I am quoting here from the article, "He told reporters he would fight for more assistance to El Salvador's private sector rather than the government's agrarian reform program." Is that a misstatement?

Mr. ENDERS. We are not assisting, in fact we are not permitted by law, to assist the agrarian reform movement in the sense of providing compensation to the owners. Nor are we, in essence, financing the ministries that are involved in this.

On the other hand, we do believe substantial funds are needed to support the private sector, and we expect that——

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Senator DODD. My point is are we going to end up—there was some talk, I guess more serious talk, in Nicaragua of funneling economic assistance directly to the private sector and bypassing the Government. I am wondering if in El Salvador we are planning—if the administration is planning—I know there are others up here on the Hill who are planning, but is the administration planning to funnel economic assistance directly to the private sector by bypassing the Duarte government?

Mr. ENDERS. No, we are not planning to do that. We think it has to be administered in part by the Government there, but a great deal of the money takes the form of loans to the private sector. For example, agricultural and industrial loans. That is the bulk of the program. That is where we think the bulk of the program should be. But we are not attempting to exclude the Government from a role in planning how that should be done.

Senator DODD. So there is no intention to divide the public and private sectors in that regard, in terms of economic assistance?

Mr. ENDERS. Could you repeat the question, Senator Dodd?

Senator DODD. Where is the emphasis going to be?

Mr. ENDERS. There is not very much in the way of state enterprise down there. What there is in the way of state enterprise is now essentially in the banking sector and the coffee trade. We are not proposing to finance organizations in those sectors. We are proposing to finance activities in much of the rest of the economy, almost all of which is either in private hands or in cooperatives.

Senator DODD. You get the emphasis I am driving at?

Mr. ENDERS. The amount of state enterprise down there is very small and we are not involved in supporting it.

Senator DODD. So we are in effect going to be—

Mr. ENDERS. I do not think you can draw the kind of comparison that you have with Nicaragua. In Nicaragua you have a collectivist government, a government of collectivist approach, and the question was will the Government be deciding how to spend those funds, and then actually spend them, or will it be, in fact, the private sector that is doing that. And now even in the case of Nicaragua, there is no way you can go into the country and make a deal with the private sector by bypassing the Government. We never proposed to do that.

The proposal which came out of the Congress with which we agree was that the moneys, if any, devoted in the future to economic assistance in Nicaragua would be devoted to the private sector ultimately, but they would obviously have to be spent in agreement with the—as a result of some kind of agreement between our two countries.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, my time is up, and I do not know how much longer we are going to be able to go, but I would like to make a request, Jesse, if I could.

This whole question, going back to the first round, of various options and plans and so forth, and I detect a strong reluctance on the part of the Secretary I think with some justification to get into any kind of a detailed response on exactly what some of these options are. But I would like to make a request of you, Mr. Chairman,

if it is necessary, to go into a closed door session to get some clear answers on some of these things, whether it is at secret level, codeword, whatever seems appropriate.

But I do not feel I have a better understanding of exactly what the options are, and I gather that some of it has to do with just the reluctance to discuss some of these things in an open forum. And I am sensitive to that, Tom, but I think it might be helpful to the committee if we could get a better feel for exactly what we are considering in this area.

So I would make that request, Mr. Chairman. I do not know how you would feel about it, but I would feel a bit more secure if I had some sense of exactly where we are headed in this area.

Senator HELMS. Senator, we have just begun to scratch the surface, and I can assure you that after the first of the year we will go as deeply into this thing as possible. In the meantime, the record will be left open for Senators who may wish to file written questions, to which written answers will be supplied by the Ambassador.

I am advised that the briefing on the Polish situation has now begun in S-116, and for that reason, we stand adjourned.

[Additional questions and answers follow:]

STATE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Question 1. Are there any options papers circulating within the administration on actions against Cuba or Nicaragua and/or involving El Salvador? If so, what are the options?

Answer. Contingency options are constantly being prepared, updated, and assessed. Our policy toward Cuba and Central America has been under review since the beginning of the Administration. A full range of options has been considered. As actions are implemented, we will be announcing them. We do not believe it useful, however, to engage in public discussions of options generated within the Administration which have not received policy level approval. Such public discussion would neither serve our foreign policy interests, nor contribute to a healthy policymaking process.

Question 2. If there is not a formal options paper circulating, what other activity regarding options is taking place within the Executive Branch?

Answer. Clearly, our examination of options has already led to decisions that are already in the public realm, such as steps taken to strengthen the economic embargo of Cuba, the announcement of plans for Radio Free Cuba, and provision of increased assistance to the government of El Salvador. The processes that led to these decisions are still active, since the situations they addressed still exist.

It would not be appropriate to go beyond stating that studies of options continue.

Question 3. Statements on the use of military force have been very vague and contradictory. The President seems to have ruled out the use of force, but Secretary Haig seems to have not. Is direct military intervention in Cuba, Nicaragua, or El Salvador an option?

Answer. Again, it is best that there be no statement about contingency studies being done by experts within the Executive. The most important policy question was answered by President Reagan in his November 10 press conference, when he said, "We have no plans for putting Americans in combat any place in the world." We, of course, continue to monitor Cuban and Nicaraguan actions.

Question 4. Among the options reported in the press in the past weeks, which are you closer to adopting?

Answer. Options mentioned in the media include some that are not under serious consideration, but as the Secretary said November 12, 1981, he was not willing to "create circumstances to reassure those regimes who have thus far been deterred in their drive toward establishing a totalitarian regime in this hemisphere."

The United States is monitoring the security situation carefully. We are also moving to address the economic problems of the Caribbean Basin countries, as the press has recently reported. We believe this Caribbean Basin Initiative, which will be coordinated with other donors and involve joint planning with the beneficiaries, is the most important of the options considered over the past year. By addressing the conditions conducive to destabilization, we engage in prevention of crisis, rather than merely confrontation with adversaries.

Question 5. Do you believe that U.S. displeasure with the Nicaraguan regime for moving further to the left is justification for aggressive acts against that country?

Answer. It is inconceivable that the United States would take "aggressive acts" against Nicaragua to any other country simply because it was "moving further to the left."

Question 6. Since the OAS General Assembly meeting in St. Lucia last week, the Administration has been virtually silent on actions against Cuba and Nicaragua. Is this in response to the views of many Latin American leaders like Lopez Portillo of Mexico and Herrera Campins of Venezuela that the aggressive tone was dangerous to the well-being of the area?

Answer. Representatives of Latin American and Caribbean Governments attended the XI OAS General Assembly at St. Lucia expecting to hear a definitive statement of U.S. policy in the hemisphere. Secretary Haig delivered a speech which called for hemispheric cooperation in achieving three fundamental objectives including:

Promotion of democracy and pluralism;

Creation of new economic opportunities for all; and

Enhancement of the security of nations through promotion of the principle of non-intervention and collective security.

It was a balanced statement, which was well-received among political leaders in the hemisphere. Several high Latin American officials, including those of some of the major democratic nations, have told us that they agreed completely with the spirit and substance of the Secretary's speech and that it had had a profound and positive impact on Latin American attitudes toward U.S. policy. The 22-3 vote in support of the Salvadoran resolution was testimony to this.

Of course, since the adjournment of the XI CASGA on November 11, this administration has continued to speak out on Cuba and Nicaragua. My statement before the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemispheric Affairs scarcely three days after the OASGA broke up discussed U.S. policies toward both countries.

Question 7. When was the Administration planning to consult with this committee on the range of options?

Answer. The Administration is sensitive to the need for consultation. Cooperation, understanding, and support from the Congress are necessary to carry out an effective foreign policy in the Caribbean Basin. Consultations to ensure that we can move together are of a high priority for the Administration, so we hope to maintain as comprehensive a dialogue as possible within established precedents.

Revelation of option studies within the Executive, however, is inappropriate generally. Creative thinking would be inhibited if options could not be quietly examined in confidence by experts. The full range of choice could be suppressed through legislative or public articulation.

Once the President narrows his options and decides to under a particular initiative, these initiatives should, of course, be carefully examined by the legislative branch in accordance with established law and practice.

Question 8. Is the State Department asserting that there are Cuban troops in El Salvador? If not, why have not State Department officials put to rest the allegations made in the Evans and Novak column that Cuban special forces troops were involved in the operation to destroy the Rio Lempa bridge? Reporters have been given vague responses to questions by State Department officials in this matter.

Answer. The U.S. Government has never asserted that there are Cuban combat troops in El Salvador. Their confirmed presence would be a most serious development not only for the United States but for the Inter-American system as a whole. The U.S. Government monitors closely all reports of Cuban personnel in El Salvador.

Question 9. Do the charges you are making in the paper that is being circulated on Cuban subversive activities in Central America and the Caribbean represent a recent significant upsurge of activity or is it a compendium of activity over the past few years? If it does not reflect a recent upsurge in activity, why is it being circulated at this particular point in time?

Answer. During the last three years there has been a steady upswing in Cuban activities in support of armed movements in Latin America and the Caribbean. The upsurge in activity dates from 1978 when Cuba decided to back the insurrection in Nicaragua. Since then Cuba has adopted a new strategy of active intervention in Latin America. Only recently has the full scope of the new Cuban strategy become clear. The research paper grew out of studies prepared for our own analysis within the State Department and was circulated to contribute to greater public understanding of the sweep and sophistication of Cuban activities.

Question 10. What was Candidate Reagan on record as saying about the Soviet brigade in Cuba?

Answer. We do not have any record of quotes by Candidate Reagan on the Soviet combat brigade specifically. However, we note that he made clear during the campaign that he stood behind the Cuban aspects of the 1980 Republican Party platform which reads as follows: "The Republicans deplore the dangerous and incomprehensible Carter Administration policy toward Cuba. The Administration has done nothing about the Soviet combat brigade stationed there or about the transfer of new Soviet offensive weapons to Cuba in the form of modern MiG aircraft and submarines. It has done nothing about the Soviet pilots flying air defense missions in Cuba or about the extensive improvements to Soviet military bases, in particular the submarine facilities at Cienfuegos and the expanded Soviet intelligence facilities near Havana."

Question 11. Is it not true that the Nicaraguans perceive threats from the United States as well as their neighbors and former Somoza national guardsmen in exile?

Answer. The Nicaraguan government is the only entity fully qualified to explain its perceptions. The leaders of the FSLN, however, have in fact professed fear of invasions from the United States, from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, and from former guardsmen. Whether these professions are based in genuine fear or the desire of the Sandinistas to create an "external threat" for their own purposes is a debatable question.

Question 12. What was the Nicaraguan response to the reported offer of U.S. non-interference in relation to the Nicaraguan perceived need of a large military?

Answer. I visited Managua last August and Secretary Haig spoke with Nicaraguan Foreign Minister D'Escoto during the OAS meetings in St. Lucia in an effort to improve our relations and to stimulate a productive dialogue. Nicaragua has not responded in any meaningful way to any of our proposals.

Question 13. Are there Cuban troops in Nicaragua?

Answer. There are approximately 5,000 Cuban civilian and military advisors in Nicaragua of whom approximately 1,800 are military/security advisors. At this time we cannot confirm the presence of self-contained Cuban combat units in Nicaragua.

Question 14. What roles are performed by Cuban military advisors and the civilian technicians in Nicaragua?

Answer. The best of our information indicates that roughly 1,800 Cubans are serving as advisors to the Nicaraguan military and State Security establishment. It is difficult for us to say exactly what they are doing in those institutions. In civilian pursuits, Cubans are advising the FSLN on its propaganda apparatus, most of its ministries, television and radio stations, teaching in schools, assisting with construction projects, working in medical clinics, and so forth.

Question 15. What is the extent of Cuban influence among the political leadership in Nicaragua?

Answer. The extent of Cuban influence among the Nicaraguan political leadership probably varies from one individual to another. The presence of so many Cuban advisors in Nicaragua, the frequent visits in Cuba of Nicaraguan leaders, Cuban training of so many leading Sandinistas, the support Nicaragua gives to Cuba in international fora, the FSLN National Directorate's rejection of elections and its apparent intention of creating a state with many of its institutions based on the totalitarian model of Castro's Cuba (for example the politically oriented literacy campaign, the Sandinista Defense Committee v. the Revolutionary Block Committees, the use of similar slogans, mass organizations, and so forth) tend to indicate that the extent of Cuban influence on the Nicaraguan leadership in general is very great.

Question 16. What is your assessment of the Nicaraguan role in El Salvador?

Answer. The Nicaraguan supply role reached its zenith from December 1980 until February 1981. Since then, Nicaragua has provided Salvadoran guerrillas with command and control facilities, and a continued flow of materiel, most of it ammunition. Nicaragua provides sites for training of Salvadoran and other Latin American guerrillas, and facilitates travel to and from Cuba. Nicaragua has served as a spokesman and propagandist for the Salvadoran guerrillas in international fora.

Question 17. Do you believe there are Nicaraguan troops in El Salvador?

Answer. I do not believe there are Nicaraguan platoons, companies, or other organized units in El Salvador. I think it is entirely possible there are some Nicaraguan citizens fighting on the side of the revolutionary forces in El Salvador.

Question 18. What level of authority do you believe governs Nicaraguan involvement in El Salvador?

Answer. I believe Nicaragua is governed by the nine-member National Directorate of the Sandinista National Liberation Front. That group also governs and is responsible for Nicaraguan involvement in El Salvador.

Question 19. Please elaborate on the reported response of the State Department to the latest opposition proposal for unconditional talks in El Salvador as "nothing new." Why shouldn't our government be open to all in a column by Stephen Rosenfeld in the "Washington Post?"

Answer. The Government of El Salvador proposed and is implementing a plan for a peaceful solution to that country's political problems. This plan involves free elections offering the people of El Salvador a chance to choose their own government. We strongly support this plan and have urged all groups, including the extreme left, to renounce violence and enter the electoral process already underway.

It is up to the Salvadoran Government to decide under what conditions it would talk with the FMLN-FDR. So far, FMLN-FDR representatives have insisted on negotiations in which they would demand a restructuring of the Salvadoran Government and armed forces. We share the Salvadoran Government's view that this proposal is unacceptable. It would grant the guerrillas a status totally out of proportion with their popular support. The Salvadoran Government has given the left every opportunity to test its popular support by participating in the electoral process, but the FMLN-FDR so far has refused to consider this.

Question 20. How can you consider the results of the March election a valid democratic exercise if the major opposition to the government is excluded from participation?

Answer. It is a highly questionable proposition that the guerrillas and their political front group are the major opposition force in El Salvador in anything but a military sense. The Social Democratic MNR and Communist front UDN components of the FDR never secured more than a few percent of honestly-counted votes during elections held through the 1970's while the Christian Democratic opposition was securing over forty percent of the vote.

Moreover, the Salvadoran Government has made every effort to encourage all political forces, including the FDR, to participate in the elections and in the discussion of key election issues such as the election law, election procedures, and campaign security. While seven political parties are participating in the process, the already registered MNR and UDN components of the FDR have not chosen to do so. And the FDR and FMLN have refused to renounce their commitment to violence and participate.

Question 21. Is the United States involved in any way in trying to bring the opposing factors to talks on a political settlement?

Answer. The United States indicated in the July 16 speech by Assistant Secretary of State Enders its willingness to facilitate contacts and discussions or negotiations on electoral issues among eligible political parties. Then in September at the invitation of the Salvadoran Government, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Briggs travelled to El Salvador to explore ways in which the United States could be helpful in the preparation and holding of Constituent Assembly elections. Mr. Briggs met there with all parties which expressed an interest in meeting with him, including the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) component party of the FDR. Mr. Briggs also met last month with two representatives of the FDR. We urged the non-guerrilla groups in the FDR to renounce violence and join the electoral process. The FDR representatives said that although elections might improve the political climate, the Marxist guerrillas intend to continue their attacks.

The United States agrees with the government and most political parties of El Salvador that the electoral process now underway offers the best means for the people of El Salvador to choose their own government and hopes that all groups, including the extreme left, will renounce violence and join the political process, and participate in elections. We will help any party willing to renounce violence to participate. We will not help any group to bypass the democratic process through proposals for imposing themselves in power through so-called negotiations, rather than through democratic elections. Our door remains open to future discussions with the Social Democrats, Christian Socialists, and other non-guerrilla elements of the FDR to encourage their participation in elections.

Question 22. In your testimony, you referred to talks in September in Salvador, with all interested parties, including the MNR. You also indicated that you are going to meet with a representative of the FDR visiting Washington this week. Have there been other meetings or discussions with the MNR of the FDR opposition in El Salvador?

Answer. Yes. Our Embassy in El Salvador maintains a wide range of regular contacts with political parties and groups in El Salvador. These have included contacts with MNR oppositionists.

Question 23. What were the issues discussed in your September talks with the MNR?

Answer. It would not be appropriate to discuss the contents of our private conversations with MNR representatives other than to note that elections were the topic of all the discussions of the Briggs mission to El Salvador.

Question 24. To what extent do these talks with the Salvadoran opposition represent a change from previous U.S. policy?

Answer. The talks do not represent a change in the U.S. position. We continue to support strongly the Salvadoran Government's plan to begin the process toward the establishment of democratic institutions and a peaceful solution to El Salvador's political problems through elections.

Question 25. Much of our support for the government is based on the moderation represented by President Duarte. What will the U.S. stance be toward a government to the right of the present one, if it comes to power as a result of the election process over these next years?

Answer. It would not be proper for us to speculate on the hypothetical results and consequences of upcoming elections. The United States supports the election process in El Salvador and not a particular candidate or party. We will deal with any democratically-elected government.

Question 26. Under what conditions would the Administration consider a normalization of relations with Cuba. Press reports suggest that the U.S. price for normalization is withdrawal of Cuban troops from Africa, and end to support of opposition movements in Central America among other things. Please comment on this. Have there been any moves on the United States-Cuban normalization issue aside from the reported meeting between Secretary Haig and the Cuban Vice President?

Answer. The United States has not established any conditions for normalization or improving United States-Cuban relations. Cuba's actions are the issue. Our attitude toward Cuba will continue to be governed by Cuba's international behavior. Certainly we would consider a total end to Cuban subversion in Latin America and elsewhere and withdrawal of Cuban combat troops from Angola and the Horn of Africa region as significant indications that Cuba is prepared to play a more responsible international role. We see no such indications.

Question 27. Did Secretary of State Haig meet with Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez in Mexico City in November? If so, what was the nature of the discussions?

Answer. Our "no comment" remains the same.

Question 28. Would you please elaborate on the issues brought to the surface in the *Washington Post* of December 10 on efforts toward a United States-Nicaraguan rapprochement?

What is each side demanding for normalization?

Do you feel that aggressive U.S. policies toward Nicaragua have helped the U.S. policy of supporting the private sector and a mixed political and economic system?

Has the Administration written off Nicaragua or can relations be repaired?

Answer. I went to Nicaragua in the hopes that we could find a formula for the restoration of close and friendly relations. To characterize U.S. policies before or after my visit as "aggressive" seems unhelpful, as we have undertaken no policies designed to hurt Nicaragua, nor any acts not required by legislation. My trip was to be the starting point for negotiations which we hoped would lead to a new understanding between our countries.

The proposals we made to the GRN were not answered. We were ready to talk, and in fact floated drafts to the GRN on two subjects of concern to them, and we had prepared further proposals, but the GRN never responded seriously to our proposals. It is difficult for me to say what the Nicaraguans wished to gain from a dialogue they refused to enter.

Shortly after our attempt to establish a dialogue, FSLN/GRN spokesmen attacked the United States, declared that the Sandinista Revolution is irreversibly Marxist-Leninist, responded to a joint United States-Honduran military exercise—designed to help Honduras react to a seaborne threat and to which Nicaragua was invited to send observers—by a national mobilization of its forces, arrested the major leaders of the private sector for criticizing the government's economic program, arrested non-Sandinista Marxist leaders for criticizing the National Directorate, attacked the non-Sandinista labor unions, decreed that strikes were illegal and made possible the capricious nationalization of businesses and property. They have continued to support Salvadoran guerrillas. In short, the FSLN/GRN has refused to negotiate seriously with us, and has made clear by its actions that it intends to establish a single-party state which accepts opposition only under barely tolerable to impossible conditions.

The United States has hoped to foster the pluralist society promised by the GRN and which it has continued to insist is its goal. Our policies have been designed, so far as possible, to support the private sector and a pluralistic political and economic system.

Obviously, the administration has not "written off" Nicaragua. But the United States cannot alone repair relations.

Question 29. There have been some positive developments in Nicaragua like the establishment of the law of political parties, and opposition factions joining the Council of State. Please give your assessment of these developments.

Answer. Since the law governing political parties has not yet been completed, I cannot comment on it. I hope that the optimism demonstrated by some of the opposition parties in returning to the Council of State is warranted, I would certainly welcome a law which legalized political parties without making them subject to the approval of the FSLN, and which gave them the opportunity to win political power through fair elections.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

CENTRAL AMERICA

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1981

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Pell, and Dodd.

OPENING STATEMENT

Senator HELMS. The subcommittee will come to order.

This morning the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs begins its second day of hearings on the political and security situation in Central America and the Caribbean Basin.

Our witness today is a distinguished, dedicated American, Dr. Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who will address in detail the security situation in the region.

At the hearings yesterday, Assistant Secretary of State Tom Enders presented a detailed Department of State study outlining Cuban- and Soviet-backed subversion in this hemisphere. Today the subcommittee has invited Dr. Ikle to help us understand how local governments in the Caribbean Basin region can cope with the increasingly sophisticated insurgencies facing them.

In addition, the subcommittee will ask Dr. Ikle to detail not only the Cuban threat to the rest of the hemisphere, but also the Cuban threat to the United States. As we all know, Cuba possesses Russian Mig-21 aircraft in abundance, including many newer models just delivered.

One of the questions to be evaluated this morning is: Are any of these aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons?

Last year there was a great deal of talk about docking and storage facilities at the Cuban port of Matanzas. The question is: Are these nuclear storage facilities and tender areas used for Soviet nuclear missile-carrying submarines?

There are other questions to be addressed, including the nature of the massive military buildup in Nicaragua. Why does Nicaragua need such a large armed force? Certainly not out of fear from invasion from the United States. If that were the case, Mexico, with whom the United States has had some differences and disagreements, would have an equally massive armed force today.

With those preliminary remarks, Dr. Ikle, we welcome you to the committee. I assume that you have an opening statement, and we will be delighted to hear from you, sir. Thank you for coming.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRED C. IKLE, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY NESTOR SANCHEZ, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, AND ROBERT F. TURNER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Dr. IKLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am gratified that you invited me to appear before your committee. You have asked me to address the military developments in the Caribbean and Central America.

For a century and a half, Mr. Chairman, the security of this hemisphere has been protected from the reach of European imperialism, initially through the application of the Monroe Doctrine, and later through the collective security efforts of the American republics.

The West European empires against which the Monroe Doctrine had been designed have long been dissolved. But a new imperialism has expanded in the East, and is expanding still, stretching from the center of Europe to Afganistan and Mongolia, with its outlying colonies and military outposts scattered around the globe; Vietnam, South Yemen, Angola—and the crown colony in the Caribbean, the Island of Cuba.

The suppression of the unruly subjects of this empire and the annexation of new territories is a major military enterprise. It is backed up by the largest military arsenals in the world, and it is being driven forward by the greatest military buildup in history.

In the center of the Caribbean, the crown colony of this imperialism is becoming increasingly a direct military threat to the region, and an indirect threat as an arms depot and logistics base for new imperial annexations in Africa and Central America.

The Soviet Union has provided a high level of military exports to Cuba. The total value of Soviet arms shipments to Cuba since 1960 is about \$2.5 billion. Since Cuban intervention in Angola, the average yearly totals have been almost twice that of the years preceding 1975. If one considers the weight of arms delivered thus far in 1981, Cuba has received 63,000 metric tons, making this the highest yearly total since the massive buildup in 1962—the year of the missile crisis.

Cuba's military personnel strength has increased, and its military capabilities have improved dramatically over the last 5 years. A significant trend has been the development of an effective ready reserve, which gives Castro and his Soviet masters a well-trained and, to a large extent, battle-experienced mercenary force which can be activated on short notice.

About 70 percent of Cuba's forces in Angola and Ethiopia are these ready reservists who were recalled to active duty. The Cuban military capability is far in excess of any actual or imaginary defensive needs. Cuban Armed Forces include an army of over 225,000, a navy of about 11,000, and air and air-defense forces of about

16,000. These figures do not include hundreds of thousands of paramilitary forces which in many instances are better trained and equipped than the regular armed forces of other Caribbean countries.

Cuba has over 2.3 percent of its population in the regular armed forces. In fact, 1 of every 20 Cubans participates in some kind of security mission. By comparison, as you indicated earlier, Mr. Chairman, Mexico with seven times Cuba's population maintains regular defense forces half the size of Cuba's, and has less than two-tenths of 1 percent of its people in the regular armed forces.

Brazil, the largest Latin American country, with 12 times the population of Cuba, also has only about two-tenths of 1 percent of its population in its active military. And in the United States we have less than 1 percent of our people in the regular armed forces. That is to say, Mr. Chairman, Fidel Castro maintains about a 10 to 20 times larger military effort than any of the other major nations in this hemisphere.

Cuba's neighbors in Central America—with the exception of Nicaragua—maintains small defense forces which vary from almost none for Costa Rica, to about 8,000 to 10,000 for Panama and 15,000 to 16,000 for Honduras and Guatemala, to about 20,000 for El Salvador. El Salvador of course has been compelled to expand its armed forces because of the totalitarian aggression against it.

The Cuban Army includes 9 active and 18 reserve divisions. The Cubans have over 200 Mig fighter aircraft, 650 tanks, 90 helicopters, 2 Foxtrot attack submarines, and 1 Koni-Class frigate, and about 50 torpedo and missile attack boats. This is clear and convincing evidence that Cuba is truly a highly militarized society with a growing military capability.

The Soviet influence in Cuba is all pervasive. The Soviet brigade, with a strength of about 2,600 to 3,000, is located near Havana. In this area, the Soviets have a major intelligence collection facility which monitors U.S. communications.

There are also an estimated 6,000 to 8,000 Soviet civilian advisers on the island. About 2,000 Soviet military advisers provide technical advice in support of such sophisticated weapons as the Migs, surface-to-air missiles, and Cuba's Foxtrot submarines. Additionally, Soviet advisors are attached to Cuban ground units.

The Soviet Union has great influence on the Cuban Government for several reasons. First, the Soviets provide Cuba's principal economic support—a leverage that Fidel Castro cannot ignore.

Second, the presence of Soviet personnel on the island—especially the large embassy staff and advisers in the economic and military spheres—allows the Soviet imperial masters to monitor closely their Caribbean crown colony.

It would be a grave mistake, Mr. Chairman, if we ignored the direct military threat that this Soviet-Cuba arsenal represents some 90 miles to the South of Florida. This Soviet military outpost supports a massive intelligence collection center and it sits astride critical sea lines of communication.

In peacetime, 44 percent of all foreign trade tonnage and 45 percent of the crude oil to the United States pass through the Caribbean. In addition, the Caribbean is a major refinery area. In wartime, half of NATO's supplies would transit by sea from gulf ports through the Florida Straits and onward to Europe.

Much of the petroleum shipments and important reinforcements destined for U.S. forces in Europe would be originating from gulf ports. The security of our maritime operations in the Caribbean, hence, is critical to the security of the Atlantic Alliance.

Mr. Chairman, the increased Soviet military presence on Cuban soil and in the Caribbean poses a grave threat to this vital lifeline of the alliance. In 1970, Soviet naval vessels spent approximately 200 ship-days in the South Atlantic. In 1980, this number has increased thirteenfold to 2,600 ship-days.

Given this presence and the current strength and disposition of the U.S. Navy, the South Atlantic sea lines of communication are far more vulnerable today than 10 years ago or at the time of the Cuban missile crisis.

Mr. Chairman, sometimes it seems to me our European allies, whose most basic security depends on this South Atlantic lifeline, are much too insouciant and cavalier about the growing military threat in the Caribbean.

More disturbing, perhaps, or at least more immediately pressing than this threat to the alliance in the event of war, is the Soviet-Cuban effort presently underway further to expand the reach of Soviet imperialism. This attempt at expansion and annexation employs all the tools of modern empire building: propaganda and deception, the export of terrorism, massive shipments of arms, and finally, the overthrow of established governments followed by the imposition of the new totalitarian rule which is intended to be made irreversible through the import of these clever policy experts from Eastern Europe.

Nicaragua is close to the final stage in this intended irreversible transition; El Salvador is fighting in the middle phase; Honduras, as Secretary Enders explained to you yesterday, is now threatened by the early phase.

There are now between 4,000 and 5,000 Cuban civilian advisers and about 1,500 Cuban military and security advisers in Nicaragua. Cuban advisers are believed to be serving in key posts throughout the Sandinista government, in which they exert considerable influence. Cuba is also getting considerable help from East European nations. We may soon see more East German police advisers in Nicaragua, those efficient Gestapos that operate in South Yemen and Angola.

There are advisers in Nicaragua from East Germany, Bulgaria, North Korea, and the Soviet Union to assist in building the Sandinista army from its currently estimated strength of 60,000 into a force of 250,000. Once achieved, this military buildup will mean 1 in 10 Nicaraguans under arms. Even at its present strength, Mr. Chairman, the Sandinista army represents the largest military force in the history of Central America.

Approximately 70 Nicaraguans are being trained as jet pilots and mechanics in Bulgaria. Existing landing strips in Nicaragua are being lengthened and will be able to accommodate sophisticated jet aircraft. Soviet advisers are deeply involved in directing the effort to upgrade the Nicaraguan air force.

Although there is no evidence of Migs in Nicaragua at present, the sighting of incoming Mig-21 crates in Cuba provides cause for concern. Arrival of Migs would dramatically increase Nicaragua's threat to its neighbors, whose fighter inventory consists of aging World War II vintage day-fighter aircraft.


Honduras, for example, has only 20 super Mystere and F-86 fighters with no all-weather capability. A loss of a single aircraft, such as occurred last year, will degrade this modest capability.


Since Nicaragua's neighbors have no match for Migs, one must ask why Nicaragua would want such an air buildup which would clearly be destabilizing. And why would Nicaragua want to introduce 20 to 30 Soviet tanks?

Let us look at the cold numbers, Mr. Chairman, in all their starkness. I have a chart here that shows the present and the projected level of the Nicaraguan military buildup in terms of men under arms.

[The charts referred to above follow:]

MILITARY FORCES (INCLUDES ACTIVE RESERVES)



% OF POPULATION UNDER ARMS

* HAS ANNOUNCED IT WILL EXPAND TO 250,000

This chart juxtaposes this "accomplishment of socialism," as Radio Moscow might call it, to the armed forces of those "rightwing fascist dictatorships" that will be the beneficiaries of the so-called national liberation movements. The two neighbors of Nicaragua, Honduras and Costa Rica, have armed forces so small you can barely see them on this chart.

It is important to understand the dynamics of what is going on at the outer edges of Soviet imperialism. What does the size of Nicaragua's armed forces tell you, Mr. Chairman? It tells you this:

If Mexico, our good friend and neighbor, were ruled by a Sandinista regime, and if such a regime followed the pattern of the Nicaraguan military buildup, Mexico would acquire an armed force of nearly 7 million men. That is what the per capita mobilization in Nicaragua would translate into in Mexico: Almost 2 million under arms with the present Sandinista buildup, and nearly 7 million with the projected buildup.

Mexico of course is a free and independent democracy with which we live in peace. Today Mexico has an approximately 130,000-man military force.

Where does this development lead to? Nicaragua is now regularly violating Honduran territory in supplying the Salvadoran guerrillas. The Nicaragua military buildup is unquestionably a threat to the efforts in the region to move toward pluralism and self-determination.

The November 29 elections in Honduras should put the West European admirers of the Sandinistas to shame. This election stands in marked contrast to the broken electoral pledges of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

In El Salvador, Cuba acted as the catalyst to organize and unify the disparate groups of the far left, as Secretary Enders testified here yesterday, and helped organize a guerrilla combined military command in 1980.

It was Cuba that both encouraged and assisted the guerrillas to launch the ill-fated so-called final offensive in January 1981. The Cubans have played a key role in arranging for the acquisition and delivery of weapons for the Salvadoran guerrillas from Vietnam, Ethiopia, and Eastern Europe by way of Nicaragua.

Guerrilla recruits have been transported to Cuba and elsewhere for extensive training in guerrilla tactics, marksmanship, demolitions, artillery and field fortifications, as well as in a variety of other military skills.

One observer has reported seeing groups of up to battalion size in training in Cuba, which suggests that at least some Salvadoran guerrillas probably have trained as integral units. The Soviet Union has of course bankrolled and assisted these efforts by underwriting its Cuban proxy at a cost of about \$3 billion annually, and by supporting efforts to collect funds, arms, and supplies from the Communist bloc for delivery to the guerrillas.

Cuba has devoted its attention and resources not only to Nicaragua and El Salvador, but has likewise coordinated clandestine support organizations in Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. In fact, convincing evidence of Cuban subversion activities has surfaced in virtually every Caribbean Basin country.

In Grenada, Cuban influence has reached such a high level that it can be considered a Cuban satellite. The Cubans are constructing air and naval facilities there that far exceed the requirements of this tiny island nation.

Mr. Chairman, the news is bad. The hour is late. What can be done? I am sure that you are interested in what is being done and can be done to deal with this serious threat to American security interests.

In September, the Defense Department dispatched a team of experts to El Salvador to assist the Salvadorans in developing a national military strategy. The team spent 2 months in El Salvador discussing the existing military capabilities, and assessing the requirements. The detailed findings of the team are currently under review, but some of the recommendations are already being implemented.

The Salvadorans have requested, and we have agreed to provide, out-of-country training for about 500- to 600-officer candidates for a light infantry battalion of about 1,000 men and for noncommissioned officers.

We hope to begin this training as early as possible in 1982. However, the need for better trained military leaders is compelling, and we must overcome these obstacles. As you already may be aware, the cost of Salvadoran requirements far exceed planned fiscal year 1982 foreign military assistance and training levels. Thus, we will need the support of the Congress if we are going to fund this urgent need and respond in a timely manner.

We are continuing to provide small mobile training teams to train personnel in areas that are deficient, such as maintenance and coastal patrolling. Equipment provided through foreign military sales includes communications equipment, helicopters, weapons, and trucks that should allow the Salvadoran forces to improve their mobility, command, and control, and their ability to interdict the supply lines of the insurgents to their external suppliers.

This effort is being supplemented by support from other concerned Latin American countries. If the favorable consensus that has developed at the "Fourteenth Conference of American Armies" in November, and more recently at the OAS meeting, is indicative of the awareness in the hemisphere, a more cooperative mutual security effort can evolve among the nations of the Americas.

We will continue to nurture the concept of collective security as it applies to the Western Hemisphere. Both by long-standing policy and by the Rio Treaty, we are committed to join with our Latin American Allies in "mutual assistance and common defense of the American Republics."

In the President's words, the United States "will accord high priority to requests from its major alliance partners and to those nations with whom it has friendly and cooperative security relationships."

Considering the nature of the security interests at stake, we would be remiss if we failed to advise you that we are developing the necessary contingency plans to respond as required and appropriate to further military threats and acts of aggression.

This kind of planning is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and must be done by them routinely in order to fulfill their responsibility to the President and to the Nation.

In closing, I would like to emphasize that our security interests in the Caribbean Basin must receive higher priority and far greater resources than in the past. In order to gain time to address the underlying political, economic, and social problems of the region, we must cooperate closely with our neighbors. We must halt terrorist aggression and deter further military attacks in the hemisphere. A failure to respond to the current threat would only lead to greater suffering, and far greater human and material costs in the future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

AMERICAN PEOPLE UNAWARE OF CUBAN STRONGHOLD

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Ikle. I want to recognize the presence of Mr. Robert Turner and Mr. Nestor Sanchez, of your department. Gentlemen, welcome to the committee.

Mr. Ikle, as I was following the presentation of your remarks, I found myself wondering, what percentage of the American people have the vaguest idea of what is going on in this hemisphere of ours?

The statistics that you gave, according to my information, were developed over months in the past and are uncontestable. Yet, all we hear in the media and elsewhere sneers belittling a Cuban role in violence in the hemisphere.

I remember hearing about the question of Cuba, 3 or 4 weeks ago on one of the talk shows as I was driving home. Somebody had referred to Cuba as a "Communist stronghold 90 miles off our shores." And I was amazed at the scoffing that comment received. Nonetheless, the arithmetic of what you said today verifies that Cuba is in fact a stronghold, and a stronghold built for a purpose.

If the American people are informed about what is going on and still want their Government to be complacent and sit on its hands, that is one thing. But I am horrified at the prospect that this hemisphere may fall into Marxist hands while the American people are asleep.

Now we have to face some questions, it seems to me. The Polish people are facing them today.

Parenthetically I would like to say that I, as one Senator, hope that in the case of Poland, we will not sit on our hands as we did in the case of Hungary and Czechoslovakia while those people were fighting for freedom. I hope we will do something, and not be reticent and timid about it. I hope we will plant the flag and be proud to say that we stand with freedom.

Mr. Ikle, I appreciate your testimony. I do not know how we can circulate it widely, but I am going to try because I want the American people to be aware of what is going on. If we do not defend freedom south of El Salvador in 1981, we may be trying to defend north of Mexico by the end of this decade, because the Communists are not kidding about what they intend to do to our hemisphere.

SUPPLIES FROM NICARAGUA AND CUBA

Now, Mr. Secretary, let me get down to some specific questions, some of which you addressed, and I want to make sure that I understood. Would you tell me again how difficult it is for the Government of Honduras to interdict supplies from Nicaragua or Cuba intended for the insurgents in El Salvador?

Incidentally, gentlemen, today we will apply the 10-minute rule on the questioning.

Dr. IKLE. Mr. Chairman, Honduras is a large territory and has a very small army, much smaller than Nicaragua's present army, and much smaller than the projected army of Nicaragua. Its military equipment is very limited and old. As I pointed out, its fighter aircraft are day-fighters of World War II vintage. Nicaragua, we fear, may be acquiring MIG aircraft. It is acquiring tanks. It is acquiring sophisticated weaponry from the Soviet Union.

The Honduran army in no way, even if it expanded three-fold, would be a match for the existing Nicaraguan army, much less the projected Nicaraguan armed forces.

Senator HELMS. Hold that chart up again, will you please?

Dr. IKLE. Given the vastness of the territory, the difficulty of monitoring the shipments through Honduras, and the ongoing effort of the Nicaraguans to supply the insurgents in El Salvador, violation of Honduran sovereignty is very hard to check.

Yet, even with these difficulties, as you know, Mr. Chairman, as I believe you have been informed in executive session in more detail, even under these difficulties the democratic Honduran Government has discovered and stopped a large number of arms shipments through its own territory destined for El Salvador.

Senator HELMS. Does Honduras possess naval radar to spot and track boats coming from Nicaragua to El Salvador?

Dr. IKLE. I believe they do not, now; no.

Mr. SANCHEZ. No.

Senator HELMS. They do not. Does Honduras possess radar and other spotting equipment to track aircraft?

Dr. IKLE. Honduras does not now possess adequate radar to spot the air shipments over its territory.

Senator HELMS. Well, that obviously points to a need on the part of Honduras if they are going to be effective in trying to help on the interdiction.

CUBANS SERVING IN NICARAGUA

I believe you addressed yourself to the military personnel in Nicaragua, as Tom Enders did yesterday—but how many Cubans are serving in Nicaragua as teachers or advisers?

Dr. IKLE. The figures are 4,000 to 5,000 Cuban civilians in Nicaragua. In what capacity they are there is not at all clear. They pretend to be teachers and medical helpers, but we have found, and suspect, there are other functions which they are carrying out there.

Senator HELMS. You said "four to five thousand" is that correct? I did not want that to be translated into 45,000.

Dr. IKLE. Right.

Senator HELMS. It is bad enough with 4,000 to 5,000.

Dr. IKLE. And about 200 to 500 teachers.

Senator HELMS. Are there Cuban advisers serving now with Nicaraguan military units?

Dr. IKLE. I wonder to what extent this should be reserved for executive session—the further detailed information on what we know or do not know about the actual activities of the Cubans. But surely their presence, without being too specific in open session, Mr. Chairman, this large Cuban presence we can surmise or conclude from other countries in which Cubans have been operating, such as Angola, has primarily a military purpose behind it.

Senator HELMS. Let us wander around any classified discussion that would have to go to executive session, and let me almost put it hypothetically.

KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV AGREEMENT

Assuming that there is a presence of Cuban military personnel in Central America, does this violate any of the terms of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement, or subsequent agreements reached as a part of the Kennedy-Khrushchev process?

Dr. IKLE. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, that agreement, like quite a few other agreements we have concluded with the Soviet Government, has some ambiguities. As I recall it, not only were the missiles to be taken out of Cuba in the Cuban missile crisis, but the Soviet military presence was to be substantially reduced, if not eliminated. Instead, of course, we have seen a buildup of the Soviet military presence, as I indicated in my testimony, in particularly the last few years.

Senator HELMS. So what you are saying is, since there has been a buildup instead of a diminishment, yes, it is a violation of that agreement?

Dr. IKLE. We did exert strong pressure right after the Cuban missile crisis on the Soviet Union to reduce and eliminate its remaining military presence. That was how we understood in our government at that time in the Kennedy administration to follow up the agreement.

TERRORIST INSURGENCY IN GUATEMALA

Senator HELMS. Let us move over to Guatemala where the terrorist insurgency is growing worse by the week. Now I have noted reports,

which I will not detail, from Guatemala to the effect that the insurgents there are receiving aid not only from Cuba and the Soviet bloc, but from Mexico as well. Is that so?

Dr. IKLE. I believe what you are referring to here is the use of Mexican territory for the support of the insurgency in Guatemala. Again, given the existence of uninhabited areas and the expansive territory, that I am afraid is a possibility.

Senator HELMS. My time is almost up, so I will end with this: With reference to Guatemala, I have here a guerrilla training booklet that, as you can see, is charred. The guerrillas who owned it were burned out of a "safe house"—it got a little hot for them. I cannot read all of the legends in it, but it covers not only Soviet equipment but American and German as well.

Have you seen this?

Dr. IKLE. I have not seen that, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Pass it down to Dr. Ikle.

I bring that up, Mr. Secretary, to emphasize how much is going on about which the American people are totally unaware. I expect that very few people really know. If you asked the American people what is going on in the Western Hemisphere in terms of communism, they would say: Well, we have a Communist stronghold 90 miles off our shore. And the information ends there.

I hope that, through these hearings, we can get the word out to the public that there is a problem.

Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being late. I join in welcoming Mr. Ikle here.

NICARAGUA'S ARMED FORCES

I must say, those figures you have in those charts are pretty damning to Nicaragua. How do you account for the fact that she wants to build up an armed force as large as that of Cuba, and many times more than all the other countries put together?

Dr. IKLE. The explanation to that, I am afraid, Senator Pell, is that Nicaragua wants to establish and expand domination over its neighbors. It wants to go beyond—and I think the chart clearly points to that—the transshipment of supplies through Honduras into El Salvador to wreck the prospects for democracy in El Salvador, to destroy democracy in Honduras and in Costa Rica, to eliminate these embarrassing examples of growing or continuing democracy among its neighbors so as to better conceal the fact that the Sandinistas themselves have violated their pledge for holding elections.

Senator PELL. Going to El Salvador for a moment, I think the State Department confirmed a report that an American-supplied helicopter with American military and civilian officials on board fired on Salvadoran citizens, peasants, on October 17. This goes to the heart of the question as to what should be the extent of our involvement.

What is your own reaction to this? It would seem to me that if Americans are in helicopters that are engaged in fire actions, that that is going a little bit further than the Congress understood with the military advisers in El Salvador.

Dr. IKLE. This kind of action that you described is also going further than what our instructions and our own policy provides for. This incident, or accident, is under investigation and the pilot is being detained to find out what happened. Clearly if it transpired as you described, it would be totally contrary to our policy.

SELLING F-16'S TO VENEZUELA

Senator PELL. Thank you. Now the southern anchor of the Caribbean Basin would be Venezuela. I would like to touch for a moment on the thought of giving the F-16's, or selling the F-16 to Venezuela.

I think you would agree with me that this is one great escalation in the sophistication of weapons that will be available in Latin America. To my mind, it is a dreadful mistake to move up this additional notch merely because Venezuela is a good friend and would like to have them. She is in no danger. Nobody is going to invade Venezuela. I do not think anybody is going to think either Cuba or Nicaragua or anybody else is going to invade Venezuela.

Therefore, why increase the sophistication in the weapons in that part of the world?

Dr. IKLE. First of all, I do not think it is a fair description to say that this would be an escalation in the Caribbean. If you look at the arms of Cuba, or the Mig's that Cuba has, the fact that the airfields in Granada are being built up beyond all reason and sensible purposes for that tiny island, thus permitting Cuban Mig's to go to Granada, or to fly to Granada and threatening Venezuela—that is to say, to carry out military operations—this is clearly a moderate and limited reaction to the threats that the democratic government of Venezuela faces.

Venezuela will of course pay cash for these arms. Their present air force is not sufficient, given the size of the country, the Venezuelan coast, and the threat that has been built up to the north.

Venezuela clearly is not trying to threaten any of its neighbors, or to export arms to undermine any other governments, as Cuba is busily doing.

THREAT TO VENEZUELA

Senator PELL. I agree to that, but my question to you is: Where is the threat to Venezuela? Why do they need these weapons?

Dr. IKLE. The threat to Venezuela is the Cuban air force and the possible extension of its reach by building up the fields in Granada.

Senator PELL. But do you seriously think it is conceivable that the Cubans could invade Venezuela?

Dr. IKLE. I seriously think it is conceivable that the Cubans might use their air superiority to attack Venezuela in certain contingencies, and we understand why the democratic Venezuelan Government would want to do its duty for its national interest to protect its territory.

Senator PELL. But if we do this, is there any question in your mind but that other countries in that part of the world will want similar planes to protect them from possible threats from Venezuela?

Dr. IKLE. There is, Senator Pell, the fact that other countries, for prestige reasons or for other reasons of military competition, may also want to upgrade their aircraft; but we do not see any of the immediate neighbors of Venezuela being threatened by this modernization of the Venezuelan air force.

Senator PELL. It is not a question of being threatened. The question is whether we are helping along the general peace process in this hemisphere by funneling weapons of this kind into South America.

Dr. IKLE. I am astonished that we should find a modernization of the armed forces in Venezuela—a very democratic country that is within reach of the Soviet Mig's which have been built up in Cuba—threat to the peace.

The threat to the peace is developing because of not only the military buildup in Cuba, but the actual use of the arms in Cuba to undermine friendly governments, including not just the smaller Central American republics, but countries like Colombia, further away than Venezuela from Cuba.

Senator PELL. When you talk about the Mig's, I do not have it at my fingertips but do you recall the relative degree of sophistication of the Mig's versus the F-16's? I thought the F-16's were a little bit superior?

Dr. IKLE. That is a difficult comparison, and it depends on the type of mission. For some missions the F-16's are superior. You are right, Senator. For other missions the Mig's are superior. You would want to talk to Air Force witnesses to get a detailed, exact comparison, but it is about a tossup, as I understand it.

Senator PELL. Well, I guess we just have to agree to disagree on this because I feel that if we move down this road that Venezuela's neighbors will ask for the same kind of help from us, and we will be in the same position that we are in so many parts of the world where we are funneling arms into both sides. I think that would be in error.

CUBAN ACTIVITY IN EL SALVADOR

Do you have any evidence as to the nature and scope of the actual Cuban activity in El Salvador? In other words, how many Cubans are presently in El Salvador now?

Dr. IKLE. I could not discuss, at least in open session, any estimate of the number of Cubans in El Salvador. We do have evidence, which I referred to in my opening testimony, as to the arms shipments, the arms that have been brought into El Salvador—by violating Honduran sovereignty and territory—from Nicaragua, and by other routes. As Senator Helms indicated, several other routes are being used.

In addition, we have the evidence that I mentioned in the testimony of training of Salvadorans in Cuba in battalion size. The planning and support that Cuba has given to the El Salvadoran insurgents includes their support and inspiration of the large offensive in January a year ago.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Thank you.

Senator DODD?

Senator DODD. Let me pick up on that last question, because that was sort of news to me. Without getting into classified information in a public hearing, did I understand your response correctly to Senator Pell that there are in fact Cubans in El Salvador, but that you cannot go into the details of that? Are there Cubans in El Salvador?

Dr. IKLE. To phrase it exactly, I should have said that in the open session here I cannot detail the evidence as to whether or not we know how many, if any, Cubans are in El Salvador itself supporting the insurgents.

Senator DODD. Let us be as clear as we can. I am not asking you to give me the information as to how we support that conclusion. I am merely asking, as I understood our response, are there in fact Cubans in El Salvador?

Dr. IKLE. No; I was saying that I could not derail here whether or not we know how many Cubans if any, there are in El Salvador.

Senator DODD. So in other words, it is not really a question—

Dr. IKLE. In other words, I was not able to answer the question here.

Senator DODD. We do not know if there are any Cubans in El Salvador.

Dr. IKLE. I was not able to answer the question in the open hearing here what we know about the possible presence of Cubans in El Salvador.

Senator PELL. If the Senator would yield for 1 second there, I thought the classified thing was the source of intelligence?

Senator DODD. That is what I was trying to get. I do not want to get to the sources—

Senator PELL. But not the fact.

Senator DODD. Do we know, or do we not know, that there are Cubans in El Salvador? Yes, or no? You do not have to tell me how you know. Are there Cubans in El Salvador?

Dr. IKLE. For the purposes of this briefing, we do not know that there are Cubans in El Salvador.

Senator DODD. But in another type of briefing, you might tell me there are?

Dr. IKLE. In a restricted session you would get a more detailed answer.

Senator DODD. You are being very evasive, Mr. Secretary. I am not trying to use this as a forum to disclose secret information; but I am not clear, as a member of this committee, as to whether or not you are answering the question as to whether or not there are Cubans in El Salvador.

Dr. IKLE. Let me, Senator, try to be helpful on this question. As I stated in my opening testimony, the Cubans are training El Salvadorans in Cuba. We have evidence on that that I cited.

They have been helping with the transshipment of arms from the Soviet Union, from other bloc countries, through Cuba to El Salvador, through Honduras into El Salvador. They have helped in the planning of El Salvadoran insurgent offensives.

As to whether or not there are actually some Cuban citizens among the rebels in El Salvador, that question I could not answer. I do not have that information.

Senator DODD. So we do not know that?

Dr. IKLE. I do not know it.

Senator DODD. OK. Let me, if I can—I should have started out by telling you I appreciate your being here and giving us this testimony this morning.

PAINTED A BLEAK PICTURE

Let me get into the pros and cons with you. You have painted a picture that is obviously a bleak one in the sense that it could approach a half a million people under arms between Cuba and Nicaragua if the Nicaraguans reach the level of personnel that you have suggested, going from 60,000 to some 250,000 people; plus approximately a quarter of a million Cubans under arms, not to mention the aircraft, sophisticated weaponry, and so forth.

That raises a couple of questions. How do we reduce that? How can we convince the Cubans and the Nicaraguans and the Soviets that they ought to reduce their military presence in Cuba and in Nicaragua, and diminish the military threat that you have outlined for us?

Now you can go about that, I suppose, several ways. I presume you are here today to tell us about a possible military response to that. Two military responses would either be, I suppose, direct military intervention to confront that threatening military force. And in the short run, I suppose some sort of military blockade to diminish the ability of the Cubans to supply arms to Nicaragua, and for the Soviets or other eastern bloc countries to provide weapons to Cuba, an effort that we successfully tried 20 years ago during the Kennedy administration.

Tell me what the pros and cons are of a military intervention. Could we effectively engage in a ground war in Latin America, given the present makeup of Nicaraguan and Cuban equipment and personnel? And what is the military judgment on that kind of an involvement?

DISCOURAGE SOVIET AND CUBAN INTERVENTION

Dr. IKLE. Let me first respond to the first part of your question, Senator Dodd. What will make the Soviets and the Cubans desist in trying to intervene in Central America?

I think what will make them desist is that they cannot expect success, but that they can expect failure in what they are trying to do. That is to say, to destroy the existing governments, democratic and less democratic governments, and to establish their own satellite regime. With that, we can help.

We can help through the economic support we are giving; and at this time I believe we also must help with the military support that I mentioned by providing training, supplies, and communications equipment for the countries that are threatened or are being used for the transshipment of arms.

Senator Dodd. Well, let me just ask you something on that point. Do you think that if we continue to provide more arms in Central and South America that that is going to discourage the Soviets and Cubans from providing military equipment to their surrogates?

And what is the evidence in the past 20 years that would indicate that that kind of a move would be successful?

Dr. IKLE. We would hope that additional training and additional arms as needed, and additional economic support of course, will strengthen the democratic forces, will strengthen the government

in El Salvador, will keep the democratic government in Honduras viable and in control of its territory, so that the Cuban, Nicaraguan, Soviet effort will fail.

Senator DODD. How much military equipment did we provide to Somoza in the last 10 years of his regime?

Dr. IKLE. I could probably provide the answer to that for the record afterward, Senator.

Senator DODD. It was not terribly successful, was it?

Dr. IKLE. The threat there was not primarily external, and obviously we had stopped backing the Somoza regime in its last years, as you know, in the previous administration.

Senator DODD. The last what?

Dr. IKLE. First of all, when we had friendly relations with that regime, there was no foreign subversive intervention of a major kind.

MILITARY JUDGMENT OF GROUND WAR IN LATIN AMERICA

Senator DODD. Well, let's get back to my major question. Tell me what the military judgment is on a ground war in Latin America?

Dr. IKLE. Our military judgment is now that with some additional security assistance—particularly to El Salvador, but also to other countries, such as Honduras, so that they can defend the sovereignty of their territory—with additional training such as we are now providing out of country, the government in El Salvador could re-establish—

Senator DODD. No, I am talking about U.S. troops on the ground in Latin America.

Dr. IKLE. We do not see any need for U.S. troops now, and the President has made that clear.

Senator DODD. Is it the general conclusion within the Department of Defense that that is not a wise military decision?

Dr. IKLE. It is never a wise decision to put military troops into a country if they are not needed, and certainly now we do not see any need—and the President has made it clear that we have no present intention of sending troops into that area.

Senator DODD. There have been some reports that there has been a disagreement between Secretary of State Haig and Secretary of Defense Weinberger over military planning for that kind of an operation. Are those reports accurate? Has Secretary Weinberger expressed concern that they would even be asked to prepare contingency plans for direct U.S. military intervention in Central America?

Dr. IKLE. It is difficult for me, Senator, to comment on specific reports since I do not know to which one you are referring to. I have seen quite a few inaccurate reports. Maybe the one you are thinking of is one of those.

Senator DODD. So direct U.S. military intervention is not an option that we are considering?

Dr. IKLE. We do not see any need for the direct sending of ground forces now, Senator.

MILITARY BLOCKADE

Senator DODD. Tell me about the blockade. In 1982, can a military blockade work?

Dr. IKLE. The blockade of 1962?

Senator DODD. No.

Dr. IKLE. The blockade in 1962 probably did have the effect of inducing the Soviet Union to withdraw its missiles. At least that is the interpretation of the outcome of the missile crisis.

Senator DODD. Now in 1982, coming into 1982.

Dr. IKLE. In 1982, the situation, of course, is quite different. If there were a new attempt by the Soviet Union to put missiles into Cuba like in 1962, obviously we would have to act, and act decisively, but as you know the military global balance is less favorable to us than in 1962.

Senator DODD. Is it your conclusion then that it could not work, or would not be successful?

Dr. IKLE. We would have less of a margin of safety than we had in 1962, considerably less. It is for that reason, in part, and in a way this illustrates the reason why President Reagan and this administration is making the effort to strengthen our global defenses, and our strategic capability, and our naval capability, so that if we should again face a crisis like the one in 1962, we would have the means to resolve it peacefully.

KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV AGREEMENT HAS AMBIGUITIES

Senator DODD. Let me ask you just one other question. My time is up here, but you indicated in response to Senator Helms, or I understood your response to his question about the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreements that they have been breached; they have been violated. Is it the conclusion of the Department of Defense that the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreements have been in fact violated by Cuba?

Dr. IKLE. Senator, what I was saying, as I recall, was that there were ambiguities in the agreement; that after the Cuban missile crisis, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations tried to have the Soviet presence further reduced, not just the missiles; that since that time of course the Soviet presence has increased.

Senator DODD. But not in violation of those agreements entered into in 1962?

Dr. IKLE. The question of whether that is a violation or not is clouded by the fact that the agreement has its ambiguities.

Senator DODD. I am sorry?

Dr. IKLE. It is unclear because the agreement has ambiguities.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Secretary, let me pick up on that point, if I may.

Is the Senate to consider that the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement is a dead letter. Do we have no recourse, in any case? Are we supposed to have no recourse?

Dr. IKLE. There are several dimensions to it. First of all, there is the understanding which clearly sank in the consciousness of the American people, and we hope the Soviet Government, that we would not and cannot tolerate offensive Soviet missiles in Cuba. I believe that was the outcome in 1962.

Ancillary provisions suffer, as I mentioned a couple of times, from ambiguities and uncertainties of interpretation; but we still obviously are trying to exert every effort diplomatically to dissuade the Soviet Union from increasing its military presence on the island.

Senator HELMS. Well, there is such a thing as turning the coin over, because if the Soviet Union or Cuba, since they act in unison, wants to take the position that any such understanding is now null and void, then the United States has a free hand to do whatever we please.

Which is to say, the volatile situation is not being created by the United States; it is being created by the Soviet Union, using its surrogate, Cuba, to do whatever it pleases in our hemisphere. And they cannot have it both ways.

Now a lot of people try to reduce this whole hemispheric problem to one inflammatory remark. I hear it all the time: "We must not have another Vietnam." I agree to that. I hope we never send American boys to fight anywhere. But if we do, I hope we never send them to fight a war that they are not allowed to win.

Now what we are talking about is the survival of this hemisphere in freedom. I do not want anybody to obfuscate that, bringing in the clichés, whether he be a Senator or anybody else. This is too desperate a situation.

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS BUILDUP

Let me ask you about Cuba. I have reports that Cuba may be storing chemical and/or biological weapons. If that is true, what can we do about it? First of all, let me ask you if there is any truth to the report?

Dr. IKLE. I do not have information on that specific issue.

Senator HELMS. Is that something you would prefer to discuss in executive session?

Dr. IKLE. Right. We do of course have exceedingly disturbing, detailed, massive information about the Soviet buildup in chemical weapons, the Soviet use of chemical weapons in Indochina and in Afghanistan, and the Soviet use of biological toxins in violation of clear international agreement in Indochina.

We expect Soviet forces wherever they go—we have seen that—to bring along chemical warfare equipment. Now all these facts, of course, make all the more serious the evidence that you were referring to.

Senator HELMS. Let me digress.

Senator DODD. Jesse, can I ask you something which you might be interested in, too, and I will take it out of my time.

Senator HELMS. The Senator from Connecticut.

Senator DODD. I have never seen those Kennedy-Khrushchev agreements. I do not know if anyone else on the committee has, but—

Senator HELMS. I have tried to get them. I tried to get them in the last administration, and I am going to continue to try to get them in the future.

Senator DODD. You have been trying to get them? I would like to see them.

Senator HELMS. I would, too.

Senator DODD. Let me see if we cannot get ahold of those. I will support you in that effort.

Senator HELMS. This is probably not the place for informal conversation, but one of these days I will tell you about the difficulty I have had—

Senator DODD. I will work on a letter today, and we will work on it together, and by the time the Sun sets tonight we will have a letter making that request.

Senator HELMS. That will be a consummation devoutly to be wished, as the Prince of Denmark once said.

ARABS SUPPLIERS OF ARMS TO INSURGENTS

Earlier this year there was a report published in this country picked from the London Observer. Let me read a paragraph:

Algeria, Libya, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Iraq are known to figure prominently among Arab suppliers of arms to the Salvadoran insurgents. The left is supported by the Arabs because the right in Central America has traditionally supported Israel.

Is that true?

Dr. IKLE. Yes; we have had evidence which would give support to much of what was mentioned in this statement. Arms have been shipped from Algeria, and PLO moneys, or PLO-type moneys have been moved into Central America to help overthrow some of these governments.

Senator HELMS. So what we have is a converging of Marxist and terrorist forces into our hemisphere, and we are supposed to sit back and apply a litmus test of purity to our own activities down there? That is the way I read the positions of some, in the media and in government, and I reject it.

I say again that if these hearings do not do anything else, Mr. Secretary, I want the American people at least to know something more about what is going on in our hemisphere than the old cliché about the stronghold of Marxism 90 miles off our shore.

The New York Times earlier this year carried a brief item from Beirut. It said:

The daily newspaper, *Il-Libya*, which has close ties with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, indicated today a link between Palestinian guerrillas and leftist guerrillas in El Salvador. In an interview the newspaper carried what it called statements by a leader of the Salvadoran rebels, and the newspaper quoted the Central American as saying—

This is a Salvadoran rebel—

We and the Palestinian revolution are in the same trench fighting the same enemy.

Why is the Defense Department reluctant to take military action against Castro?

Dr. IKLE. I am sorry?

Senator DODD. Why is the Defense Department reluctant even to talk about taking military action against Castro?

Dr. IKLE. The Defense Department is not reluctant in talking about military action for any reasonable contingencies that may be required. We obviously want to be cautious and sure that our military action will succeed. As you yourself indicated, Senator Helms, in referring to the war in Vietnam, one does not go into a conflict

to lose it, but to win it. Therefore, planning for major military actions, which is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has to be done in a very serious manner to be sure that not only the first move is successful, but your last one, as well.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Secretary, I have discussed this time and time again at the top levels of the State Department and it is always pushed back a little bit further, and a little bit further. I understand that I asked about the Defense Department, and I am now talking about the State Department, and I am in effect told each time: Well, we are looking at it—and so forth.

CASTRO HUMILIATES UNITED STATES

Meanwhile, Mr. Castro does everything he can to humiliate this country. He nearly paralyzed the State of Florida with the outrageous actions of sending those prostitutes and criminals over here, and that sort of thing.

Now it seems that question that needs to be answered about Mr. Castro is: Is he, or is he not, a threat to the United States, as well as to Central America?

Dr. IKLE. Mr. Chairman, the thrust of my statement and my remarks I hope makes it very clear that indeed Castro is a clear and present threat to Central America and to the United States. He is a threat, as I also indicated, to our support for the European allies, and we wished the European allies understood this more clearly. Because in the event that we have to send shipments and oil to our allies through the South Atlantic, the equipment, the submarines, the Mig's, the Soviet intelligence stations in Cuba could all serve to interrupt that European lifeline.

Of course Castro and his Soviet backers are a clear threat to the development and survival of democracy in Central America. I do fully agree with you, Senator, that hearings like these I hope will serve to alert the American public to the dynamic danger—it is not something that is static, an island 90 miles off our shore—that has remained unchanged since 1962. It is a rapidly and dangerously changing situation.

Senator HELMS. It is not some theoretical thing; it is an actual danger.

Dr. IKLE. It is actually moving forward.

CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR MILITARY ACTION

Senator HELMS. Well, you may not want to discuss this publicly, but does our Navy have even the beginning of a contingency plan for a blockade of Cuba?

Dr. IKLE. We indeed must have a range of contingency plans for military actions that might become necessary, and there are a number of contingencies whether it is the outbreak of war overseas, or whether it is some new military action by the Cuban Armed Forces, or whatever the cause might be.

Senator HELMS. They are tugging on my coat saying my time is up. I am sorry it is.

Senator PELL?

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CUBA A NUISANCE—NOT A THREAT

I guess I would be remiss if I did not say that the thought of Cuba as a threat to the United States is not shared by all of us. I think of Cuba as a darned nuisance, but I would not characterize that country which has a population I think less than the size of Chicago—no reflection on Chicago—being a threat to the United States. It is a nuisance. It is a very active nuisance, and I think we should recognize the fact that it is the only exporter of virulent communism in the world today, much more so than the Soviet Union. I recognize that fact.

I think one of the reasons for it has been our misguided Cuban foreign policy over the last 20 years whereby we have sought to isolate her, insulate her, thrust her into the arms of the Soviet Union, and have almost put into steel the bonds that bind Cuba and the Soviet Union. My own view is that the more we can move in the direction of relaxation of tensions, the more the natural Communist system will suffer the fate of all authoritarian systems in the long run.

Now I would like to touch briefly on the question of the Nicaraguans being trained outside of Nicaragua. You say that 70—

Dr. IKLE. The Salvadorans?

Senator PELL. No, the Nicaraguans. You say in your testimony that 70 Nicaraguans are being trained as jet pilots and mechanics in Bulgaria. What other Nicaraguans are being trained outside of Nicaragua?

Dr. IKLE. There I would want you to get a briefing from intelligence sources to tell you what additional evidence, if any, there might be on Nicaraguans being trained, beyond what I said in my opening testimony.

Let me get back to your earlier point, also, Senator. I did not want to imply that we consider the Cuban Armed Forces a threat to the United States in the sense that they might invade Florida. The military threat of Cuba to the Atlantic alliance that I referred to is far more specific and more real, I am afraid.

It is that in the event of war if we should want, according to our plans, to ship reinforcements and oil supplies to Europe, and we would have our hands full in trying to stem aggression in Europe, the Soviet military capabilities in Cuba could interrupt this important lifeline to the Atlantic. That is an important military threat which further strains our already strained naval resources. So that is a more confined but very real problem.

As to whether it was our foreign policy that drove Castro into his relationship of in fact a colony or a satellite of the Soviet Union, or whether it is Castro's own compulsion and drive, I think it is the latter.

We had relaxed our relationship with Cuba just in the last 3 years in the Carter administration. We established a mission in Havana, and let the Cuban Government open a mission here. It was precisely during this period that the Cubans have moved in Nicaragua to support the offensive; they have moved in El Salvador to encourage the insurgents to destroy the Government. So the historic evidence clearly points in the opposite direction: That our efforts of reducing the gap between us and Havana were rewarded by new offensives on the part of Cuba.

TRAINING OF NICARAGUANS OUT OF COUNTRY

Senator PELL. I think we could continue on this for quite awhile, but regardless of what you are saying, I think you cannot say that the action of a year or two can change a country's policy of 20 years. But in any case, let me return for a moment to the question of the Nicaraguans.

I am not asking for your sources, but could you give me an estimate? Are there more than 70 Nicaraguans being trained outside of Nicaragua?

Dr. IKLE. More are being trained outside in alleged or actual academic engineering training, military training. I am sorry that I do not have the figures at my fingertips, but I would see to it that we can give you further information, both classified and unclassified, as required.

Senator PELL. Would it not be a fair assumption that there are probably not more than about a couple hundred Nicaraguans being trained as soldiers, military people, under the Communist governments?

Dr. IKLE. Our concern is not that there are Nicaraguans being trained at the Moscow Military Academy. Our concern is that pilots are being trained for what would be a dominating number of Mig aircraft in Nicaragua, which clearly would threaten all the Nicaraguan neighbors.

The rest of the training of the bulk of the Nicaraguans is taking place in Nicaragua with Cuban assistance, and by the Sandinistas themselves.

Senator PELL. I guess what I was struck by was in your statement where you said that 70 Nicaraguans are being trained as jet pilots and mechanics in Bulgaria. A little further on you say that "we have agreed to provide out-of-country training for 500-600 officer candidates," in El Salvador "for a light infantry battalion of about 1,000 men, and for noncommissioned officers."

I think that is a rather large scale out-of-country training program. I had not realized we had actually agreed to provide this training. When was that agreement reached?

Dr. IKLE. It is important, though, to recognize the difference here in black and white. We are supporting a government that is struggling to have elections; that has started the land reform; but that is under constant attack by imported arms. We are supporting it but not by training Salvadorans in flying F-16's, which would be the equivalent of training Nicaraguans in flying Mig's.

We teach them how to handle communications equipment so they can stop the infiltration; how to handle rifles and hand guns; how to organize the army; how to conduct the kind of guerrilla operations in a way so as not to harm or injure the civilian population. This is the kind of training we want to provide.

The importance of the Nicaraguan training that I referred to in my testimony is not that there are 70 Nicaraguans being trained, but that Nicaraguans are being trained to fly Migs. The emphasis is on the aircraft.

Senator PELL. I recognize what you are saying, and what we are saying to you is: We know they are the bad guys and we know we are the good guys, but the fact of the matter is that we also seem to be

quite involved here and we are supporting a government that has committed atrocities. I am sure President Duarte deplores every murder that occurs in El Salvador, and the rate of killing, from all that I can understand, may have declined a little bit; but people are still being murdered predominantly by forces of the right rather than the left every day.

I am inclined to agree with you that we should strengthen Duarte personally—but by helping the military we are also helping the people who are engaging in the murder of civilians.

REQUEST INCREASED MILITARY AID FOR EL SALVADOR

In this regard, in your testimony I detect a certain opening of the way to a request for increased military aid to El Salvador. Am I correct in this?

Dr. IKLE. You are correct that in my conclusion I indicated that a somewhat larger military assistance program will be required to enable the Government of El Salvador to fight off this increased infiltration of arms and men from Nicaragua and other countries. And of course somewhat greater economic assistance will be required.

Also we would like to have the ability, Senator Pell—and that goes in a way to the heart of your question—to train the forces of the El Salvadoran Government so that they can establish the peace in their country and permit elections and land reform to continue, as the Duarte government is going to continue, without doing harm to their own people. That is a difficult job. It requires good training. It requires knowing how to conduct military operations in a densely populated country without killing innocent bystanders.

Senator PELL. My time has expired, but I would just conclude by saying that this is a democracy and, in my State particularly where we have very close ties with the Maryknoll Sisters, there is a deepset concern, more concern about the murder of the nuns in El Salvador, more concern about the ongoing violence in that country, than there has been in any foreign policy issue in the last few years. I share their concern. I not only reflect it, I share it, and as one Senator I will look very skeptically at any request for increased military assistance to El Salvador.

Dr. IKLE. Senator, is the concern also there about the suppression of freedom in Nicaragua, the arresting of businessmen, the censorship and suppression of the outstanding newspaper in Managua by the Nicaraguan Government, the importation of totally unnecessary arms, the buildup of the armed forces 10 to 20 times greater than those of their neighbors? Do your constituents share that concern? Are you explaining to them the situation in the larger countries?

Senator PELL. No; for the very simple reason that the rate of murders is far more in El Salvador, the number of people being murdered, than it is in Nicaragua. Human lives are what we are talking about.

My time has expired.

Senator HELMS. Senator Pell, Rhode Island is probably like North Carolina, the only thing is, we are nearer to Cuba than you are. [Laughter.]

We are nearer Cuba than Connecticut, too, I might add. [Laughter.]

The people in North Carolina do not know about the activities you are describing. I hope we will not glide over your response, which was made respectfully to Senator Pell. We are all concerned about deaths of the nuns. So let us put that aside and say "we agree on that."

The next question is: Do we agree on what else is going on down there?

Senator Dodd?

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HOW BEST TO DEAL WITH PROBLEMS

Mr. Secretary, I think if you began to try to synthesize some of the differing views you sense here at this table, I do not believe that anyone at this table, or anyone on this committee for that matter, holds any brief for Fidel Castro, or is interested in seeing his expansionist tendencies enhanced at all.

I think the issue in the debate probably centers on how best to deal with that problem. If I were the defense minister of Cuba—and I presume, because we have good, open public hearings in this country, I presume there are people here in this audience today who are taking good notes and they are going to be reporting back to whoever they report back to—but if I had heard your response to Senator Helms' inquiry about why we do not consider a direct military intervention in Cuba, an attack, and your response being limited to the fact that we want to know whether or not we can succeed, if I were the defense minister there I think I would be concerned about the level, and quantity of our arms and equipment; that I would be worried if I heard an assistant secretary of defense say that the only issue is whether or not we can succeed in that effort.

I am not surprised, and I am wondering why you would be, then, that they are building up military equipment and supplies and asking you for more equipment. Does that seem unreasonable to you? If you were the defense minister of Cuba, how would you react if you heard an assistant secretary of defense say the only issue is whether or not we can succeed in that kind of a military effort?

Dr. IKLE. I seem to recall that the question was what kind of planning—

Senator DODD. Why are we not considering military intervention. That was the question. Am I correct?

Dr. IKLE. No. Why the Defense Department was reluctant in planning. The answer I meant to give, and I hope I gave, was that in the planning of military operations you have to be thoughtful and make sure that the military operation will succeed.

Senator DODD. No, you did not. You said: I would want to know whether or not you could succeed.

Dr. IKLE. To make sure, Senator Dodd, that if you plan a military operation as a military planner or member of the Joint Chiefs, you want to make sure it will succeed so that if and when the President ever encounters a crisis, an attack, a war where he has to order military operations, it does not turn out to be a failure.

Senator DODD. Well, if you were a defense minister in Cuba and you heard an assistant secretary of defense in this country say, "I want to know whether or not you can succeed," would you not be concerned about whether or not you could defend yourself?

Dr. IKLE. I would, if I expected that my superiors were planning to attack the United States, or planning a major kind of aggression which would force the President of the United States and the Congress to order a military operation, then indeed I would be worried that that military operation might, in fact, succeed, because our military planners are careful.

Senator DODD. I think this is the point that Senator Pell is getting at, that what we are getting here is that one set of actions militarily begets another, and then yet begets another, so that you end up getting this tremendous buildup. We respond when we see 500,000 people under arms beginning in Cuba and Nicaragua, and we are going to respond to that. We get worried about that kind of a thing, and we want to make sure we are going to protect ourselves.

In the real world, I am not terribly surprised how they respond when we respond. The question of escalation in our own hemisphere I think poses serious dangers as a result of the United States and our allies, as well as Cubans and their surrogates building up military equipment and supplies and an arsenal, to the extent they are.

It seems to me that we have to look at some other way of addressing this problem.

I wonder, Mr. Chairman, you know in the last 2 days we have had a lot of talk, and in fact in formal testimony about various plans and so forth. I am not interested necessarily—although I would be—about getting the specific plans, but I wonder if in a closed briefing we could actually get what options are being considered? Could we make that request, just to give us what the options are?

Senator HELMS. Oh, absolutely. The Chair has that on the list.

SPECIFIC PLANS BEING CONSIDERED

Senator DODD. Well, I would make that a formal request. You mentioned in your testimony that there are some very specific plans that are being considered. You said, "we would be remiss if we failed to advise you that we are developing the necessary contingency plans to respond as required and appropriate to further military threats and acts of aggression."

I would make a formal request, Mr. Chairman, that we be given under the proper circumstances the complete list of options that the Department of Defense is considering in that regard, if I may.

Let me just ask you one other thing here. There has been some talk, and I have never heard a formal response to it. Did Secretary Haig meet with the Vice President of Cuba?

Dr. IKLE. Not to our knowledge. I do not think so.

Senator DODD. Or their foreign minister? Did they have some meetings with him?

Dr. IKLE. Not to our knowledge.

Senator DODD. Nor the Vice President of Cuba?

Dr. IKLE. Not to our knowledge.

Mr. SANCHEZ. Not to our knowledge.

Senator DODD. Not to your knowledge. You mentioned in your testimony, "Nicaragua is close to the final stage of this intended irreversible transition." If you were speaking to Secretary Haig, what would you advise him as to how we ought to reverse, if at all possible, this irreversible transition so that we do not end up in a situation as you have described where Nicaragua becomes in fact a little Cuba in Central America? What should we do?

Dr. IKLE. Our influence at this stage is limited. There is still some economic assistance being provided through our national agencies. Our European friends are still providing economic assistance. We can encourage them to make clear that this assistance is to be used precisely as a lever; that it will be turned off if further steps are taken toward totalitarianism; that it can improve if the suppression of democratic leanings ceases.

In addition, of course, as Secretary Enders testified, we have tried to persuade the Government of Nicaragua not to continue on this path.

Senator DODD. Do you think by flirting around with the notion of possible military intervention, or a blockade of Nicaragua, is more or less likely to reverse this irreversible trend? If you were the Assistant Secretary of Defense in Nicaragua, what would your advice be to the junta if you heard the United States say we are thinking of a blockade or military intervention because we want to reverse your leanings and affiliation with Cuba and the Soviet Union?

Dr. IKLE. As you may have noted, Senator, through this entire hearing I never mentioned the idea of a blockade, and I do not—

Senator DODD. Might I conclude that that option is out, then? Is that option out?

Dr. IKLE. I did not say any particular options would be excluded for new contingencies that might arise. The Joint Chiefs, and others of us in the Pentagon, have the responsibility to prepare for the event of war in order to deter it. There may be contingencies where all kinds of actions—including blockades—are in order.

Senator DODD. Well, just go back to my question. If you were confronted with those—they have been reported in the press; the Department of State is apparently considering it, if not the Department of Defense. What would be the reaction? How do you reverse that trend, if you hear that the "Colossus of the North," as they like to refer to us, are talking about military intervention or a blockade?

SUFFICIENT ARMED FORCES LIKEY TO DETER AGGRESSION

Dr. IKLE. Given the historic experience we have had with Communist-inspired totalitarian efforts to expand and annex territory, those were usually stopped most successfully by establishing a barrier which provided, if needed, for the use of force.

Consider, for example, the situation in Europe, where peace has been maintained along the dividing line between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Before that line was established, attempts were made to regard Czechoslovakia for example as a country in between—as a bridge, something we should not threaten. After the takeover in Czechoslovakia we backed the establishment of NATO.

In contrast, look at Afghanistan, where the way in which we might respond to military aggression was at best ambiguous before it occurred, and the Soviet military move was not deterred. ^{uf}

So I think recent history tells us that, as much as we regret having to resort to military means, establishing the real prospect that armed aggression, whether paramilitary or military, will be met by sufficient armed force is most likely to deter the aggression.

Senator DODD. I do not think I made myself quite as clear as I would like. We are not the Soviet Union. We do not deal that way. Hopefully we are not thinking about how they respond to Afghanistan is how we might respond to a Nicaragua.

We are presumably trying to build up some strong allies and relationships in our hemisphere to improve their economic and social conditions. We have found historically that that is the best defense against communism or totalitarian regimes. That is the best defense of all. I presume you agree with that?

Dr. IKLE. Indeed.

Senator DODD. Well, if that, in fact, works, and we are beginning to talk about intimidating a country to enter our sphere of influence, if you will, where has that been successful in the past? What historical record is there that through the process we are considering right now, by threatening Nicaragua, that we can reverse the political trends in that country to embrace and join the alliance that we would like to build up in our own hemisphere? What is the historical tradition that supports that conclusion?

Dr. IKLE. I do not think it was my proposition that by threatening Nicaragua we could reverse the trend. I do not think I implied that.

DEMOCRATIC PROCESS CAN FLOURISH AND CONTINUE

The point I was making is that we have to tell El Salvador, Honduras, and so on, that the democratic process there can flourish and continue even though these countries are under a military threat.

You need two things. I would totally agree with you, Senator. First, you need the economic and social development. We know these reforms have been made in El Salvador and an effort is now being made to hold an election. But in addition, you have to stop naked military aggression, whether it is by terrorists or larger military forces. Otherwise, elections, land reform, and economic recovery cannot take place because terrorists are blowing up the power stations, bridges, and school buildings.

It is a combination of the two that is needed when the point has been reached, as is now the case, that there is an actual threat of military force.

Senator DODD. My time is up, but I gather by your last statement that you believe, and that it is the conclusion of the Department of Defense, that the agrarian and economic reforms are a significant positive contribution toward economic stability in El Salvador?

Dr. IKLE. Indeed. And it is most regrettable that they could not run the further course because of this ongoing terrorist and military campaign against the Government.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Secretary, let me renew Senator Dodd's question, since he did not put a caveat on it that you had to be a Communist. If you were defense minister of Cuba and hearing these comments this morning, would you go back and say: Look, Mr. Castro, let us promote peace instead of armed aggression in Central America?

Now that is a fair question, inasmuch as Senator Dodd did not say you had to be a Communist. Now of course if you are a Communist, you would go back and say: Let's do whatever. But is that not the real test of what Mr. Castro is up to, whom he represents?

So it is almost irrelevant what anybody would recommend to him, because we know what his goals are. He has made those clear from the very beginning. As I said yesterday, I recall very well how Mr. Castro was portrayed during his attempts to take over as an agrarian reformer.

I remember specific denials by some of the most noted commentators and politicians in this country that, "Oh, no, Mr. Castro is not a Communist." And as soon as he took over he said, "I am, and I have been, and I always will be."

So from the beginning we have known what he is and what he is up to. So how you are going to answer that question of Senator Dodd's depends upon whether you are a Communist or not. And of course you are not.

Senator LUGAR?

Senator DODD. I don't know. Do we know that?

Senator HELMS. I will take an oath on it. [Laughter.]

GO TO THE SOURCE OF THE DIFFICULTY

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, Secretary Ikle, I appreciate your statement this morning in which you indicated the substantial efforts of Cuba to influence Latin America.

I suspect that part of our dilemma is how to respond to these advances by the Cubans in such a way that we are not received as either heavy handed, or as indiscriminately selling arms to everyone involved, creating even more dilemmas as we go. I am not certain how we go about this rearmament of our friends, or give a protective layer so that democracy can flourish in circumstances such as the ones we find. I think we are always on the horns of a dilemma.

Let me approach the question from a different angle, because this frustration perhaps led to comments by Secretary Haig and others that we would need to go to the source of the difficulty. The source apparently was Cuba and, in a more remote fashion, the Soviet Union.

What would you infer from the proposition that as much as 25 percent of the gross national product of Cuba is now provided directly by the Soviet Union? If that kind of leverage is available, what prospect is there that the Cubans, whatever else might be their self-interest, would cease and desist activities that were of importance to the Soviet Union?

In other words, could you characterize in any way the leverage that is there, the degree of freedom that Cuba has in a foreign policy sense, leaving aside any emotional volition that might be exercised independently?

Dr. IKLE. Senator Lugar, you mentioned "Cubans" there. It is important of course to distinguish between the Cuban population at large and the Castro regime. The sentiments of the majority of the Cuban population I think were rather vividly expressed many times through the immigration and escape of refugees to this country, and the many outstanding people of Cuban origin that we now have who live in this country who came from Cuba in various waves of voluntary migration and escape.

The sentiments of the Cuban people are reflected in some of the outstanding literary figures that were imprisoned for a long time and who have spoken of those feelings.

If you talk about Fidel Castro and some of his henchmen, I am not sure there is a means to pry them loose from the Soviet Union. Their allegiance and feeling and ideology may just be linked too closely.

CASTRO REGIME OPTIONS LIMITED

Senator LUGAR. Well, are we faced with a situation in which it is in the interest of the Soviet Union to foment difficulty in Central America that goes on and on? In other words, the point you are making is that he really cannot get free of the Soviets, or does not want to get free of the Soviets, given that without the Soviets the entire country collapses? Is not the proposition then a fairly grim one that the Cubans are probably going to be about this degree of intervention for a long time? There is no end in sight, as the cards are now dealt.

Dr. IKLE. Not unless and until economic, sociological, and political forces in Cuba begin to develop, and the Cuban people can convince Castro or his successors that they do not really want to be the vanguard of Soviet imperialism, but they want to have greater economic development.

As you know, Senator, Cuba used to be, in terms of per capita GNP, the third most advanced country in the hemisphere. It is now down to I believe No. 20. That has been the accomplishment of the Castro regime.

Clearly the people must have different feelings, only when they are in Cuba they cannot express them.

Senator LUGAR. Well, that is true.

Dr. IKLE. In other words, in the short term the answer to your question is: Yes, we would expect Castro to try to continue to destroy, as my colleague Tom Enders expressed it yesterday, to have this machine going to destroy existing governments in Central America and elsewhere. We may not be able to change the motivation of the existing regime in Cuba, but we can curtail their ability to interfere, by stopping them, by strengthening those who want to oppose them, by working together with other Latin American countries.

Senator LUGAR. Well, that obviously is what we are about. I suppose I am back to the source again: that if the Soviets are providing as much support as they are for that government, the options for Castro are limited.

If the Cuban people should decide they wanted a different type of policy, what really would that have to do with it? In other words, let us say there were expressions by some Cubans that they ought to change course. If in fact the Soviets are in a position of being

able to pull the plug in which the entire economy collapses, is there really any prospect historically of change there?

I do not see it. That is why I am pursuing this line of questioning today. I think so long as that tie is there economically and politically that the options for Cuba are fairly limited. Now they might pursue them with greater or lesser enthusiasm, but I am not certain that when you are dependent to that extent that there is any independence at all. It is not at all clear, for example, who will be paying the bills in the coming days in Poland. If you have a nonviable economy, an economy that does not work—and in the Cuban situation it does not work by a long shot—then the degree of economic freedom, or democratic freedom, or anything else that develops to change this pattern, it seems to me, is very limited.

If this is the case, then we are almost always going to be on the frontiers of some other country knowing that Cuban foment continues, trying to figure out where it will bob up next. We will be trying perpetually to counter in a satisfactory way this incursion, or that one, or the next one.

SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION

What thought have we given in a strategic sense to Soviet-Cuban ties? Is there anything we can do about it at all? Is there anything we should be doing about it?

Dr. IKLE. I think the example of Poland really points in the other direction. That is to say, people under a Communist regime can develop new forms of society, new ways of managing their affairs, and could, if left alone, embark on a road to advance their freedom and their economy. They would then certainly be able to count on support from the West.

As you know, Poland has received rather generous treatment with its credits and loans from the West over the last several months. The reforms in Poland, if they had been left to continue, in all likelihood would have led to an economy that would have flourished and given the people greater liberty.

Senator LUGAR. May I stop you at that point? In the real world, things are not left just to work their way out. You still have the Soviets.

Dr. IKLE. In the real world we do have Soviet military intervention, or the threat thereof, or we have Cuban intervention as in Nicaragua. That is what this is all about. Therefore, we need military forces to cope with the real world, where people are not permitted to express their own views and feelings, but are being suppressed or manipulated by the use of military force. That is really in essence the story of what I was arguing here today.

I know, Senator Lugar, you are not suggesting that we should experiment by offering economic aid to Castro to try to win him away from the course on which he has embarked. You are not suggesting that because you know we have tried that experiment.

It was precisely during that period, when we opened up toward Cuba, when we let him establish a mission here, when there was a question of maybe lifting the embargo, that Castro embarked on intervening in Angola and other places in Africa, and started this operation in Central America.

Senator LUGAR. No, I am not making any suggestions. I am just attempting to try to figure out how the course of history can be changed. I appreciate your testimony on this subject, but I still am troubled by the fact that I am not sure we have a handle on how we are going to turn things around.

Dr. IKLE. There is no single answer. Military measures are needed, economic measures, and as you know, this is not part of our Department of Defense, but we also plan for Radio Marti, Radio Cuba, so that the Cuban people can be better informed about what goes on on the island. That is very, very important.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Secretary, we thank you for your—

Senator DODD. Mr. Secretary—Mr. Chairman, could I ask just one more question?

Senator HELMS. The Senator from Connecticut.

PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

Senator DODD. Since you are here, how are the Panama Canal treaties doing? How is it working? Is it working all right down there?

Dr. IKLE. As far as I know, the operations are working all right and the process is functioning.

Senator DODD. Is it the Department's conclusion that this has been a pretty good deal, aside from the specifics of the working of the treaties, that this has been a fairly effective counter to Cuban influence in Panama?

Dr. IKLE. I think the concerns about the upside and the possible downside of the treaty really cannot be answered for a long time. As I understand those who were concerned, apart from the obvious benefits of the treaty there might be a downside. There were people who were concerned about that.

We are taking no long-term view. We would have to meet again maybe in several years—

Senator DODD. But short-term, it seems to be doing that?

Dr. IKLE. In the short-term it is entirely satisfactory.

Senator DODD. And just for the record, the involvement in Angola occurred in 1975. The opening up of the Cuban interest section occurred in September of 1977, not the reverse.

Dr. IKLE. Yes. I appreciate the correction.

Senator DODD. I think there was some confusion there. The Cuban involvement in Angola did not happen after we opened the Cuba mission.

Dr. IKLE. But they further increased their forces in Angola.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Secretary, of course the test on the Panama treaties will occur later on, because there has been little perceptible change in the operation thus far. You will say for the record that we are inhibited in the use of our bases down there certainly in terms of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and other hostility in the region. So it would not be accurate, nor do I believe you wish to imply, that all is well. The canal is still operating, true, but there are other inhibiting factors.

I will have some questions in writing on that which you can answer later. I would say again what I have said earlier, that these hearings will be continued after the recess. There will be many of them, I will say to my friend from Connecticut, and I will be glad to consult with him on the nature of the hearings.

I think there is no disagreement at all between Senator Dodd and me on what we would like to achieve. There may be some divergence as to how to achieve it.

Without objection from the committee, the Chair will instruct the staff to proceed to have these hearings printed, and of course the record will be kept open for a couple of days so that the Senators present and not present may submit questions to Secretary Ikle, as was the case with Ambassador Enders yesterday.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, are we also going to get those options? They are going to provide that for us?

Senator HELMS. Yes. Let me wish all a joyful and meaningful holiday season, and thank you again for coming up. We stand in recess. [Additional questions and answers follow:]

[From the Congressional Record, Aug. 11, 1982]

RESPONSE OF FRED C. IKLE CONCERNING FIDEL CASTRO

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, shortly we will be voting on the *Symms amendment*. It has been suggested that instead of drawing a clear line of demarcation we should pursue a course of moderation and friendship with Fidel Castro. It is asserted that such a policy will give positive results.

Earlier this year, I made inquiry of Dr. Fred C. Ikle, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Dr. Ikle's response to my questions are significant in terms of the argument that is being made that it is safe for us to discard the Monroe Doctrine.

I ask unanimous consent that my questions and the answers given by Dr. Ikle be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

"Senator HELMS. It has been suggested that Fidel Castro is merely reacting to the hostility displayed by the United States, and that a more moderate and flexible U.S. policy might give him an alternative to relying almost exclusively on Moscow. Do you find any merit in this reasoning?

"Mr. IKLE. I think that question is adequately answered by Castro's actions in response to varying U.S. policy shifts during the past six years under several Administrations. You will recall that about six years ago Cuban military forces were just beginning their military buildup in Angola. President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger made strong public statements that the United States would not tolerate such conduct, and for a period of time in December 1975, the Soviet airlift of Cuban troops and equipment to Angola was halted. Then the Congress passed the Tunney/Clark Amendment, tying the President's hands by prohibiting further assistance to the non-communist elements in Angola. The Soviet-Cuban airlift resumed immediately, and within two weeks the number of Cuban troops in Angola had doubled. It continued to increase gradually in the following year, so that at the end of the Ford Administration there were estimated to be about 14,000 Cubans in Angola.

President Carter's Administration took a more sympathetic approach to the Cuban problem, and made a significant effort to improve U.S. relations with the Castro government. For example, the Carter Administration:

"Opened an 'interest section' in Havana, and permitted the Cuban Government to do the same in Washington.

"Relaxed the travel restrictions on Cuban diplomats at the United Nations and in Washington.

"Encouraged increased cultural exchanges between the two countries.

"Lifted the restrictions on vessels which had previously called at Cuban ports allowing them to subsequently visit U.S. ports.

"Lifted the ban on travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba.

"Permitted the resumption of charter flights between Cuba and the United States.

"It is worth recalling the response of Mr. Castro to these friendly overtures. During the Carter Administration, Cuba:

"Increased the number of Cuban military personnel in Angola from about 14,000 to 20,000.

"Increased the Cuban presence in Ethiopia from 0 to a height of 17,000 in 1978 and in Nicaragua from 0 to 500.

"Initiated a massive effort to subvert noncommunist regimes in Latin America. Cuba provided military assistance to Nicaragua to include advisors, weapons such as surface to air missiles, anti-aircraft guns and light arms. In the case of Grenada, Cuba provided advisors and anti-aircraft weapons and began construction of an airfield which would have military utility.

"Denounced the United States at the summit meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana in September 1979. Castro charged that Latin America had historically suffered greatly from U.S. aggression, colonialism, and neo-colonialism.

"These actions hardly support the contention that a more conciliatory approach by the United States to United States-Cuban relations will make Castro our friend.

"The United States is not looking for a confrontation with Cuba. Nevertheless, we are unwilling to sit idly by while Fidel Castro and his Soviet bosses subvert and seek to overthrow the less powerful non-communist governments of the region. If Castro truly desires peace and improved relations with the United States, he should begin such a rapprochement by stopping his aggression and permit other States to live in peace. We assure you that a halt in Cuban efforts to subvert other countries would not go unnoticed by this Administration.

"However, so long as Fidel Castro continues his aggressive policies in Latin America, Africa, and other regions of the world, we will continue to regard him as a serious threat to international peace and stability. We believe—and the history of the 1975 Tunney-Clark Amendment suggests—that the credibility of our deterrent rests in large part on Congressional attitudes; and thus the need to resort eventually to the use of U.S. military forces will be determined in part by Castro's perception of Congressional views. Unless the Congress is perceived to be supportive of the President's strategy, no U.S. action short of actual military force is likely to have much influence on Cuban policy.

"Senator HELMS. What effect do you believe knowledge of the fact that the Joint Chiefs have contingency plans to meet Cuban aggression in the region will have on Cuban decision makers?

"Mr. IKLE. Unfortunately, history demonstrates that peace is not furthered by failing to respond effectively to the threat or use of armed force. We believe it is important that Fidel Castro be put on notice that the United States is capable of responding to continued aggression with a wide range of flexible options aimed at making the costs of aggression and subversion greatly outweigh perceived benefits.

"If Mr. Castro wants to promote the security of Cuba, he should cease his efforts to undermine and overthrow the governments of other states. We hope that by alerting him to our deep concerns, and our strong commitment to the cause of freedom, he will appreciate the wisdom of ceasing his subversion of other States."

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Question 1. Please respond to reports that the Secretary of Defense has been taking the position that the United States should not become involved in direct military action or a blockade of Cuba and/or Nicaragua.

Answer. The Secretary of Defense recognizes the significance of the Cuban/Nicaraguan linkage with the subversion taking place in Central America. For example, he has stated that a Marxist takeover in El Salvador "would be a foothold on the mainland that we would very much be opposed to seeing take effect." He has supported providing additional military training and economic assistance to El Salvador but has indicated that he did not see any need for American military activity and hoped that U.S. military action would be avoidable. This is consistent with the President's statement that "We have no plans for putting Americans in combat any place in the world."

Question 2. What do you see as the options the United States has with regard to policy toward Cuba and Nicaragua?

Answer. It has been our policy that it would not be in the security interests of the United States to reveal the details of any options that may be under consideration.

As you know, the President has recently indicated that he does not favor the use of military forces in Central America at this time. Should the situation change and a decision be reached to increase substantially the role of U.S. Armed Forces in countering Cuban and Soviet aggression in this hemisphere, the appropriate consultative procedures would be followed prior to the implementation of such a decision.

Question 3. In your testimony, you seem to be making a case for increased U.S. military assistance to El Salvador. What are you planning in terms of money, types of equipment, and U.S. military advisors?

Answer. The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 authorized \$25 million in FMS and \$1 million in IMET for El Salvador for fiscal year 1982. However, there is a need for more money to pay for expanded training, such as the out-of-country training for Salvadoran forces now underway in the United States. Types of equipment that may be provided could include trucks and communications equipment to improve command control, individual and crew-served weapons systems for the expanded force structure, helicopters for modernizing the World War II vintage aircraft inventory, and Navy patrol boats to improve interdiction. There are no plans to provide U.S. military advisors, only to continue the Mobile Training Teams (MTTs).

Question 4. What is your assessment of the military situation in El Salvador? What are your sources of information?

Answer. The Salvadoran military is improving and has the military advantage. Salvadoran forces are now capable of conducting operations against the guerrillas in all parts of the country.

Two years ago the insurgents began their campaign to take over El Salvador. They were and are trained and supported by people with 25 years experience in guerrilla warfare. Their approach was tied to a very sophisticated understanding of tactical intelligence, command and control, and disciplined troops. They have never had large numbers or widespread popular support, yet their understanding of insurgency allowed them to exploit the deficiencies of the Salvadoran military.

The Salvadoran military, 28 months ago, was literally a 19th century constabulary force, with poor training and positioned to face a possible threat from Honduras. With the rise of a nationwide guerrilla campaign, the Armed Forces were ill-prepared to fight this type of war. They started fighting the guerrillas with no clear understanding of the complex nature of this type of conflict.

In the past year the Salvadoran Armed Forces have had to learn how to counter a well developed guerrilla threat while training and expanding their forces. They are rapidly learning how to cope with the insurgency. During the January 1981 general offensive, the guerrillas were unable to defeat the poorly trained and unprepared Salvadoran military. In any direct contact with government forces, the government forces have been successful in routing the guerrillas. Further, the guerrillas cannot defend any territory that government forces decide to enter. The steady improvements in the capability of the government forces are overcoming many past deficiencies.

Certainly, it should be recognized that the Salvadoran military has many short-comings and its development into a modern, well-trained counterinsurgency force cannot take place without some setbacks and time to make the necessary adjustments.

Question 5. What lead to differences of opinion between Secretary Haig and Colonel Garcia on the stalemate issue?

Answer. We defer to the Department of State as the agency best qualified and appropriate to respond to this question.

Question 6. If the guerrillas are receiving increased amounts of weapons, how do you explain the stalemate? Why wouldn't the guerrillas be achieving military successes given the limited military capabilities of the Salvadoran military?

Answer. Prior to the January 1981 general offensive, there was a heavy flow of weapons into El Salvador. This flow dropped off following the insurgents' defeat but since March 1981 it has again been on the increase.

There has been a commensurate improvement in Salvadoran military forces which have, to date, limited the insurgents to hit and run tactics and attacks against the infrastructure.

Question 7. What is your assessment of Salvadoran military capabilities?

Answer. The Salvadoran military is capable of preventing a military victory by the guerrillas, but they are not yet able to control the insurgency sufficiently to address the underlying social and economic problems. A major problem for the Salvadoran military has been coping with the strain of fighting a countrywide insurgency, while at the same time expanding the size of its forces. The rapid increase in force levels has left the military severely short of junior officers and NCOs. The training of one battalion, as well as 500-600 junior officers, in the United States will measurably assist El Salvador to enhance the professionalism of its military forces.

Question 8. Are the refugee camps on the Honduran border a military problem?

Answer. Yes, they are. However, the Honduran Government is in the process of relocating these camps away from the border. [Deleted.]

Question 9. What are your sources saying about the extent of guerrilla control of the countryside in El Salvador?

Answer. The guerrillas are concentrated mainly in lightly populated, mountainous areas along the border with Honduras. They hold territory only in the absence of a government presence, and have been unable to hold any territory once the government has decided to enter an area. As the failure of the January 1981 offensive indicated, the insurgents continue to be unable to develop the support of the people.

Question 10. How successful are the guerrillas in mobilizing the support of the peasants in El Salvador?

Answer. The guerrillas have not been successful in mobilizing the support of the peasants in El Salvador.

Question 11. What is the state of the civil-military relations in the rural areas of El Salvador?

Answer. Relations between the regular military forces and the people in rural areas are reported to be improving as control over the troops becomes more effective. However, relations with elements outside the regular military (Treasury Police, National Police and National Guard) have improved more slowly.

Question 12. Is the Defense Department asserting that there are Cuban troops in El Salvador? If not, why have not officials put to rest the allegations made in the Evans-Novak column that Cuban special forces troops were involved in the operation to destroy the Rio Lempa Bridge? Reporters have been given vague responses to questions by officials on this matter.

Answer. No. In this case, as in others of its kind, it is not appropriate or in our best interests for the Department of Defense to respond to the many highly speculative allegations regarding security issues that appear daily in the media. [Deleted.]

Question 13. Do you believe there has been an increase in the flow of weapons from Cuba into El Salvador? If so, why do you think the guerrillas are not gaining the upper hand?

Answer. There has been an increase in the flow of weapons into El Salvador during the past few months. However, despite this ready access to weapons, the guerrillas presently do not have the manpower to militarily defeat the government forces. The insurgents have limited themselves to hit and run tactics and destruction of the infrastructure.

Question 14. During his visit to Washington, Salvadoran Defense Minister Garcia did not make an issue of Cuban involvement in El Salvador. What do you think of his assessment of the situation?

Answer. First of all, let us set the record straight. COL Garcia most emphatically made an issue of Cuban involvement in El Salvador here in Washington at the XIVth Conference of the American Armies (XIVth CAA). In his November 5 speech entitled "Aggression in El Salvador," COL Garcia clearly demonstrated that the fingerprints of Fidel Castro are all over the insurgency in El Salvador in what is blatant intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. We agree with this assessment, and Castro has himself admitted to assisting the guerrillas. In order for the Committee and the public to have the benefit of COL Garcia's indictment of the Cubans and their Soviet masters, we are submitting for the record the November 5 speech of COL Garcia. See attachment.

(Presentation by the Minister of Defense and Public Safety of El Salvador, Col. D. E. M. Jose Guillermo Garcia, to XIV Conference of American Armies, on November 5, 1981.)

AGGRESSION IN EL SALVADOR

1. INTRODUCTION

It is most gratifying to me, and a high honor, that I have been invited to address this distinguished meeting, and given an opportunity to describe the current situation in El Salvador as it really is. I am extremely grateful to each and every one of the military Delegations gathered here.

I am sure that all of you here, at the mention of the word "violence", will think of El Salvador, and the mention of El Salvador will bring the word "violence" to your minds.

On March 30, 1980, at the funeral service for Archbishop Romero, the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, a priest named Miguel de Escoto, accused the Armed Forces of El Salvador of having perpetrated a massacre.

On April 26, 1981, Roy Burgeois, a priest of the Maryknoll Order, who had entered the country as an interpreter with a CBS television crew, disappeared after leaving his San Salvador hotel. The blame for his disappearance and death was laid at the door of the Salvadorian public security forces two days later, when a body was found answering the description of Father Burgeois and dressed in his clothing.

On August 10, 1981, the world press reported that the Salvadorian Armed Forces were unable to dislodge the terrorists who had taken over the town of Perquin in Morazan Department and established a revolutionary government in that liberated territory.

There you have three examples of a stream of Soviet actions intended to discredit and weaken El Salvador and other countries. The three accusations I have just mentioned are false. Both national and international correspondents were witnesses to the fact that the public security forces and the Army were strictly confined to barracks during Archbishop Romero's funeral service and so were not present in the area where the events are alleged to have taken place. Likewise, Father Burgeois appeared in person at his country's Embassy ten days after his supposed disappearance and left El Salvador for the U.S. on May 7 this year; no one so far has been concerned about the Salvadorian who was sacrificed in the cause of subversion to deceive international public opinion.

Contrary to what was reported in the international press, the Salvadorian Armed Forces, after guaranteeing the lives of the civilian hostages taken by the terrorists in Perquin, cleared the town of the subversive elements in a few hours.

In other words, news items of this type are the result of false information spread by the international subversive propaganda apparatus. They are a new, basic weapon of subversion in El Salvador and are one aspect of an unmistakable strategy designed to achieve subversive objectives.

It is apparent that the concept of modern warfare has changed, especially that followed in the present struggle in El Salvador. Subversive terrorism now includes as a vital element of its strategy a generalized form of psychological warfare, which relies on psychological pressure as a major means of capitalizing on national and international public opinion. That strategy also uses lies and exaggeration, as in the case of El Salvador, to throw the communications media into confusion.

In my capacity as Minister of Defense and Public Safety of El Salvador, I wish to state again that this Conference provides me, and through me the Armed Forces I represent, with an invaluable opportunity to describe the current situation in El Salvador as it really is.

2. BACKGROUND

(a) *Social*—Prior to October 15, 1979, Salvadorian society had developed in a context of marked social differences characterized by divisiveness and antagonism among the various segments of the population. The situation was exacerbated under the influence of Marxist theories, which had long been fomenting class struggle and exploiting the marginalization of the poorest groups of Salvadorian society by its economically powerful sectors.

Other factors aggravated the difficult social situation existing in El Salvador:

- (1) The effect of international communist expansion;
- (2) High population density (240 persons per km²);
- (3) The filled need for jobs, housing, health care, an adequate diet and education, resulting from the country's state of underdevelopment.

(b) *Economic*—The wealth of the country was concentrated in the lands of a few families, who consequently held political power. They owned the best

land, the source of commodities like coffee, cotton and sugarcane on which the Salvadorian economy was based. They also controlled the foreign trade in these products as well as the national banking and financial system.

(c) *Political*—Until 1931, El Salvador's political rulers were members of the families making up the economically powerful sector. Thereafter, the country's Presidents were military officers who had the support of the same group.

Lacking the complete support of the Armed Forces, this situation led—in 1944, 1948, 1960, 1961 and 1972—to successful or attempted coups d'état aimed at ending a state of affairs which hindered the professionalization of the Armed Forces and went against the interests of the great majority of the Salvadorian population.

The established governmental system functioned on the basis of fraud, heavy taxation and in general on manipulation of the electoral process.

In a word, the prevailing economic, political and social system was discriminatory and unjust and failed to meet the aspirations and needs of the people.

(d) *Military*—The development of the Armed Forces in El Salvador has been marked by professional and technical advances corresponding to changes in the military arts and sciences. The same limitations seen in any developing country also affected El Salvador in the spheres of logistics, personnel and the procurement of armaments, materiel and equipment.

3. THE MILITARY ACTION OF OCTOBER 15, 1979

On October 15, 1979 the Armed Forces of El Salvador deposed the Government of General Carlos Humberto Romero, setting up a Revolutionary Government Junta composed of three civilian members representatives of progressive capitalism and grassroots organizations making up El Salvadorian popular Front together with two military officers representing the Armed Forces. This action, essentially the result of the conditions prevailing at the time, was a manifestation of the right of insurrection open to all peoples whose governments fail to comply with the law.

The proclamation of the armed forces

The Proclamation of the Armed Forces and the military action of October 15, 1979, marked the beginning of a revolutionary process of democratization and profound social and economic change. The fundamental tenets of that Proclamation are:

- (a) the elimination of violence and corruption;
 - (b) the guarantee of human rights;
 - (c) the adoption of measures to ensure an equitable distribution of the national wealth, accompanied by accelerated increases in gross national product;
 - (d) the directing of El Salvador's external relations toward positive ends.
- (For further details, see the accompanying documents.)

4. POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENT SINCE OCTOBER 15, 1979

Taking the panoramic view, the major political and military events occurring since October 15, 1979, can be divided into the following periods:

(a) *October 15, 1979 to January 9, 1980*—The distinguishing mark of this first period is that the Government was a coalition of the Armed Forces and certain social and political groups representing the interests of the left and the extreme left. Known as the Foro Popular, it failed to crystallize the political pluralism to which the Armed Forces aspired and which was categorically declared in their Proclamation.

When two members of the first Revolutionary Government Junta, accompanied by many cabinet members, resigned from their government posts en masse, it was not due to the failure of a process but to the limits imposed by international Communist expansionism. That force desired either true reform nor revolutionary change, but only to secure and consolidate its political power, principally by destroying El Salvador's Armed Forces. During this period the Armed Forces pressed for the formulation and implementation of the emergency program referred to in their Proclamation.

It is of particular interest to mention here that Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo, a member of the first Junta and who is now Chairman of the Frente Democrático Revolucionario, after 87 days in power limited himself to dissolving the Organización Democrática Nacionalista, (ORDEN, a group without legal status). In so doing, he forgot to make the structural changes which he himself had demagogically advocated as a member of the Foro Popular and which he continues to advocate from his present political position in the service of terrorism.

The activities of Roman Mayorga Quiroz, another member of the first Junta and former Rector of the Jesuit-run Catholic University of El Salvador, were quite similar to those of Dr. Ungo. At present he is actively involved in terrorist front organizations, living outside the country.

Other members of the cabinet of the first Revolutionary Junta who resigned—such as Salvador Samayoa Jr. (Minister of Education), Hector Dada Hirezi (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Ruben Zemora Rivas (Minister of the Office of the President) and Rafael Oqueli Colindres (Minister of the Interior)—as well as certain members of the Foro Popular entrenched at the highest levels of the Salvadorian Government, also had an opportunity to put into effect the social and political changes so badly needed by the country. Although they had advocated such changes in the past, they failed to implement them because of their unwavering obedience to the precepts of international Communist expansionism.

Dr. Dada Hirezi left the country one day before the agrarian reform was decreed.

(b) *January 9, 1980 to January 10, 1981*—In response to the crisis that arose in late December 1979 and early January 1980, the Armed Forces of El Salvador were compelled to invite the various political forces of the country to participate in the formation of a new Government Junta and cabinet. This brought the leaders of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) directly into the political arena, under a political agreement concluded by the Armed Forces with that organization.

On January 9 the second Revolutionary Government Junta took office, this time with two Christian Democrats replacing an international socialist of the extreme left and a follower of the Jesuitical leftist clerical line. There was also an independent professional member who replaced the businessman on the Junta.

The second Revolutionary Government Junta was reorganized in early March of that year with the departure from the country of the Christian Democrat Hector Dada Hirezi. He was replaced by another Christian Democrat, Jose Napoleon Duarte.

It is important to note that the first Revolutionary Government Junta did not follow the precepts of the Armed Forces Proclamation. It was the second Junta, a few days after its formation and at the urging of the Salvadorian Armed Forces themselves, which decreed and implemented the agrarian reform, the nationalization of the banks, and government control of foreign trade.

It is worth noting also that the Armed Forces believed that political democratization and socioeconomic structural change are the only course of action open to El Salvador. Adhering to the policy guidelines laid down in their Proclamation, they made all of the efforts and sacrifices necessary to put those major changes into effect, with the following accomplishments during the period in question:

(1) In early March of 1980 the Armed Forces participated in taking over the properties included in the first phase of the agrarian reform, which were turned over to the rural cooperatives. Thus began the most profound and peaceful agrarian action ever witnessed in the Americas, directly benefiting the rural communities and holding out the prospect of integral development for these deprived groups of El Salvador.

(2) In the same month the Armed Forces occupied the offices of the credit institutions and savings and loan associations of the Republic, thereby beginning the nationalization of the banking and financial system. I should mention that this action was applauded even by the employees of those institutions.

(3) At the initiative of the Armed Forces, the nationalization of foreign trade was also decreed in March 1980; the commodities involved were coffee, cotton and sugarcane, the leading earners of foreign exchange for the national economy.

(4) On the recommendation of the Armed Forces:

(a) Effective measures have been adopted both to protect consumers and to prevent excessive inflation.

(b) Action is being taken to stamp out corruption in public administration and in the administration of justice.

(c) An amnesty was declared in 1980 so that the armed terrorists who wished to take advantage of it would abandon their destructive ways. This measure has brought a substantial number of terrorists (1500) under the protection of the Armed Forces.

(d) Far-reaching and massive programs in health, education and housing have been undertaken to benefit the poorest of our people.

(5) Friendly relations have been re-established with the Republic of Honduras by a General Peace Treaty signed in 1980, which the Armed Forces welcomed.

(6) The Armed Forces have fostered the spirit of Central American unity to its full extent.

(7) The Government of El Salvador has maintained cordial relations with all countries of the world that respect our nation's sovereignty.

During this period armed subversive terrorist action in El Salvador was aimed at frustrating our economic objectives, in the hope of thrusting the national economy into chaos by imposing capricious war taxes and by massacring and threatening farmers in order to prevent them from planting. The terrorists burned public transportation facilities, government and private vehicles, sugar and coffee mills, sugarcane plantations and cotton warehouses. They also burned government ministry buildings, municipal buildings and telecommunications offices, and used dynamite to attack banks, power substations and transmission towers, bridges and diplomatic offices. We can infer from all of this that the purpose of subversion in El Salvador is to destroy the national economy in order to seize power and establish a totalitarian regime of the Marxist-Leninist stamp in our country. This goes against the deepest feelings of the Salvadorian people, who have manifested their support and respect for the Armed Forces by word and deed.

(c) *January 1981 to the present*—In fulfillment of their constitutional mandate and in keeping with their discipline and professionalism, the Armed Forces are one state institution that, over the years since our independence, has struggled to uphold the democratic system in El Salvador, that has guaranteed and will continue to guarantee the integrity of the national territory and the sovereignty of the Republic. Accordingly, both in El Salvador and in other countries where similar situations have occurred, Communist subversion has sought, and in some countries such as Cuba and Nicaragua, has achieved the complete destruction of the Armed Forces and the formation of People's Armies with a Marxist-Leninist bent. In following this pattern the principal military objective of the Communist subversion that is openly operating in our territory has been since January 10, 1981, the total elimination of the present Armed Forces and the creation of a "new-style" army that would be based on the "Peoples' Army" built up during the subversion process.

The Plan of War and the Plan of National Insurrection, which the forces of subversion had formulated for their final offensive of January 10, 1981, as well as the actions taken on that date, are described fully in the documents in your possession.

It should be emphasized that the Salvadorian Army neutralized the final offensive of the terrorists in 72 hours and without any military aid from abroad even though the day before, January 9, the terrorists had announced, both within and outside El Salvador, the success of their operation and their control of a large part of the country.

Finally, special mention should be made of the fact that the Salvadorian people refused the support sought by the terrorist groups for general strike on January 12. In that and subsequent actions the Salvadorian people demonstrated, at home and abroad, that together with the Government and the Army they were steadfastly opposed to supporting those who were causing violence and destruction in their country.

A. POLITICAL SOLUTION

The groups armed by international Communism, which by their acts are destroying our national fabric and trying to bring us into a sphere of influence alien to our democratic political system, are the same groups that are actively fighting our Army.

It is precisely these armed groups, calling themselves Organizations of the People, which claim that a constructive dialogue should be begun to establish a democratic way of life. Since they have openly declared hostilities against the people, the Government and the Armed Forces, there would be no purpose in opening any dialogue with them until they abandon their hostile attitude.

They are the forces that have declared this war and it is they who must lay down their arms if peace is to be achieved. These armed groups are not made up of Salvadorian citizens who seek the well-being of the people; they are terrorist groups ignorant of what patriotism means, led and trained by foreign elements and guided by ideologies alien to our political system.

To sit down and talk to terrorists would be tantamount to declaring that we too are terrorists. As for establishing a democratic co-existence with those armed groups, the misnamed "Organizations of the People," it is enough to ask: Is it possible to live in peace and democracy with those who have sought and are trying to destroy our country? What response did the Communist subversion give to the Amnesty Decree and its extension? What was their response to the proposal for a Salvadorian Bishops' Conference?

Dialogue takes place between persons, between civilized groups; between representatives of states in a common dispute, but there can be no dialogue between the law and lawbreakers.

(a) *Political Position and Election*—With the full support of the Salvadorian Army and the Salvadorian people who went en masse to the Flor Blanca National Stadium on September 15, 1981, our Independence Day, the Revolutionary Junta, through its President Jose Napoleon Duarte, announced the political stance of the Government of El Salvador, which holds that the solution to the crisis which our country is experiencing must be basically political in nature.

In that regard it states that "the electoral process is the proper instrument for achieving a democratic solution, a key element of which is an inter-party dialogue in which all legally registered political parties may take part without discrimination of any kind, ideological or political.

"The Government of El Salvador has decided not to negotiate or to establish a dialogue with armed subversive elements or with any similar group for the purpose of making deals behind the back of the people. It urges them to lay down their arms and take part in the democratic contest under peaceful conditions."

"This proposal is in itself the road to peace and harmony; it was presented not only to the various domestic forces bent upon prolonging the violence but to all peoples of the world and in particular to those sister countries that have believed in the honesty of our purpose. We ask them that just as they gave us their support at the time interventionism was repelled, they give us their support in the crusade for democracy and national pacification. We are ready to concentrate our energy on establishing the best possible conditions for the Salvadorian people to decide at the ballot box what the fundamental characteristics of our new nation should be."

Two years after the military action of October 15, 1979, at a mass meeting of support for the Salvadorian Army, the Commander-in-Chief, Colonel Jaime Abdul Gutierrez, in addition to lifting the curfew, proclaimed an extended amnesty for all those who had continued to take part in the violence. Among other things he stated: "Thus, while the spokesman of the Democratic Front, from his comfortable position as a permanent guest in luxury hotels, once again threatens us with war if we do not bow to his unacceptable proposals, we are offering to those who are fighting and dying in the mountains and suffering deprivations of all kinds, the possibility of once again becoming part of a peaceful country and thus of escaping the deception in which they have been kept and of participating in a revolutionary process in which the masses of the people are being increasingly involved. . . ."

(b) *Interventionism in El Salvador*—Since the present conflict in El Salvador is part of the struggle of the great world powers for hegemony, it cannot go unnoticed by those who serve either cause or ideology. They are major factors in the struggle of all those involved in the Salvadorian problem, either directly or indirectly.

Thanks to the world networks of international Communism, the subversive forces have widely publicized their political objective and policies throughout the world. Because these are in accord with the Marxist-Leninist principles laid down by the international Communist movement, the subversives are receiving the support of all Communist countries and their satellites as well as of those governments, international agencies, world personalities and political groups that are linked to Marxism. The French/Mexican position and that of the countries that have adhered to it insofar as it relates to the Salvadorian problem, may be characterized as a clear manifestation of diplomatic and political intervention in the internal affairs of our country. It gave official and public recognition to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and to the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) of El Salvador as representative forces willing to assume the obligations and the rights deriving therefrom, and in addition proposed that the Armed Forces be reorganized.

Another type of intervention is the peace proposal for El Salvador presented at the United Nations by the Coordinator of the Government Junta of Nicaragua, who was accompanied on the Nicaraguan delegation by Guillermo Ungo, in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations, since he is the President of the FDR. This proposal, which was made in the name of the FMLN and the FDR, contains a commitment to seek and implement a peaceful settlement, for which purpose they propose a set of general principles, foremost being the reorganization of the Salvadorian Army, including the incorporation into it of the officers and enlisted men of the FMLN.

Another type of intervention is the supply of large amounts of high-quality military equipment. The subversive forces operating in the country have received, are receiving, and could continue to receive equipment from the supply base that the Russians and the Castroists have established in Nicaragua. Also Salvadorian citizens have received military training and political indoctrination in Russia, Cuba and Nicaragua.

Mention must also be made of the assistance that continues to be provided in various countries through subversive organizations under the cover of ecumenical and humanitarian committees. So far we may conclude: that the national and international high command of the subversives has the military and financial resources needed to support its forces and to achieve their objectives in El Salvador. Once their military objective has been gained they have the military support of Communist and socialist countries around the world.

In this context, the Soviet Union has an opportunity to realize its geopolitical objective in the region—further political and military penetration in the American continent through the direct action of Cuba—and of strengthening the already existing pro-Soviet position in Nicaragua in order to continue its expansion in Central America and the Western Hemisphere. This was demonstrated by recent events in Colombia which forced the government of that country to suspend diplomatic relations with Cuba because of the support, in particular training, given to the M19 terrorists.

We should also take a glance at the similar problems of international subversion that the democratic countries have faced. Clearly, there are no identical armies, peoples, or governments and the terrorist criminal groups act in different ways in each region and country. But all of them—armies, peoples, and governments—have the same purpose. For the Armed Forces, it is to be the faithful guardians of territorial sovereignty and integrity and to obey and enforce the laws of the Republic; for the peoples, the yearning to live in peace and to work; and for the democratic governments, to use all their efforts to provide their people with a decent way of life. Communist subversion seeks to enslave the people and to rule them in accordance with Marxist-Leninist ideology and practice, and above all to destroy the Armed Forces.

6. CONCLUSIONS

As part of their demagogic plan the Marxists are deceiving the people by telling them that they want to take power in order to make radical changes in the economic, social, and political structures. But when they are part of the Government, as for example Ungo and his comrades, who were members of the first Revolutionary Junta and its Cabinet, they did not make any of the changes they had advocated. The changes that have been made in the Salvadorian revolutionary process prove that they can be carried out in a society without the need for a Marxist-Leninist totalitarian system. It has been found in our country that social, economic, and political changes can be brought about with the resolute participation of the legally constituted Armed Forces. Our countries must assign greater importance to international communication in order to offset the propaganda of world subversives whose main purpose is to spread false information. We must on no account allow Central America to come under Marxist-Leninist governments, given the geopolitical and strategic importance it represents for any power that dominates this region. Mention should be made of the imbalance of forces in the Central American Isthmus, caused by the increase in the strength of the Nicaraguan Army and the amount of materiel, equipment, and arms supplied to that country. We believe that those countries which are not Communist but have directly or indirectly supported the subversion in El Salvador have done so because they do not know what is really happening in our country. The subversive forces in El Salvador pinned their hopes for achieving power on the following factors:

1. Popular support (which the terrorists have not been able to gain)
2. Military operations (which were unsuccessful)
3. A political and diplomatic offensive based on international deceit.

In El Salvador, the people, the Government and the Army are waging a war against international subversion and are playing a decisive role in the defense of democracy in the American hemisphere.

7. REFLECTIONS

From what we have said about the tragedy of El Salvador, we may ask: Will we win the understanding and support of all the countries of the free world? Will military, diplomatic, and economic aid cease to be given to the subversives in El Salvador? Will we Salvadorians be forced by international pressure to surrender our country to Soviet imperialism? Must a Marxist political system be established in El Salvador before the American hemisphere understands the real intentions of Soviet expansion?

Only time will give the answers to these questions, taking into account the moral and materiel support of the countries opposed to Communist expansionism.

Before I step down from this rostrum, I wish to publicly express the sincere appreciation of the Salvadorian people, its Army and its Government to the peoples and governments of the friendly countries that have provided us with materiel and moral support for the continued existence of our country, which yearns for peace, freedom, and democracy.

I have given you the authentic testimony of a Salvadorian soldier who is fighting against aggression.

Question 15. Do you believe that there are Nicaraguan troops in El Salvador?

Answer. No. However, it is likely that individual Nicaraguan citizens, some of whom are probably former military, are participating with insurgent elements inside El Salvador.

Question 16. Why do you believe the Nicaraguans are building up their armed forces? Do you believe they would attack their neighbors?

Answer. The intentions of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) are not clear. However, the massive buildup occurring is far in excess of forces necessary to exercise domestic control.

Question 17. Is it not true that the Nicaraguans perceive threats from the United States as well as their neighbors and former Somoza national guardsmen in exile?

Answer. Yes, this is what they claim. However, their refusal to stop supporting insurgencies in other countries casts doubt on the intended use of their massive military buildup.

Question 18. Are there Cuban troops in Nicaragua?

Answer. Yes. However, there are no known units of Cuban troops in Nicaragua.

Question 19. What roles are performed by Cuban military advisers and the civilian technicians in Nicaragua?

Answer. Cuban military personnel are extensively involved at all levels of the Nicaraguan Armed Forces and security forces, providing advice and technical training. Cuban civilian technicians are involved throughout the Government but with concentrations in education, health, and public works.

Question 20. Do the Nicaraguans receive any military assistance from Western nations? Have they requested military assistance from Western nations?

Answer. The only military supply relationship with a Western nation is the recently announced \$15.8 million contract with France. This sale will result in delivery to Nicaragua of two patrol boats, two helicopters and a small quantity of trucks along with provision of training for pilots and boat personnel. Panama provided some assistance in police operations and training in 1979 but this assistance was terminated by early 1980. In 1979, the United States made some overtures to the Sandinistas regarding provision of nation building type equipment but the Sandinistas did not follow-up. Also, Nicaragua, with other Central American countries, is included in and benefits from the Venezuelan-Mexican Joint Oil Facility. [Deleted.]

Question 21. The Administration has indicated a desire to resume military assistance to Guatemala. Please give your rationale for the need for such assistance. What are you planning in terms of money, types of equipment, and U.S. military personnel?

Answer. Guatemala is confronted with a serious and growing threat from a Cuban supported insurgency. We have not provided security assistance since 1978, due initially to the Government of Guatemala's (GOG) taking umbrage at the human rights policy of the previous Administration, which the GOG considered interventionist. Continued denial of military assistance has been based on Guatemala's poor human record. The outstanding security assistance cases, which are FMS cash sales and not credit, total about \$2 million and are basically in the field of spare parts and "safety of flight" equipment. The Air Force has been particularly hard hit by the lack of spare parts for its A-37 fixed wing aircraft and UH-1H helicopters. We anticipate no increase over the small MILGP currently in Guatemala.

Question 22. Are there more than 70 Nicaraguans being trained outside of Nicaragua?

Answer. Nicaraguans are being trained in Cuba and the Soviet Union. Hundreds of students—grade school through high school—are in training as students on the Cuban Isle of Youth (formerly Isle of Pines). In addition, some 50 fishery related students are studying that subject with a 4-year scholarship in Cuba.

At least 83 college-level students are currently in the Soviet Union studying a variety of disciplines, including the sciences, journalism, telecommunications, industrial engineering and entomology. These students are attending the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow.

Question 23. It has been suggested that Fidel Castro is merely reacting to the hostility displayed by the United States, and that a more moderate and flexible U.S. policy might give him an alternative to relying almost exclusively on Moscow. Do you find any merit in this reasoning?

Answer. I think that question is adequately answered by Castro's actions in response to varying U.S. policy shifts during the past 6 years under several Administrations. You will recall that about 6 years ago Cuban military forces were just beginning their military buildup in Angola. President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger made strong public statements that the United States would not tolerate such conduct, and for a period of time in December 1975, the Soviet airlift of Cuban troops and equipment to Angola was halted. Then the Congress passed the Tunney/Clark Amendment, tying the President's hands by prohibiting further assistance to the non-Communist elements in Angola. The Soviet-Cuban airlift resumed immediately, and within 2 weeks the number of Cuban troops in Angola had doubled. It continued to increase gradually in the following year, so that at the end of the Ford Administration there were estimated to be about 14,000 Cubans in Angola.

President Carter's Administration took a more sympathetic approach to the Cuban problem, and made a significant effort to improve U.S. relations with the Castro government. For example, the Carter Administration:

- Opened an "interest section" in Havana, and permitted the Cuban Government to do the same in Washington.

- Relaxed the travel restrictions on Cuban diplomats at the United Nations and in Washington.

- Encouraged increased cultural exchanges between the two countries.

- Lifted the restrictions on vessels which had previously called at Cuban ports allowing them to subsequently visit U.S. ports.

- Lifted the ban on travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba.

- Permitted the resumption of charter flights between Cuba and the United States.

It is worth recalling the response of Mr. Castro to these friendly overtures. During the Carter Administration, Cuba:

- Increased the number of Cuban military personnel in Angola from about 14,000 to 20,000.

- Increased the Cuban presence in Ethiopia from 0 to a high of 17,000 in 1978 and in Nicaragua from 0 to 500.

- Initiated a massive effort to subvert non-Communist regimes in Latin America. Cuba provided military assistance to Nicaragua to include advisors, weapons such as surface to air missiles, anti-aircraft guns and light arms. In the case of Grenada, Cuba provided advisors and anti-aircraft weapons and began construction of an airfield which would have military utility.

- Denounced the United States at the summit meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana in September 1979. Castro charged that Latin America had historically suffered greatly from U.S. aggression, colonialism, and neo-colonialism.

These actions hardly support the contention that a more conciliatory approach by the United State to United States-Cuban relations will make Castro our friend.

The United States is not looking for a confrontation with Cuba. Nevertheless, we are unwilling to sit idly by while Fidel Castro and his Soviet bosses subvert and seek to overthrow the less powerful non-Communist governments of the region. If Castro truly desires peace and improved relations with the United States, he should begin such a rapprochement by stopping his aggression and permit other States to live in peace. We assure you that a halt in Cuban efforts to subvert other countries would not go unnoticed by this Administration.

However, so long as Fidel Castro continues his aggressive policies in Latin America, Africa, and other regions of the world, we will continue to regard him as a serious threat to international peace and stability. We believe—and the history of the 1975 Tunney-Clark Amendment suggests—that the credibility of our deterrent rests in large part on Congressional attitudes; and thus the need to resort eventually to the use of U.S. military forces will be determined in part by Castro's perception of Congressional views. Unless the Congress is perceived to be supportive of the President's strategy, no U.S. action short of actual military force is likely to have much influence on Cuban policy.

Question 24. What effect do you believe knowledge of the fact that the Joint Chiefs have contingency plans to meet Cuban aggression in the region will have on Cuban decision makers?

Answer: Unfortunately, history demonstrates that peace is not furthered by failing to respond effectively to the threat or use of armed force. We believe it is important that Fidel Castro be put on notice that the United States is capable of responding to continued aggression with a wide range of flexible options aimed at making the costs of aggression and subversion greatly outweigh any perceived benefits.

If Mr. Castro wants to promote the security of Cuba, he should cease his efforts to undermine and overthrow the governments of other states. We hope that by alerting him to our deep concerns, and our strong commitment to the cause of freedom, he will appreciate the wisdom of ceasing his subversion of other States.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

CENTRAL AMERICA

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1982

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee convened, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, and Pell.

OPENING STATEMENT

Senator HELMS. The subcommittee will come to order. I am advised that other Senators will be here later in the morning. Since we have only 2 hours, I think we should proceed.

The subcommittee has called this hearing to continue the series begun in December. Those hearings included presentations by Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders and Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle, and both of these gentlemen outlined the considerable threat which Cuban aggression and subversion pose to countries in this hemisphere. I mention that because I hope that today's hearings will not be considered in isolation, but in the context of the findings presented in December.

Cuba and the Soviet Union have targeted countries throughout this hemisphere, with no regard for their form of government; countries which have a solid democratic tradition, as well as countries which are only now attempting to establish truly democratic institutions, have been targeted. And governments throughout the region must now cope with the increasing intensity of terrorism and destabilization planned, coordinated and supplied by Cuba and Cuba's friends.

I have just returned from Central America. I went to Honduras to serve as President Reagan's personal representative at the inauguration of President Roberto Suazo Cordoba. President Suazo is the first freely elected Honduran President in more than a decade. But with his election came the first sign of a resurgence of democracy in Central America.

Whether or not that free and open election will be the harbinger of freer and better times for the remainder of Central America remains to be seen. Certainly there is the desire on the part of the peoples of Central America for freely elected governments. Elections are scheduled for Costa Rica this weekend. Early next month there will be elections in Guatemala, and later in the month in El Salvador. Elections are also scheduled for the Dominican Republic and other Caribbean nations.

But just as much as the peoples of the region want free and open elections, so too Cuba, Nicaragua and their Soviet allies do not want free elections. The Marxists terrorists of the region, backed directly by Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet bloc, have as their goal the disruption of elections where possible and the takeover of governments in the region by physical force, not the ballot box.

We are hearing a lot of orchestrated propaganda about the situation in Central America. Some of it may be true. The purpose of these hearings is to get at the truth, realizing that there is no nation in the world that meets the standards of perfection. But we have to decide whether we are going to defend this hemisphere against the aggression of communism. If we are not, then we ought to decide that now. If we are, then we ought to decide how to do it and under what circumstances.

I note the presence of the distinguished Senator from Kansas, Mrs. Kassebaum. Senator, do you have a statement?

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not.

Senator HELMS. I thank you for being here this morning.

Now, we welcome again the distinguished ambassador, who has a statement, I understand, and I hope that it will include an overview of the prospects for democracy in Central America and the Caribbean. We welcome you and you may proceed as you wish, Mr. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS O. ENDERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Secretary ENDERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to come back before the subcommittee, particularly at this time when it seems to us that it is vital to clarify and to affirm what the United States is seeking to achieve and should seek to achieve in Central America as a whole, as well as in El Salvador in particular.

Perhaps then, if you agree, we should start from the fundamentals at this first hearing of what promises to be a week or longer of hearings on this subject. We believe that a responsible American policy must have two elements to it: defense of our national security interests; support for freedom; and where necessary, social reform allied to economic development.

There cannot be any mistaking that our national security interests are being challenged in the area. Cuba is systematically expanding its capacity to project military power beyond its own shores. The arrival this year of a second squadron of Mig-23/Floggers and the over 60,000 tons of war supplies imported from the Soviet Union last year come on top of what has already been several times the largest air, land, and sea inventory in the region.

Nicaragua is being exploited as a base for the export of subversion and armed intervention throughout Central America. Inside Nicaragua there are Soviet, East European, and as many as 2,000 Cuban military advisers, who are building Central America's largest military establishment with Soviet arms. Outside of Nicaragua, the clandestine infiltration of arms and munitions into El Salvador is again approaching the high levels recorded just before last year's final offensive.

The decisive battle for Central America is now underway in El Salvador. For if, after Nicaragua, El Salvador is captured by a violent minority, who in Central America will not live in fear? How long

would it be before major U.S. strategic interests—the canal, the sea lanes, oil supplies—would be at risk?

For much of our life as a nation, our country has faced no threat from its neighbors. But unless we act decisively now, the future could well bring more Cubas: totalitarian regimes so linked to the Soviet Union that they become factors in the military balance and so incompetent economically that their citizens' only hope becomes that of one day migrating to the United States.

This brings me to the second pillar of our policy. The sharing of political power through democratic institutions and the overcoming of violence and poverty are not only fundamental for us—they are also fundamental for our neighbors.

There is an acute economic crisis engulfing the entire region. Lawlessness from the violent right frequently compounds the problems created by insurgent violence and external intervention. The fragility of institutions under political and economic stress can create chain reactions of disorder and abuse that feed dictatorship.

Faith in representative democracy and government institutions will erode if these trends continue. Yet, in societies as deeply divided as those in Central America only pluralistic institutions can enable people to live with each other without violence.

Rather than sacrifice either our interests or our values, either support for democracy or defense of our security, we must find a way to assert both so that we can check the Communist drive for power in the region, yet help the region develop in a humane and democratic way, using the state of danger to help the people of Central America realize their political and social aspirations.

That is the spirit, Mr. Chairman, in which the administration understands the conditions on aid to El Salvador contained in the Foreign Assistance Act. Yes, there is a challenge to our national security, so military and economic assistance are required. But yes, we must also use our assistance to help El Salvador control violence, make land reform work, develop a democratic process, bring murderers to justice. I do not mean to say that we would have used, on the administration side, exactly the same mechanism to achieve these goals, but our goals are the same.

The certification that the President has just made shows that there has, indeed, been substantial progress toward each of the desired goals laid out in the law.

Thanks to efforts by the military command, the levels of violence against noncombatants have fallen; all sides agree that the trend is down. And I would like, if I could, Mr. Chairman, to return at the end of my testimony to the allegations of massacres that have been made recently and discuss that in some greater detail.

For all the inherent administrative and political difficulties, land reform—the most comprehensive program of land reform ever attempted in Latin America—is moving ahead.

Despite violence and the absence of deep-rooted democratic traditions, the electoral process is gathering momentum. Eight parties have entered the campaign that officially opened last Thursday. Important elements of the Salvadoran society, including the church and peasant organizations, have come out strongly in support of elections. But the guerrillas have refused to test out their strength at the ballot box.

The Salvadoran Government has made major progress in its investigation of the murder of four American church women. We expect indictments based on a strong case very shortly, maybe as early as this week.

This is clearly not enough. More is needed, especially in the area of violence. But we have been able to certify that a lot has been achieved in the midst of an externally supported insurgency in a deeply divided country.

There are some—I think there are a few—who would argue that El Salvador is not reforming itself fast enough and that we should cut off aid. But that would defeat, I believe, the goals that both the Congress and the administration are pursuing. All hope of achieving functioning democracy in El Salvador would vanish. The Soviets and Cubans would have a new opening to expand their power on the American mainland. And it would be hard to argue that Nicaraguanizing El Salvador would be an effective way to promote human rights.

But there is another basis for action. Two years ago a new Salvadoran Government committed itself to political reform, free elections and land reform. The United States supported it then and we support it now.

Mr. Chairman, sometimes Americans underestimate the power of democracy in this area. That I think is a mistake.

The Caribbean Basin has far more democratic than repressive states. The resilience of more than a century of democracy has enabled Costa Rica to hold up magnificently under the pressures of a brutal economic crisis. Honduras, where you and I have just been to attend the inauguration of a new and democratically elected President, shows that if given a chance people are eager to see their leaders elected democratically.

The democracies of the area are beginning to realize that they will remain democracies only if they stand together. Within Honduras the Cubans are trying to unify the left and start another insurgency, while across the border Nicaragua is building up the biggest and best equipped army in Central American history. To Nicaragua's south, Costa Ricans are watching the Sandinistas organize military operations in their own rich and largely undefended Guanacaste province and wondering what will happen when more Soviet-built tanks and perhaps Migs appear next door.

In El Salvador, insurgents are escalating their violence and terror, doing everything to prevent the elections from being held, including threats of death to candidates and voters.

In response to this situation, Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador formed on January 19th the Central American Democratic Community, to defend their values and seek the support of other democratic states.

On January 27, on the occasion of Honduran President Suazo's inauguration, three democracies—Venezuela, Columbia, and the United States—responded. The six will now meet regularly to help carry through the democratic transformation in El Salvador and protect free institutions elsewhere; to overcome the region-wide economic crisis fueled by the recession in the world economy and by terrorism; to attempt to head off the arms race Nicaragua seems determined to impose on its neighbors; and to be ready to use the resources of the Inter-American system to defend against armed aggression.

These steps are part of a collective action approach to the area's problems, an approach proposed by Secretary Haig at the OAS meeting in St. Lucia last December and evident in the OAS General Assembly's endorsement of elections in El Salvador by a 22 to 3 vote. The democracies are banding together to defend their values and their security in a time of rising danger. For the dangers are rising fast.

We have tried to communicate with Cuba, to convince Castro of the dangers of confrontation. But the Cubans are accelerating their acquisition of intimidating armaments. They are aggressively pushing their policy of organizing and supporting violent insurgencies throughout Central America.

We have tried to communicate with the Nicaraguans to offer a way out of confrontation if they would restrain their military buildup and cease their support of insurgency in El Salvador. But the Nicaraguan response has been to move toward greater internal repression—for their large Miskito Indian Minority, for the remaining free radio stations and press, for the church, for democratic leaders and businessmen—and to accelerate their buildup of heavy arms, and to bring in more Cuban and Soviet advisers, while exporting more arms to rebels in neighboring countries.

Mr. Chairman, the Caribbean Basin is right on our borders. We cannot, even if we wanted to, turn our back on it. The administration, the Congress, the American people are all confronted with the problems of the area. Together we must find a solution.

What the administration suggests—to gain the initiative and make sure the area's besieged and aspiring democracies survive—is to:

Support the fledgling Central American Democratic Community—that grouping of three countries I mentioned—in its efforts to protect democracy and promote the common welfare, defense, and development. We must act both individually and through the inter-American system.

We should, we believe, provide increased military assistance to El Salvador and Honduras, the two most threatened states. We expect in the immediate future—I believe it will be today—to use emergency authority to draw on Department of Defense stocks for approximately \$55 million to replace lost aircraft and to assure that the Government of El Salvador has the means to defend itself against the attacks on its economy and to protect the electoral process.

We should, we believe, provide emergency financial assistance to a number of states in the basin suffering from economic catastrophe. The administration will shortly put forward its proposal to the Congress.

And we should, finally, along with our partners in the Nassau group, Venezuela, Mexico and Canada, continue our international cooperation to help the Caribbean basin as a whole achieve long-term prosperity. The administration will shortly send specific proposals on trade and investment to the Congress.

As we move forward on these items, we must redouble our efforts in El Salvador, to help bring violence under control and to push forward with land reform. Simultaneously, we must help all countries of the area to choose legitimate governments through elections. Americans will not permit, we believe, that Central America's future will be decided in Moscow or Havana. We do not think they will support, nor will we, solutions that are inherently undemocratic or unjust.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to be here to present this statement. I would like to say a word, if I could, about reports

of a massacre of very substantial portions in the province of Morazan in El Salvador. These reports appeared originally on the Radio Venceremos, the insurgent radio. I believe they were originally carried on December 27, 2 weeks after a government sweep had occurred in the area, and they claimed that 192 noncombatants had died at the town of El Mozote.

On January 2, the figure was increased to 472. In the latter part of January or during January, representatives of two U.S. newspapers visited the area, and on January 27 the figure in one of those American papers was raised to the number of 700 killed in and around the area. An organization called the Salvadoran Human Rights Commission, which is in fact not a human rights commission at all but a political organization working for the insurgents, used a figure of almost a thousand.

The town of El Mozote is now in insurgent hands. We have not been able to visit it. But we have been in the area interviewing refugees, and there are a large number of refugees from the canton of El Mozote and surrounding towns. And we have been talking with persons who had information on the military action there. We have had people there in the last couple of days, and I would like to just read a summary of their report. We will be putting something out on it this afternoon, but the summary perhaps should be read.

The embassy investigation of the reported massacre at El Mozote included a visit to the area by the assistant military attaché and an embassy officer. Our conclusions are as follows:

Although it is not possible to prove or disprove excesses of violence against the civilian population of El Mozote by government troops, it is certain that the guerrilla forces who established defensive positions in the El Mozote did nothing to remove them from the path of battle, which they were aware was coming and had prepared for. Nor is there any evidence that those who remained attempted to leave.

Civilians did die during the Operation Mescuate, the name of the operation. But no evidence could be found to confirm that government forces systematically massacred civilians in the operation zone, or that the number of civilians killed even remotely approached the number being cited in other reports circulating internationally.

The population of this canton in December 1981 was estimated by the sources in surrounding towns that we visited in the course of the last week at something around 300, I think suggestive of the difficulty of using some of these large numbers.

Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt at all that, although progress has been made in controlling violence in El Salvador, that a massive problem remains. This problem is at the center of our relations with the El Salvador Government, and it is our determination to make substantial progress in controlling this problem as we pursue the other objectives which I outlined in my statement.

Thank you.

INNOCENT PEOPLE SLAUGHTERED

Senator HELMS. Mr. Ambassador, I thank you. I do not think it is any accident that all of the reports reached a crescendo just as our hearings were to begin this morning. I notice that there is no estimate—there never is—of how many innocent people were slaughtered by the so-called insurgents.

When I was in Honduras last week I had lunch with a representative of the Lutheran Church who is operating a refugee program with private funds. He described in some detail what the Indians in the eastern part of Honduras told him about the Sandinistas coming over the border and slaughtering literally hundreds of innocent

Indians. But you never read anything about that in the *Washington Post*.

I looked through the paper yesterday morning and I saw five stories about El Salvador. It was no accident that those five stories appeared the day before these hearings.

I think we have to decide, whether we be conservatives, liberals, Democrats, Republicans, or independents, precisely what it is we want to happen in Central America. And I think we had better ask ourselves, why do certain people not want elections in that region.

Mr. Ambassador, do you recall during the hearings in December when I held up a Honduran newspaper showing pictures of arms that had been captured in a so-called guerrilla safe house, arms which had been intended for use in disrupting the election? Do you remember that episode?

Secretary ENDERS. Yes, sir.

EFFORT TO PREVENT ELECTIONS

Senator HELMS. Now, am I wrong when I perceive that there is a calculated, dedicated effort to prevent elections in these countries?

Secretary ENDERS. There is a calculated, dedicated effort to prevent the election in El Salvador. We have been looking at some documents that the insurgents themselves have been circulating, in which the reason for that effort is put forward quite clearly. This is, one of them said—I was looking at it the other day—this is the opportunity for the Government, which they said was a government representing the oligarchy and the repressive forces. This is an opportunity for the Government to acquire a social base and become legitimate.

Well, I think if you asked the members of the junta that overthrew the old military government 2 years ago why it was that they were proposing a process of elections in a country that has had such a bad experience with elections in the past, it was precisely because they wanted to create at last a legitimate government, elected by the people and accepted by the people in El Salvador.

That is going to be a big order, Mr. Chairman. But we have noticed some encouraging signs on that. For a long time the church in El Salvador was skeptical of the elections process. But I think it is noteworthy that in the course of the last 2 weeks a very strong statement by all of the bishops of El Salvador, including the apostolic administrator, have issued a very vigorous statement supporting elections, for precisely the same reason: The first opportunity to get a legitimate government accepted by the people in El Salvador.

There were all of these other groups coming out in favor of it. It is interesting to note, Mr. Chairman, that in the new statement of position signed by all five insurgent leaders that was put out at the end of December, the mention of elections in the future, even after the insurgents would have, according to their plan, come into the government is a very peculiar one. The insurgents say about this:

First, we bring ourselves into the government, we have a composite government. Then they say—this is their idea of elections—then we can go before the people and have a plebiscite whether this composite government is acceptable to the people or not.

But there is no mention of elections afterward to find out whether the composition of that government is acceptable to the people. The only mention of elections that they have is that there could be municipal elections. And this I think is the Nicaraguan formula. There is

going to be no election about who holds power; there is only going to be an election about who can administer locally.

Senator HELMS. I read a story in the New York Times, I think it was Saturday, that seven policemen were killed in Guatemala in just 3 days of last week. Is that story true?

Secretary ENDERS. I don't know the answer to that.

[Pause.]

Secretary ENDERS. There have been several reports in the last few weeks.

Senator HELMS. Well, who killed the policemen? I understood your assistant just told you that this happens frequently. Is that right?

Secretary ENDERS. Yes.

Senator HELMS. Now who is killing the policemen? Why is that not front-page news? Why is it relegated to one column-inch on an inside page?

When I think back 25 years, I recall reading about a fellow named Fidel Castro—an agrarian reformer, not a Communist, the New York Times and the rest of the media told us. Oh, no, not a Communist; he is just an agrarian reformer. And now we are getting the same treatment with Communist guerrillas in Central America.

Now, what do these people who are orchestrating all of the difficulties, while we are trying to maintain some kind of alliances of strength and at least some hope of stabilizing Central America, what can any administration do in the face of overwhelming propaganda efforts that are clearly orchestrated?

My time is up. I yield to Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

CERTIFYING EL SALVADOR

Secretary Enders, I was intrigued by the editorial in the Washington Post on January 29 entitled "Certifying El Salvador." The gist of that editorial suggested, and I quote from the final paragraph, the conclusion:

For people who can't take the junta, the honest response is not to say the junta is—surprise—beset and flawed, but rather to make the case that it is acceptable to the United States if El Salvador goes the Cuban way.

That, I suppose, is really what you are saying. You have perhaps not characterized the junta as "beset and flawed," although many have, and I suspect that this is a fair criticism of a government that is both embattled and imperfect. It tries the patience of the American people as they read about El Salvador and wonder why we remain involved, and why we cannot come forward with a better horse to ride on.

We are impatient with the fact that as we read reports that even if the elections are held, fighting may continue. There is a feeling likewise that the battles that are going on in El Salvador simply continue a long tradition of trouble for a very poor people who have not had much.

Now, the case that you are making pretty strongly this morning is that Cuba already is a powerful force in the Caribbean, that there is evidence of further armament, that we see further extensions into Nicaragua, and that the choice for us is as clear as the Post editorial. Those who counsel that we need to get out and be clear of the whole situation, I suppose, have to face the realities of politics in the Caribbean. Others are prepared to move in and to take control,

and you have said the Caribbean is very close to us. We cannot remain indifferent.

I hear a lot of people, and many come to my office, who are suggesting loud and clear that we should terminate our relationship with El Salvador. With some people perhaps there is a romance that somehow we might become involved with the guerrillas, for all I know.

Some people seem to feel that the guerrillas represent a tidal wave of democracy, of hope, of human rights, thoughtfulness about the poor, and that somehow there is in the guerrilla organization a government waiting for our support. Some do not think through the matter that far. They simply say they are outraged by atrocities, outraged by heavyhandedness. They want an end to it. They want no support for it. And they want the aid cut off.

TERMINATE AID

Now, could you describe as specifically as you can what would happen if we were to take the advice of many persons in our country who are vocal and articulate and well-meaning who say to cut off the aid now? That the certification should not have been made, and furthermore, if it has been made, we should proceed in a congressional resolution to terminate this thing once and for all. What would be the effect, in your judgment, of the passage of that legislation?

Secretary ENDERS. If the United States were to terminate aid now, the existing government and army would, of course, fight on, but the fact that having supported them under two administrations in their struggle, and supporting the reforms that they have proposed, the fact of repudiating them would obviously be a massive blow to them. There would very probably be a period—a substantial period—of great bloodshed in El Salvador, followed quite probably by a victory of the insurgent forces, particularly given the continuing support from Nicaragua.

Senator LUGAR. Let me just stop there. Do you believe the guerrilla forces would eventually win, and that would be true because of their support from Nicaragua?

Secretary ENDERS. Exactly so. They are a rather small force, about 5,500 at the present time. They are not able really to confront concentrations of government forces in open battle, but they have attacked the economy as an instrument of demoralization, and reduced the income of all Salvadorans, and they are playing on war weariness. If we repudiated the Salvadoran Government, that would, of course, be a massive psychological blow to that government and army. I think there is a question as to how long it would last under those circumstances.

Senator LUGAR. What would happen if the insurgents did win? What scenario would you predict then?

Secretary ENDERS. Well, we have an organization on the insurgent side which is very much like the organization that came to power in Nicaragua. The same structure, a national directorate composed of Marxist-Leninists, with various supporting groups, not all of which are Marxist-Leninist.

Indeed, as you will recall, there was a very broad coalition that came to power in Nicaragua. I think we have seen in the course of the last 2 years since the Nicaraguan revolution the line that Nicaragua will take. There has been step after step toward removing internal freedoms, depluralizing the country, if you will. Little by

little, they have moved against the church, intimidated *La Prensa*, the famous newspaper, are closing down the remaining radio stations now. They put the leaders of the private sector into jail. They are moving step by step toward creating a one-party state, and are almost there.

There have been the leaders or members of the potential opposition that have been put in jail. There are some 5,000 political prisoners in Nicaragua at the present time, and of course in neglecting the economy, the new government moved very fast to build up substantial military power, bringing in all of these Cuban and Soviet advisers and the new heavy equipment.

ONE-PARTY STATE

In other words, in a word, we would expect that the new government in El Salvador, after a period of pluralism, would move toward a one-party state of a highly repressive and militaristic character.

Senator LUGAR. If all of this followed, why should people in the United States be concerned? Try to express as succinctly as you can why having Nicaragua and El Salvador in this condition makes any difference to us.

Secretary ENDERS. Well, I think most Americans don't want the area to be controlled by the Cubans and Soviets. They don't want the area to fall into the hands of repressive and dictatorial regimes. They don't support the outcome in Nicaragua. On the other hand, I think that most Americans also want to make sure that the reforms are real, that there is genuine progress toward democratic government, and above all, that the violence that they are aware of is controlled as rapidly and as effectively as possible, and I think these goals were clearly indicated in the Foreign Assistance Act, and as I say, they are goals that the Congress and the administration share, and the problem is to get on and make sure that we achieve those goals.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HOW MUCH AID TO EL SALVADOR?

I think that we would certainly concur with the direction that you have laid forth in your statement. What I seem to be hearing is a great deal of confusion, through reports in the press, about what is really going on. One thing that seems to be paramount right now in the confusion is how much aid will be going to El Salvador.

You say here that the \$55 million is a drawdown in the DOD budget. It is not something that would even require consent from Congress. But there is a figure out now of \$100 million of additional aid. I am assuming this is part of the package of economic assistance and military assistance that will be presented in the Caribbean development economic program. Is that correct? I think it would be helpful if you could clarify how much total aid the administration will be requesting this year for El Salvador.

Secretary ENDERS. I can't give you, Senator, a final figure for the latter question, but we will be presenting to the Congress a package of proposals for both the emergency assistance to the area and for the creation of long-term trading and investment opportunities

throughout the Caribbean Basin. These will be Caribbean Basin-wide proposals, the islands and Central America together, and they are not primarily focused on El Salvador.

However, within that, we expect a significant amount of assistance to El Salvador, but I cannot confirm at this point the figure that you have heard just cited of \$100 million, but it will be something, we believe, in that order of magnitude, and it will be a request to the Congress.

Now, we have already in the budget a total of assistance to El Salvador for fiscal 1982 approximately \$112 million economic, \$25 million military, and the \$55 million, up to \$55, I should say, military drawdown would be in addition to the \$25 million and the amount that is finally decided for that part of the general Caribbean Basin proposal, which is in the Caribbean Basin plan. It will be on the order of magnitude of something like \$100 million, but we don't have a final figure for it.

I am told here that if you include CCC credits, that our fiscal 1982 proposal is for \$142 million, including the short-term agricultural credits. So, I would correct my \$112 million figure.

Senator KASSEBAUM. At this point, you would not be anticipating an amount above what is already included in the foreign aid bill?

Secretary ENDERS. No, we wouldn't be anticipating a further request for economic assistance for all the Caribbean Basin countries, probably six of them in particular that require assistance, to include El Salvador, in addition to the amounts which are already in the fiscal year 1982 budget request.

So, in other words, to be precise, there will be an additional request for assistance among other things for El Salvador.

Senator KASSEBAUM. You don't have that figure yet?

Secretary ENDERS. We don't have a precise figure yet.

INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS TO WATCH ELECTION PROCESS

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would just like to ask a bit about the elections in El Salvador. Has there been any thought given to a team of international observers that would go to El Salvador?

Secretary ENDERS. Yes. Four countries have already undertaken to provide observers, Colombia, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Egypt. The United States has been asked and will provide some, and we believe that most countries, most of the democracies in the hemisphere, will provide observers.

Senator KASSEBAUM. How long will they be there prior to the election? Will they go just for that?

Secretary ENDERS. It will depend from country to country. But they have been invited to come and observe the whole process, the setting up of the polling processes all the way through to the counting of the ballots and the announcement of results.

Senator KASSEBAUM. How much credibility do you think can be given to the elections when the Democratic Revolutionary Front, the main opposition, has refused to participate? Of course, that is their own fault, and that is the choice they made, but do you think, given that, that the elections then can be viewed with some credibility?

Secretary ENDERS. Well, I think they can, and maybe in this regard—I referred earlier to the statement of the bishops on this. Maybe I could just read excerpts of it, because I think it expresses very clearly what the situation is down there. They say, "We see in the approaching election scheduled for March 28th of this year a

faint glimmer of hope, a possible beginning of a solution to the present crisis of the country.

We believe that these people—

Our own people, they mean—

who are still suffering destruction, death, hunger, persecution, and sickness caused by the unceasing military conflict, would be able to begin another epic in which the same people can express themselves and speak for themselves. By means of these elections we will move away from a de facto government to a legal government, a change that is basic for the development of the country.

The deputies to the constituent assembly will revise the present constitution or write a new constitution which will form the base of the political, judicial, and social order of the nation. We have reached a moment when we should reunite to begin the reconstruction of our already very deteriorated country. Our efforts will be addressed towards the search for the welfare of all of the people, of every honest citizen.

Then it goes on to say:

Divine and human law obliges us publicly and privately to express our worship and love for the Lord and also commands us to fulfill our obligations to the fatherland, which ought to be an expression of the realization of the well-being of all. One of these obligations is the public expression of what the people desire by means of the vote. Given the special circumstances in which we live, we want to remind all Catholics that they have the obligation of conscience to vote. In this way we will know the will of the Salvadorian people.

It would be ideal if all citizens participated in the elections. For that reason, we regret that some of our brothers reject them.

And then it goes on to appeal for their participation. It is, of course, the hope of the insurgents that they can disqualify the elections by not participating in them. But let's face it, Senator, the insurgents have already made a choice 2 years ago. They had large mass organizations. There were many strikes and demonstrations which were led by insurgent forces in that country, which were mass movements. When they decided to go for the so-called guerra prolongada, the war against the economy, and inevitably against people's livelihood, they lost a lot of the constituency that they had.

One wonders how well they will do. They made a choice. The choice now is to try to defeat them.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman, could I just follow on with one brief question? I would appreciate it.

Secretary ENDERS, as I understand it, the \$55 million that will be drawn down now is a replacement for helicopters that were lost in the attack on the air base. Is that not right?

MORE MILITARY RESOURCES REQUIRED

Secretary ENDERS. Part of it will be, Senator. Up to \$25 million would represent the replacement for planes and equipment lost in the airport attack. However, this is an emergency drawing, and we have come to the conclusion by the end of the year—you may recall the last time that Fred Ikle and I were here we suggested that more military resources would be required. We would have gone at that time, actually, for the resources had the Congress been in session, and clearly, this is something that has to be done with the Congress, as well as the administration, but we delayed until this point in order to do it.

We think an emergency exists, due to the attacks on the economy. Over \$50 million worth of economic assets have been destroyed in the course of the last year by this guerra prolongada tactic, by the buildup in Nicaragua, and by the threats to disrupt the election;

and, therefore, we think a larger emergency in addition to the airport attack exists, and we were all ready before that to put forward a proposal of this nature.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But other than that, you don't anticipate any additional requests for the extra money between now and the election?

Secretary ENDERS. No, we do not, Senator.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just following up, Mr. Secretary, on the viewpoint of the Catholic Church, the statement you read was by the bishops of El Salvador?

Secretary ENDERS. Yes, sir.

Senator PELL. Is that agreed to also by the archbishop?

Secretary ENDERS. Yes, sir.

Senator PELL. He does agree to that?

Secretary ENDERS. He signed it.

Senator PELL. The archbishop signed it as well?

Secretary ENDERS. Yes, sir.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

CAN MEANINGFUL ELECTIONS BE CONDUCTED

I am sure we all read with great interest the interview with Ambassador Hinton yesterday in the Post. At the time, I was struck by the fact that he said that we may well be left with no alternatives but to seek a military victory, but can there be such a thing, in your view, that is, a long-term military victory?

Secretary ENDERS. No, sir. That is not my view. This is above all a political and economic struggle, and it must ultimately have a political and economic solution. In order to make that possible, we think that providing military assistance to this government so it can fend off the attacks on it is necessary, but in the end, Senator, it will be political moves—we think the creation of a legitimate government and land reform, which will ultimately bring the conflict to an end.

Senator PELL. But can meaningful elections be conducted, in your view, in the present atmosphere of civil war?

Secretary ENDERS. We don't know yet whether they can. We believe that there is a good chance they can. The insurgents have developed a strategy for disruption in which they will attempt to create as much harassment at the polling places as they can. This is already well known. Intelligence documents pick it up. But there is a certain momentum. People who have been in San Salvador and other places recently indicate this, and I think the statement by the church has represented that. There are a lot of parties that are participating. Campesino's Union is strongly behind it. The one major organization representing labor in the country, the so-called UPD, is strongly behind it. And the desire on the part of people in El Salvador to have some say in their future is coming to the fore.

Now, something like this happened in Honduras, you know—people said, how can they have an election there after having all of those years of military rule? Then the people came forward. When they were given an opportunity, they came forward, and were very anxious to work, to vote.

This is different because of the circumstances of war. We don't know yet, Senator, whether it is going to be possible for a large number of people to express their views, but part of the problem in the past has been the illegitimacy of military governments in that country. They controlled it for more than 50 years, and that is why the present government is determined to have an election, and why we back it.

Now, let me say, if I could, that this is the first step in the electoral process. It is the election of a constituent assembly. The idea would be that that constituent assembly would then debate all the big questions affecting El Salvador and draw up a new constitution, then go on to a presidential election and a parliamentary election some time next year. So it is going to be a long process, but for the first time we should have representatives who can claim to have some genuine popular backing, and that may change things.

TWO DISAGREEABLE ALTERNATIVES

Senator PELL. Well, would you correct me if I am wrong, because I read the Hinton interview, and the gist of it was, to my mind, that we have two disagreeable alternatives, a continuing military impasse or a Communist or very leftwing government in that part of the world. Isn't that the conclusion that you came to and that you have?

Secretary ENDERS. Senator, I don't want to characterize the Hinton interview, nor would I suggest the particular formulations which were reported in the press, and I don't know whether—

Senator PELL. Would this be your view?

Secretary ENDERS. That is not my view. That is not the view of the administration. We are proposing additional military assistance and additional economic assistance because we believe that, indeed, there has to be given the means, more time for this government to overcome its opposition and to keep its country going while it does that. But the real emphasis in the end has got to be on institution-building in that country.

In other words, we think a political solution is possible, but it will undoubtedly take a long time.

Senator PELL. But doesn't this remind you a little of what we used to think in Southeast Asia, when we had other conversations in the same room, where we thought if we kept it up long enough, we could get a good political solution?

Secretary ENDERS. I find it hard to make the analogy with that. We have been in this a rather short time, only since the overthrow of the Romero government, at which time we backed the two reforms, the land reform and the political reform, and we are still backing them, and that is 2 years ago now. It is a rather short time. We do not have either the presence of the U.S. Army in that country nor do we have the presence of large numbers of Communist troops from a neighboring country. These are quite different circumstances. We do have support from a neighboring radical country, Nicaragua, and in very serious proportions, but I think it is quite a different circumstance, Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. I am not sure that I agree with you, but history and time will show us.

HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

In connection with the reported human rights situation, I notice that, according to a report by Christopher Dickey in the Washington Post, the armed forces announced that troops killed 19 people in a successful action against leftist guerrillas, and then the article goes on to point out that relatives and witnesses insist the people killed in the raid had no political connections, and were grabbed from their homes by uniformed men wearing masks. Included among the dead were a 57-year-old woman and a 16-year-old boy, and teenage girls said they were raped by troops, et cetera, et cetera. Do you think this is an accurate statement?

Secretary ENDERS. An accurate statement by Mr. Dickey?

Senator PELL. Yes.

Secretary ENDERS. I don't know. I don't know what happened two nights ago. I don't know whether this was or was not the kernel of a guerrilla organization, as maintained by the Government of El Salvador, and I don't know whether the claim of the Government of El Salvador to have picked up substantial quantities of ammunition and guns there is an accurate one or not. We are trying to find out. However, I do deplore what appears, however you answer those questions, to be the excessive violence of this action, and I find it very difficult to buy the notion that there was in fact a fire fight, and that this was the result of it. But we are trying to find out what did happen.

Senator PELL. From the viewpoint of the past, it would probably seem a pretty accurate description of what goes on. My time has expired. Thank you.

Senator HELMS. Go ahead.

WILL GUERRILLAS LAY DOWN WEAPONS AND VOTE?

Senator PELL. I just have one more question. In the elections how can you really expect the guerrillas, who have a price on their head, to lay down their weapons to walk in and vote? Would you if you were a guerrilla? I know I wouldn't.

Secretary ENDERS. Well, the suggestion was that there should be discussions on how the election should be held, including the security question and including the ground rules, including the assurance that the elections will be counted in a fairway, and all the questions you would normally expect about an election. It was not a suggestion that, as you say, that they simply walk into the poll and present themselves, but the guerrillas showed no interest in having such discussions.

Senator PELL. Was there any thought given to the idea that they ought to have a United Nations panel there to watch the first elections?

Secretary ENDERS. There has been considerable thought given to the possibility of this being done by the Organization of American States. That has been done on a number of occasions in the hemisphere in the past, but I don't see why it couldn't be done by the United Nations too.

Senator PELL. Will it be done by one group or the other, do you think?

Secretary ENDERS. Yes, but I think we should suggest that maybe the United Nations should do it too.

Senator PELL. Either way, I would hope that one or the other would do it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 Senator HELMS. Thank you, Senator.

U.S. ADVISERS AT TORTURE CLASS

Senator Percy is on his way here, and wants to ask you a few questions. In the meantime, Mr. Ambassador, when I was in Raleigh, I noted in the New York Times of January 11 an article with the headline, "Salvadoran Says U.S. Advisors at Torture Class." Are you familiar with this article?

Secretary ENDERS. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. It is written by Mr. Raymond Bonner, special to the New York Times. I don't know Mr. Bonner from Adam's house cat, and I don't know how reliable he is. I understand that a number of newspapers turned that story down before the New York Times agreed to publish it. In any case, the article written by Mr. Bonner alleges that, and I quote, "a 21-year-old who asserts he is a former Salvadoran soldier says that U.S. military advisers were present at two training sessions early last year when two suspected guerrillas were tortured by Salvadoran army instructors."

Now, obviously, Mr. Ambassador, that is a serious charge. Further, the article charges, as I recall, that U.S. military personnel present were dressed in jungle camouflage fatigues, and that they wore green berets. Is this story true?

Secretary ENDERS. No, sir, it is not true.

Senator HELMS. How did you ascertain that it is not true?

Secretary ENDERS. The Department of Defense interviewed all of the military trainers that were in El Salvador at that time in detail, took statements from them, and all those statements were emphatically negative about this, and I should add that the trainers are prohibited from wearing green berets and fatigues or camouflage fatigues in El Salvador, so that that detail is simply not correct.

There are a lot of stories of this kind that kick around in places like Mexico City. This story came from Mexico City. And they get a certain currency after a while simply because they are kicking around, and then somebody picks them up and puts them into the newspaper. This story is not true.

Senator HELMS. Well, it certainly adds to the confusion to which Senator Kassebaum alluded.

MAJOR EFFORT TO ASCERTAIN FACTS

Secretary ENDERS. Well, maybe I could say a word about that. It seems to me that there is a particular burden put on us and we in the administration and our embassy down there as a result of the certification requirements in the Foreign Assistance Act. We are asked to certify on things of this type. And so we do spend a lot of time trying to establish the facts, and in a lot of these cases we haven't been able to get all of the facts, but we are making, Mr. Chairman, a major effort to ascertain in detail what is going on in a lot of these massacre stories, for example.

We had a striking example of this kind of thing last year, in which there was a story that was widely circulated of sealing 1,000 people in a cave in El Salvador and killing them all by smoking them. This went on for about 3 weeks, and then some geologist pointed out that there were no caves that could hold 1,000 people in that part of El Salvador, but I think that this suggests, and Senator Kassebaum

referred to it, I think it suggests the passions and the feelings, the high feelings that are generated by this conflict, and the necessity of being very careful about our information.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. If you would just wait for a few minutes until Senator Percy gets here, I want to accord him the courtesy of being able to ask you some questions.

In the meantime, we have as our next witness a distinguished Member of the House of Representatives. I traveled with him last week, and I am not sure that I ever pronounce his name right, but Congressman Lagomarsino is here. If you would go down to the table, we would welcome you, sir.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM CALIFORNIA**

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee; last week, when Senator Helms, Congressman Goodling, and I returned from our trip to Honduras to witness the inauguration of the new President, Roberto Suazo Cordoba, I was asked if I would come by today and make a few comments about the inauguration as well as the election process.

In November, Congressman Benjamin Gilman of New York and I were invited by the Honduran National Constituent Assembly to observe the elections that were going to be held on November 19. The assembly had been elected the previous April to establish a constitution and to select a provisional president pending the election they were to oversee, also to elect three Vice Presidents, the National Constituent Assembly itself, mayors, and city councils and members of the court.

When we went to Honduras, we were briefed by the country team, Ambassador Negroponte and his group, and I might say for the record, Mr. Chairman, and I think you would agree with me, having seen and observed Ambassador Negroponte over the last weekend, what a very competent, able representative we have in that country.

Then we met with the electoral tribunal that was established by the Constituent Assembly to draw up the rules and regulations, and procedures for the election. That assembly was made up of a member of each party running for election, and the chairman, an additional chairman selected by the Constituent Assembly itself.

They had a monumental task, of course, because it has been a long time in that country since they have had a free and open election carried out country-wide. Also, it is complicated by the fact that in Honduras, the literacy rate is something like 50 percent, perhaps even less than that.

There were four parties named by the electoral commission to be eligible to participate in the process, the two traditional parties, the Nationalist Party and the Liberal Party, as well as a party that had come into being several years ago called the Innovation and Unity Party. That party, although it was very small—it only held three seats in the Constituent Assembly—was the balance between the National and Liberal Parties.

The Liberal Party had 35 seats. The National Party had 33, and Innovation and Unity had three, so they were sort of the balance wheel, if you will, in that particular process. There was another party that joined in the election, the Christian Democratic Party. They did very poorly, as it turned out. There was an independent candidate for president who did even more poorly.

So, there were actually five parties on the ballot, and therefore, because as I pointed out Honduras has a high illiteracy rate, they took care of that problem by designing a ballot that contained only the colors of and the insignia of the political parties. The person voting would make his mark below the particular designation of the party that he wished to vote for.

The electoral tribunal was made up of representatives of each of the four main political parties plus a chairman elected by the Constituent Assembly. Although the chairman of the electoral commission was also a member of the Liberal Party, everyone to whom we spoke to at the time—and we spoke to quite a number of people of various persuasions and so on—all indicated to us that the gentleman who was the chairman should be given high marks as being fair and unbiased.

It is interesting that when there was a charge of fraud that that commission, the Electoral Commission, rejected it by a vote of 4 to 1, even though it represented, as I say, all four of the political parties. We were there when the charge was levied. We were not there for the vote, but we were informed later that that had been the result, the vote of 4 to 1.

There were 150,000 names, more or less, in dispute, names that did not appear on the list of eligible voters when the process started. That was whittled down to about 40,000 by the time we visited Honduras and the election took place. The National Party claimed that most of that 40,000 were members of their party, and people who, of course, would vote for their candidates, and that they were being excluded by the Liberal Party so as to help their cause.

In any event, President Suazo won the election by about 150,000 votes, so that became almost a moot point, and it may well be that the salvation of Honduras may result from that fact, because now, of course, the Liberal Party does have a strong majority in the Congress as well as the Presidency. I think that that will lead to a better result than might be the case if they were to continue in the more or less stalemate situation that they had before.

I think most observers would indicate that the election was handled fairly. There were lists published showing the people who could vote, and the election was held on a Sunday, so that everyone could vote. Something that surprised me was that even the churches were closed, at least during the time the polls were open, from 6 in the morning until 6 in the evening. There were no liquor sales.

We visited a number of polling places. What they did was to divide up the eligible list in bunches of 300, alphabetically. Each person would go to his or hers designated polling place, men and women separately, which I understand is a historical thing and not something that was just drawn up for this election. Each elector would then show his registration card. It would be stamped. He would be given a ballot, and would go into a closed booth, vote, come back out with the ballot folded, put it in the ballot box, and then dip his little finger in a pot of indelible purple ink to indicate that he had voted and to make it very difficult, if not impossible, for him to vote again.

We visited two villages and two towns. We were in one very small town near the Nicaraguan border about 10 o'clock; almost everybody had already voted at that time. There was great enthusiasm, a lot of zeal. There didn't seem to be much antagonism. Then we went to a larger city, closer yet to the Nicaraguan border, a town called

Choluteca. The first one was Morolica. There we met with the commander of the armed services for that area, a Colonel Daniele Bale Castillo, who not only told us about the electoral process and what the armed services had to do with it, but also indicated to us their concern about events that were taking place nearby on the Nicaraguan border, and about efforts to smuggle arms into the country, and about extremist activities, and so on.

As a matter of fact, the night before, there had been a big raid in the capital of Honduras, Tegucigalpa, where arms and military uniforms were seized, military uniforms of the armed services of Honduras. It was the opinion of the authorities that those uniforms were going to be used to create confusion in the country. They also seized a number of foreigners, people from Uruguay, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and some local Honduran Communists as well.

The military did guarantee the election, and we observed that although there were plenty of military troops on hand guarding bridges and places like that, that none were stationed closer than 100 yards to the polling places. They were there so they could respond if there were any acts of violence or attempts to intimidate people from voting.

I might point out that, historically, I understand the military in Honduras has not been guilty of the same kind of repression that unfortunately has been the case all too often in some of the surrounding countries. The Constituent Assembly, interestingly enough, appointed as interim president President Paz, who had been the chairman or the head of the armed services, and who had been president up until the time the Constituent Assembly was formed.

Now, some people might say, well, they did that because they were afraid to do otherwise. Possibly that had something to do with it, although the people in Honduras that we talked to, our Embassy staff and others, all seemed to give President Paz very high marks, and said he did a good job, and that his regime was certainly not brutal or repressive. The people did want to have a civilian government, however, and certainly they did not want him to stay on permanently. They did want to elect their own civilian President.

Our impression was that the military behaved very well during the electoral process. They were not partisans. They had no candidate of their own. They did not endorse any of the political candidates. Some political analysts say, and they are probably correct, that one of the reasons that President Suazo won the election as handily as he did and by the margin he did was that there was some kind of backlash against the military and against the Nationalist Party because they were identified more closely with the military than was the Liberal Party.

But in any event, President Suazo made it plain all during his election campaign, he made it plain after he was elected, in his first speech upon being advised that he was elected, he made it plain in his inaugural address, and he certainly made it plain to you and I, Senator, that he is very friendly to the United States, and wants to have close relationships with us, and that, to the contrary, he is very anti-Communist, and is concerned about Communist influence in the region.

We visited during the election day activities the two hometowns of the major candidates, Nacaome, where Candidate Zuniga, the National Party candidate, was from, and that was a major stronghold, as you might suspect, of the National Party. There were a number of disputed names on the electoral list there, and people did feel

rather strongly that they were being excluded. I remember that a candidate for mayor explained to us, sought us out and complained to us that votes had been stolen in his nearby small town. We also met with the electoral commission there and talked about this problem. Later, although we didn't witness this, we understand that a ballot box was indeed stolen, that the military had to intervene, and there was one shooting.

Later we visited the city of La Paz, a very small city near Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras, which was the hometown of then candidate Dr. Roberto Suazo Cordoba, and we went into Tegucigalpa itself, visited a number of electoral booths there. There were more people voting later in the evening in the capital, which I guess is to be expected, than was the case in the small towns.

I might say that in the smaller towns there was a problem in some cases, and perhaps this was a problem, one of the problems in Nacaome, that some voter would walk or ride his horse or burro down from the top of the mountain where he lived, and if you have been to Honduras and have seen the situation there, it is understandable that they might not make that trip to town ahead of time to find out whether they are on the electoral list or not, so there probably were some cases where somebody would arrive in town, go down to vote, and find their name wasn't on the list, and it was too late to do much about it, because of the nature of the country itself.

We didn't see any problems, incidentally, in Tegucigalpa itself. A couple of times while we were standing there observing, and we did so for about an hour, as I recall, various booths, what they call mesas, several people came up and did not find their name on the list. They were advised to go to another table, and in every case that we observed, at any rate, they did find their name there.

We stayed in one mesa after the voting time was over, and they started counting the votes. One of the electoral tribunal officials representing the National Electoral Tribunal challenged a ballot. He said that there were two marks in one place, and therefore under the law that ballot had to be discarded. One of the women who was working as an election official there challenged his finding or his recommendation, pointing out, and I thought this was very interesting, that after all, "What we should be interested in is whether the person intended to vote for that particular party."

It was very plain from looking at the ballot that the person did indeed intend to do that. He said, "Yes, but the law says that you can only have one mark." The lady quite accurately pointed out, "Well, then, we have to throw all of these ballots out, because they all have an 'X' and that is two marks." So they had a vote on that, and although there was a lot of contention, a lot of rivalry between the four parties that they all represented, all four parties voted against this man, and the ballot was allowed to stand.

They used computers for the first time in this election, and throughout the whole process it seemed to me to be very fair and open, and although certainly I can't verify that the process by which they put the names on the ballot in the first place and registered the people was entirely fair, I think that it probably compares quite well with some of the problems that occurred right here in the Nation's Capital during the last election, when many people complained that they were not on the lists.

So, I guess that was the only serious contention, and as I say, if indeed there was any fraud, or if there were irregularities, they were more than overcome by the margin of the election.

The inauguration came off as planned. There were some reports or some speculation by some of our own press that the military would at the last moment step in and keep the inauguration from occurring. Not only did that not happen, the military that we met with, you and I, Senator, and our colleague, Mr. Goodling, assured us that they were strongly behind the effort to return civilian rule to Honduras, that they were going to do what they could to help. I for one was especially impressed by the new head of the armed services, Colonel Alvarez, who, when he talked to us, said in answer to the question, what do you need, "The thing we need more than anything else is to promote social justice, and we need economic assistance." He said, certainly we do need military assistance, and they do, but that the main things they needed were to have economic assistance, and he did pledge the continued support of the armed services.

The inauguration took place in the Tegucigalpa soccer stadium. There were, I think, about 25,000 people there. The presidents of Colombia, El Salvador, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Panama were there. The Prime Minister of the newly found or the newly independent country of Belize was there as well, and they even had quite a large delegation of representatives from Nicaragua, including the defense minister, Mr. Ortega.

One interesting sidebar is that seated next to us in the stands was the colonel who was in charge of immigration, and he told us that when Mr. Ortega arrived with his entourage, they were armed with AK-47 Russian weapons, that they were told that those were not to be allowed in the country, that certainly sidearms were permissible, but not that kind of weaponry, and they were told either they had to go back or they could ship the weapons back. Being as Mr. Ortega and friends were there, I guess they shipped the weapons back.

It was a festive ceremony. Mr. Suazo gave, although I didn't catch all of the translation and have not yet had a chance to read it in print, what seemed to be an inspiring address, well received by the crowd. He pointed out that although they would need assistance from the outside, it was a job they had to do for themselves. He thanked the military for their cooperation, and he indicated, and got quite a bit of applause when he said so, that although they were going to build their economic situation and do what they could to do that, that they were going to respond and to fight any attempt by outside influences to adversely affect them.

My impression talking to the people in the embassy, after talking to our military advisers down there, and after talking to the president, and after talking to the Salvadorian military, is that they do in fact need military assistance, especially such rather elemental things you would think as radar and communications. We were told, for example, that until a very short time ago, the commander of the armed services detachment in the southeast part of the country that borders on Nicaragua on the Atlantic Coast didn't even have a radio. His wife bought him one, so now he has a radio that he can communicate with the capital. Radar is practically nonexistent in the country. It makes it very difficult for them to interrupt and intercept things coming in from the outside, especially along the coast, on both sides, on the Pacific and the Atlantic, and we discussed ways that that might be overcome.

As you know, the armed services of Honduras are outnumbered about 5 to 1 by Nicaragua. There are reports that Nicaragua is about to receive new Mig aircraft from Cuba and the Soviet Union,

that they have tanks, and we know that the French just sold them 1,000 defensive rockets. I don't know what they are defensive against.

So, it is a very touchy situation, and they certainly do need economic assistance, and they need that military assistance as well. I am convinced that President Suazo is well aware of the difficulties that he faces. I think he has the will to do something about them, and although he has some very difficult decisions to make and some very difficult steps to take, I believe, I personally believe that he will at least make a very strong attempt to do that. It is not going to be easy to do it.

The IMF representatives who were down there also told me that Honduras has already been twice in default on the conditions that were imposed on them by IMF. They know that it is going to be a very tough thing to get their economic house in order, but they do seem to be very much attuned to that need, and as I say, very much of a mind to do something about it.

One problem that occurs to me, and this occurred to me when I was there in November, too, is that in controlling their own borders, which they need to do for a number of reasons, to prevent smuggling of arms, smuggling of narcotics also, is that the police in Honduras have that job for the most part. They are the ones who carry it out. And under our law, we are not permitted to assist police departments or foreign countries in any kind of activity. I would think that we ought to give some attention, some thought to at least looking into that and seeing if we are really being wise in our restriction, or if there is some way that a restriction could be changed so as to carry out the purpose that we all want to accomplish.

I pointed out to President Suazo when we met with him after the inauguration that I felt, and I think all of our party does, too, and I know that the President and the State Department agree with this, that what has happened there has already been an example of what can happen in the other countries in Central America, and especially if he is successful, and it just seems to me that if we are going to, and I think properly so, punish our enemies, or at least not extend benefits to them, then it certainly goes without saying, at least I think it does, that we should help those who are our friends, who are trying to emulate us in democracy, and who have announced to the world that they are our friends.

Senator HELMS. Congressman, thank you for a most interesting account.

Senator LUGAR.

Senator LUGAR. I have no questions. It is good to hear your report, Bob, and we appreciate your coming this morning.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. No questions. I just join in welcoming you here.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you very much.

Senator HELMS. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. No questions. I would second everyone else.

Senator HELMS. Thank you very much.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Now we will hear from Mr. Aryeh Neier, vice chairman of Helsinki Watch and vice chairman of America's Watch. Mr. Neier has recently traveled to Central America, and is here today to discuss his findings.

Before you begin, sir, we are going to ask the public witnesses to make brief summaries of their statements, because of the time, and I

might add that Mr. Manion of the staff enjoyed visiting with you during your trip to Central America. Now you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF ARYEH NEIER, PROFESSOR OF LAW, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, AND VICE CHAIRMAN, HELSINKI WATCH, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Mr. NEIER. Thank you very much, Senator Helms.

Senator, last week we issued a 275-page report which we submitted to the President, calling on the President not to certify compliance with the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act. We addressed two of the provisions of the act.

One is the requirement that the President find that the Government of El Salvador is making a concerted and significant effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights; and the other is the requirement of the act that the President certify that the Government of El Salvador is achieving substantial control over all elements of its own armed forces, so as to bring to an end the indiscriminate torture and murder of Salvadoran citizens by these forces.

With respect to the second requirement, in our view the Government of El Salvador is in control of its own armed forces and is responsible for the torture and murder that has been committed by those armed forces. To the extent that it lacks control of its own armed forces, it is not taking serious steps to try to punish those who may have been involved in torture and murder.

During the course of my visit to El Salvador, I had occasion to meet with Col. Guillermo Garcia and his principal aides. One of them I asked was, how many politically motivated murders there have been in El Salvador. He gave me a figure covering about a 21-month period of some 2,407 politically motivated murders in El Salvador.

That figure was approximately one-eighth the number that was reported by the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State. In other words, the police forces of El Salvador did not count as politically motivated murders seven-eighths of those politically motivated murders that were reported to the Department of State by the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador. It is very difficult to make a concerted effort to control politically motivated murders if you do not even count seven-eighths of those that are reported by the U.S. Embassy.

I asked how many members of the Armed Forces or the security forces had been criminally punished for these politically motivated murders? No one was able to cite an instance in which any member of the security forces or Armed Forces had been criminally punished for these politically motivated murders.

Under these circumstances, we believe that it was improper to certify compliance with the requirements of the Foreign Assistance Act.

With respect to the possibility that elections will confer the legitimacy on the Government that the Government of El Salvador itself says it lacks and that Secretary Enders said it lacks at this point, with all due respect, we do not agree that these elections are capable of conferring legitimacy.

Senator Kassebaum made the point that the Revolutionary Democratic Front had chosen not to participate in these elections. I would point out that six top leaders of the FDR were abducted from a press conference by a military force and that their mutilated corpses were later found elsewhere in San Salvador. It is pretty difficult to

make a choice to take part in an election if that is likely consequence of taking part.

The President's certification message to the Congress reports that more than 20 Christian Democratic mayors were murdered in El Salvador during 1981. That is a very low estimate. Taking that estimate, however, El Salvador has a population one-fiftieth the size of the United States. A comparable figure in the United States, accordingly, would be 1,000 mayors murdered.

Can you imagine what the chances of participating in an election would be if you knew that 1,000 mayors in the United States had been murdered during the course of the year? For my part, I can tell you that I would not voice the criticisms of the Government of El Salvador that I voice today if I thought my prospects for surviving were approximately what they would be if I voiced these criticisms in El Salvador. I would not take part in an election if I thought that there was a likelihood that I would be killed for making critical comments about the Government.

Those who make strong critical comments about the Government in El Salvador today are likely to be killed. Therefore, the election cannot confer legitimacy on the Government if part of the potential political spectrum does not participate because of that likelihood.

It may be that the FDR and other forces would not have participated in the elections anyway. We cannot know. But we do know that the level of violence in El Salvador is overwhelming and that the vast majority of the violence is committed by the government and by forces controlled by the government or by paramilitary forces which operate with impunity.

Under those circumstances, the hope that elections can resolve anything in El Salvador seems futile. I note that Secretary Enders referred to the statement by the bishops and that the acting archbishop joined in that statement. It is worth pointing out that he is acting archbishop because the archbishop of El Salvador was one of those who was assassinated. And, at least at the time that I was in El Salvador, the acting archbishop's position was different.

I asked the archbishop whether he believed that elections would solve the problem. He said flatly no. If he has changed his mind, as indicated by the statement that Secretary Enders quoted, I do not know the basis.

Certainly, there is no indication that the Government of El Salvador is punishing those engaged in political violence and, thereby bringing about the conditions necessary to make elections a possible solution. Elections are always the way that a government ought to try to achieve legitimacy. But elections in circumstances where opponents of the government cannot speak out critically against the government lack the prerequisite conditions for providing legitimacy.

I am happy to address the question of elections in the other countries in the area. It is entirely up to the committee whether I proceed with respect to that.

[Mr. Neier's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ARYEH NEIER

My name is Aryeh Neier. I am Vice Chairman of the Americas Watch, a committee of the Fund for Free Expression. I also serve as Vice Chairman of the Helsinki Watch, an affiliated Committee. I am also Adjunct Professor of Law at New York University. I appear here today on behalf of the Americas Watch which last week issued together with the American Civil Liberties Union a 275 page "Report on Human Rights in El Salvador."

Last August, I had occasion to visit El Salvador and to meet with President Duarte, with the military leadership of El Salvador, and with other officials. In the course of my meeting with President Duarte, I asked him what kind of elections could there be in March when hundreds of his own party's elected and appointed officials have been killed during the past two years for offending the military and paramilitary forces controlled by the military in El Salvador. He responded: "It doesn't make any difference how many of the Christian Democrats are killed—we are still there."

Perhaps this reflects bravery, perhaps bravado. Either way, it is also nonsense. It is simply beyond reason to suggest that an election is meaningful in circumstances in which candidates expressing opposition to the military rulers of the country are likely to be killed. As dangerous as it is for Christian Democrats to take part in the elections, it would have been far more dangerous for the main opposition group, the Democratic Revolutionary Front, to participate. As you know, six top leaders of the FDR were kidnapped on November 27, 1980 while preparing a news conference at the San Jose High School in San Salvador and their mutilated corpses were found later. As our Report states (at page 69), "The abduction was carried out by heavily armed men in civilian dress while the school was surrounded by some 200 soldiers and police for 25 minutes. According to 'Socorro Juridico,' the involvement of the government is also indicated by the fact that the vehicles used in the abduction were identified as belonging to official security organizations."

Even if the elections scheduled for March should take place peacefully and even if the fraud that has characterized Salvadoran elections should be absent this time, the results will have little or no meaning. The choice available to Salvadoran citizens has been so narrowed by military terror as to make it unreasonable to place any hope in these elections. Such elections would have no more significance than a peaceful, honest election in the Soviet Union in which the choice of candidates is restricted by the dictates of the Communist Party. In El Salvador, the choice of candidates is restricted by military terrorists.

In our view, the necessary conditions for holding meaningful elections are spelled out in the Foreign Assistance legislation signed by President Reagan on December 29. The government of El Salvador must first make a "concerted and significant effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights" and must "end the indiscriminate torture and murder of Salvadoran citizens" by its armed forces. Despite the President's certification on January 28, these conditions have not been met. Until they are met, elections are worthless. What follows is an excerpt from the Americas Watch—ACLU "Report on Human Rights in El Salvador."

B. POLITICAL RIGHTS SINCE OCTOBER 15, 1979

This extreme abuse of the democratic process, and the resulting lack of confidence in it by a majority of the Salvadoran electorate, were among the major factors that led the officers to overthrow Romero in October 15, 1979 and establish the present regime. The Proclamation of the Armed Forces of that day said that "the successive governments (were) themselves the product of scandalous election frauds . . ." and that this, among others, was the "basic cause of the economic and social chaos and of the generalized violence at the present time, which can only be overcome by the coming to power of a government that guarantees the enforcement of a truly democratic system." The new Junta pledged "to guarantee the observance of human rights by: (a) creating an atmosphere appropriate to holding free elections within a reasonable period of time, (b) allowing the establishment of parties of all ideologies, so as to strengthen the democratic system and (c) stimulating free expression of thought, in accordance with ethical standards."⁴

The Junta and Cabinet installed on October 15, 1979 reflected the attempt to involve democratic parties and sectors in the government. The governing coalition, therefore, included representatives of the Christian Democratic Party and of the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), a social-democratic party headed by Guillermo Ungo, as well as other politicians and groups who had been part of the opposition to the Romero regime.

The uneasy coalition lasted less than three months, for in December the military commanders, apparently reacting against an attempt by younger, moderate officers to form a council, announced to the assembled Junta and Cabinet that they would not obey the Junta but would only follow orders from Col. Jose Guillermo Garcia, the Minister of Defense.⁵ In early January, most of the civilian members resigned and the military struck a deal with the Christian Democrats, in which Hector Dada Irezi and Jose Antonio Morales Ehrlich were brought into the Junta. Dada's subsequent resignation from the government

⁴Proclamation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of El Salvador, Oct. 15, 1979.

and the party shortly after the killing of Mario Zamora Rivas showed that the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was irrevocably split over the issue of continued support for the process initiated in October 1979.⁶ Since then, civilian participation in the government has been reduced to Duarte, Morales Ehrlich and R. Avalos Navanelt and its political base today does not extend beyond the fraction of the PDC that Duarte leads.

The Junta continues to confront varying degrees of opposition from conservative circles. The PCN has recently issued political statements, and seems to be reorganizing for the 1982 electoral campaign.⁷ During the summer of 1981, a few minor parties surfaced, apparently as a result of the announcement of elections. They are the Movimiento Democrático Salvadoreño, the Partido de Orientación Popular and a party calling itself the "authentic" MNR, formed primarily by former MNR members still occupying lower positions in the government. The three are expected to form a moderate coalition to oppose the PDC and PCN. Some of their leaders, like Ivo Priamo Alvarenga and Rene Fortin Magana, as well as some representatives of the business sector, are expected to join the Junta in the near future, either joining the Christian Democrats or actually replacing them.⁸

The opposition to the Junta has re-organized since October 1979. The "popular organizations" represented in the Bolque Popular Revolucionario (BPR) have been joined by many prominent moderate leaders, including Ungo, Hector Dada Irezi and several others who held Junta or cabinet positions after October 1979. They have formed the Frente Democrático Revolucionario (FDR), an umbrella coalition of opposition political parties and independent organizations. The several guerrilla organizations, in turn, have themselves become united under the name of Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (FMLN). The FDR and FMLN, having agreed to coordinate their actions, a Political-Diplomatic Commission of the FDR-FMLN has become the visible head abroad of the opposition to the government.

The denials by the government of the right to political participation of a large number of citizens are best exemplified by the publication, in March 1981, of a long list of "traitors" held responsible for the current situation in the country. The list includes the best-known opposition politicians like Guillermo Ungo, Roman Mayorga Quiroz, Hector Dada Irezi, Fabio Castillo, Alberto Arene, and Roberto Lara Velado. It also includes prominent citizens like Hector B. Recinos, the country's highest trade union official; Father Inocencio Alas; Professor Ignacio Ellacuria, the President of the University; journalist Jose Napoleon Gonzalez and attorney Roberto Cuellar, of the Legal Aid Office of the Archdiocese. The rest of the names belong to grass-roots leaders in different organizations, all of them potentially important in an electoral campaign, because of their support in such sectors as peasants and workers. The list is particularly relevant in light of the killing by government forces in November 1980 of major leaders of the FDR who had been similarly identified.

In the midst of this political situation, the government announced elections, to be held in March 1982 to choose delegates to a constituent assembly, to be followed by Presidential and legislative elections in 1983. On March 5, 1981, the Junta enacted Decree No. 603 which repealed the 1961 electoral law, appointed three principal and three alternate members to fill the vacant positions of the Central Election Council, and entrusted it with the task of preparing a new draft election law, to be submitted to the Junta for consideration.

The Council proceeded immediately to seek assistance in drafting the new draft electoral law. On May 6, the Council met with the Board of the Federación de Abogados de El Salvador (Salvadoran Bar Association) and requested a list of jurists to help draft the necessary legal instruments. On May 11, the Bar declined to submit such a list, on the following grounds:

The state of siege and martial law continue in effect;

Public credibility and confidence are deeply affected by the unilateral configuration of the provisional government, since the majority of the members of the Junta belong to a single party;

The composition of the Central Electoral Council is "strongly influenced by the party in power" (At least two of the Council members belong to President Duarte's Christian Democratic Party.);

⁶ Dickey, Christopher, "Death as a Way of Life," in *Playboy*, October 1980, pp. 173-174.

⁷ See his resignation, dated March 3, 1980, and his letter to the leadership of the PDC, announcing his intention, dated March 1, 1980.

⁸ "The Central Electoral Council Abuses Its Duties", paid advertisement in *El Diario de Hoy*, San Salvador, June 2, 1981, p. 21.

⁹ "Politics a-lo-Salvadoreño, But with a Touch of Foreignness", in *Informe* July 11-August 21, 1981 (A publication of Agencia Independiente de Prensa, Washington, D.C.).

The generalized climate of violence that dominates El Salvador.⁹

The Council nevertheless submitted to the Junta a draft Provisional Law for the Formation and Registration of Political Parties that was strongly criticized by the FDR because it required the formation of a new party identifying at least 3,000 of its members as well as supplying their addresses, too obvious a risk in the present climate.¹⁰ The law was enacted on July 10, 1981 after the Central Electoral Council had accused the Junta of "not giving due importance to the electoral process scheduled for March of the coming year."¹¹ The original time-table had called for the Law of Political Parties to be in effect by May 25.

Jorge Bustamante, chairman of the Council, said on May 21 that no elections could be held in El Salvador as long as the government maintained the state of siege and martial law in effect. Public meetings, publications of paid advertisements in newspapers and political tours should be permitted, he said.¹² In July, U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton also expressed hope that the government would restore constitutional guarantees before the elections.¹³ As of mid-September 1981, neither the state of siege, nor martial law nor the curfew had been lifted and no announcement had been made as to when they would.

The electoral law setting specific conditions for elections, establishing a time-table and actually providing for the holding of an electoral campaign, is being drafted, but no announcement has been made as to when it will be enacted.

At the same time that the provisional law of political parties was made public, on July 10, 1981, the Junta announced the automatic recognition of four parties, the Party of National Conciliation (PCN), the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) and the National Democratic Union (UDN), the latter two members of the opposition coalition, FDR. Later however, the leadership of the latter two parties rejected this recognition and denounced it as a ploy to provoke a split in the opposition.¹⁴

According to the chairman of the Electoral Council, the FDR would be allowed to participate if it becomes a political party, puts down its arms and publicly states that it has broken away from, and does not support, any guerrilla group. Col. Gutierrez, however, has said that the FDR cannot participate "because it is not a political party but the democratic facade of the guerrillas."¹⁵ In July an unidentified Cabinet minister told The New York Times correspondent Raymond Bonner that the army would not allow Ungo to be a candidate in new elections.¹⁶

GUATEMALA

If anything, the elections scheduled to take place in Guatemala are even more meaningless than in El Salvador. The reason is the same: military terror has made it impossible for critics of the military regime to campaign for office. More than a hundred Christian Democratic leaders of Guatemala were murdered by security forces of the government during the past year or by private armies operating with impunity. Previously Guatemala's two most popular antimilitary political leaders, Manuel Colon Argueta, a former Mayor of Guatemala City, and Alberto Fuentes Mohr, a former minister of the interior and minister of foreign affairs were murdered. Several attempts have been made to murder Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo, the surviving Christian Democratic leader who speaks out against military terror. As U.S. Ambassador Chapin has reported to the Department of State, the government of Guatemala had not brought any criminal prosecutions against those responsible for political murder.

As in El Salvador, there is a long tradition of fraudulent elections in Guatemala. Those I spoke to when I visited Guatemala last August seemed certain that this tradition of fraud would be perpetuated. Even if the voters should not support General Anibal Guevara, former minister of defense in General Lucas Garcia's government and the candidate of the government, it seems a foregone conclusion that he will be declared the victor. This makes a mockery of the election.

COSTA RICA

As the Committee is aware, Costa Rica has a strong democratic tradition. Despite serious economic difficulties which have produced human rights problems in a country noted for its zeal in defending human rights, there is every indication that the elections will be open, free and honest. I visited Costa Rica in September; a lively election campaign was well underway and it had every earmark which should make us enthusiastic about the process. It seems a shame that a country

⁹ Letter of May 11, 1981; El Pais, Madrid; Ignacio Ellacuria, "Elecciones o Proceso de Mediacion en El Salvador?"; El Mundo, San Salvador, May 13, 1981.

¹⁰ Stephen Kinzer, "Salvadoran Leaders Vow to Hold March Elections", Boston Globe, July 19, 1981.

¹¹ FBIS, 15 July 1981, pp. 5-6.

¹² FBIS, 22 May 1981, p. 8.

¹³ Stephen Kinzer, op. cit.

¹⁴ Ungo, cited in FBIS, 29 June 1981, p. 2.

¹⁵ FBIS, 4 June 1981, p. 3.

¹⁶ Raymond Bonner, "U.S. Policy Opposed by Many in El Salvador", the New York Times, July 18, 1981.

with so fine a democratic tradition gets such meager economic support from the United States compared to the support given to so repressive a government as El Salvador.

Senator Helms. Well, let us see about the questions that the Senators may have. I yield to Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DIFFERENCE IN VIEWPOINT

I was interested in the difference in viewpoint between the archbishop in the statement he signed as opposed to his conversation with you.

Mr. NEIER. Well, in his conversation with me—two other participants in that conversation were Congresswoman Schroeder and Congressman Petri—the archbishop held out his own services for negotiations if negotiations would take place. We indicated that he did not think that elections could be a solution unless the political violence was curbed. It has not been curbed.

Senator PELL. Obviously, his view has changed.

Mr. NEIER. It may well have changed.

Senator PELL. And if you have any afterthought or supplemental information as to why it has changed, we would be very interested.

Mr. NEIER. I am sorry; I do not know the reason that it has changed.

Senator PELL. I understand that the FDR position on negotiations prior to the elections has moderated from their earlier position of calling for a restructuring of the Salvadoran Armed Forces. Would you give us your view as to the viewpoint of the FDR on a political solution?

Mr. NEIER. Senator, you are going beyond my competence. I cannot tell you the viewpoint of the FDR. I can tell you that representatives of the FDR that I encountered said that they wanted negotiations and that they were unwilling to surrender their arms in the interim. But I cannot tell you anything beyond that about their views.

Senator PELL. In essence, your thought is that the opponents of the regime who have expressed themselves will be justifiably frightened to participate in the election?

Mr. NEIER. Yes. And when I say that, I include a very large number of the members of President Duarte's own party, the Christian Democratic Party. In the course of our meeting with President Duarte we had occasion to ask about the hundreds of leaders of the Christian Democratic Party who had been assassinated since the time that the Remero regime was overthrown. President Durate replied that, "It does not matter how many of us they kill, we will still be there."

That strikes me as bravado. One can admire President Duarte for being willing to stick his neck out but it is hardly possible to be critical of others who are not willing to stick their neck out under circumstances where hundreds of their political colleagues are killed in what is, after all, a very small country.

FDR LEADERS ASSASSINATED

Senator PELL. Which were the group? I missed the exact name of it? Which was the group that you mentioned earlier, whose six leaders were assassinated?

Mr. NEIER. These were six top leaders of the FDR who were holding a press conference in November 1980, and they were kidnaped from the press conference and, as I said, their mutilated bodies were found later on in San Salvador.

Senator PELL. And these were the six top leaders of the opposition party?

Mr. NEIER. They were six top leaders. They were not the only top leaders.

Senator PELL. Was this described in the press?

Mr. NEIER. This was widely described.

Senator PELL. In El Salvador?

Mr. NEIER. I was not in El Salvador at the time that took place, so I cannot tell you whether it was reported in the newspapers. It was so widely publicized an event elsewhere that I assume it had to have been reported in the newspapers there.

Senator PELL. In view of the fact that political assassination seems to be a way of life there, I was just curious, how long were you in that part of the world?

Mr. NEIER. Senator, as brief a period as possible, and only under circumstances where I accompanied Members of Congress who were furnished with excellent security by the U.S. Embassy. I took advantage of that security. I would not consider going to El Salvador under other circumstances.

Senator PELL. And the Members of Congress who were with you, who were those?

Mr. NEIER. Congresswoman Schroeder and Congressman Tom Petri of Wisconsin.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Senator.

POLITICAL MURDERS AVERAGE 200 A WEEK

Mr. Neier, you say there were 2,407 political murders but there were eight times as many as that?

Mr. NEIER. Well, 2,407 was the number that the commander of the national police gave me when I asked the question of Col. Guillermo Garcia.

Senator HELMS. How did you arrive at the figure of eight times that many?

Mr. NEIER. By conversations I had with Ambassador Dean Hinton, in which he reported an average of 200 a week.

Senator HELMS. Now, are you including the murders perpetrated by the insurgents in that figure?

Mr. NEIER. I was asking for all politically motivated murders, no matter who committed them.

Senator HELMS. Does that mean that seven times as many, based upon what you said, seven times as many were committed by the insurgents as by the armed forces?

Mr. NEIER. No. I asked the commander of the armed services and the commander of the police how many politically motivated murders were there. And I was told between October 15, 1979, and the end of July 1981, there were 2,407. That averaged out, I calculated, to about 26 a week.

When I asked Ambassador Hinton how many politically motivated murders there were, he indicated that the Embassy reported to the

State Department an average of about 200 a week. It was fairly simple arithmetic to calculate the discrepancy.

Senator HELMS. But what you are saying to me, then, is that a person killed by an insurgent is also a politically motivated murder——

Mr. NEIER. A person who is killed by an insurgent——

Senator HELMS [continuing]. But you do not know how many of the approximately 18,000 that you suggest were killed were killed by the insurgents?

Mr. NEIER. I do not know how many. I only know that the armed forces and the police only count a very small proportion. That leads me to the conclusion, Senator—and perhaps one should not jump to conclusions—but that leads me to the conclusion that the armed services were really only counting those that were committed by the insurgents as politically motivated murders and left out all of those that were committed by their forces.

Senator HELMS. Everybody has his own figure, then.

Mr. NEIER. Everybody has his own figure.

Senator HELMS. How long have you been active in the Helsinki Watch?

Mr. NEIER. Well, the Helsinki Watch was organized at the beginning of 1979 and I was one of the organizers of it. Actually, I started working on it about 6 months earlier, before we were formally launched.

Senator HELMS. So that would be about 3 years?

Mr. NEIER. That is right.

Senator HELMS. How long have you been active in the Americas Watch?

Mr. NEIER. The Americas Watch was created last year as an outgrowth of the Helsinki Watch, and it was a deliberate response to this administration's distinction between abuses of human rights committed by hostile totalitarian countries on the one hand and friendly authoritarian countries on the other hand.

UNITED STATES HAS TO BE CONSISTENT

In our view in the Helsinki Watch Committee, that undermined us. Because we were critics of abuses committed in hostile, totalitarian countries—the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the others—we felt that evenhandedness was the only way to demonstrate concern for human rights.

I might add on that, Senator, one of my colleagues in the Helsinki Watch Committee is in Geneva today appearing before the U.N. Human Rights Commission, urging the Commission to put Poland on the agenda of the Human Rights Commission. There she is faced by people from other countries who say, what about El Salvador.

In our view the United States has to be consistent. It has to be an advocate of human rights in Poland and in El Salvador.

Senator HELMS. Do any Latin American countries other than Cuba and Nicaragua export terrorism, to your knowledge?

Mr. NEIER. Yes. The Government of Argentina is active in Bolivia, and therefore I would say that it has exported military terrorism.

Senator HELMS. Do any fund terrorism on a broad basis, almost worldwide?

Mr. NEIER. I do not know of any Latin American countries that fund terrorism on a broad basis worldwide. But I am not an expert on that.

Senator HELMS. Are you familiar with Mr. Valdivieso?

Mr. NEIER. No.

Senator HELMS. He is in the audience, and at the conclusion of the hearing we are going to invite him, if he wishes, to make comments. He has been a frequent critic of the Duarte government and yet he is here and has offered to testify. And that will be at the pleasure of the subcommittee.

Senator Percy?

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

HELSINKI ACCORDS ABRIDGED IN POLAND

First of all, I would like to say, inasmuch as you mentioned Poland, Professor Neier, that I can bring you a direct message, having been in Chicago with Secretary Haig on Saturday, that almost a million Polish Americans are concerned about the fact that the Helsinki accords are being totally abridged in Poland today. If there ever was a demand for someone, some nation, to adhere to what they had solemnly signed, this is it; and we should hold them, not to previous standards that they had, but to the new standards of Helsinki. And that was what we in Chicago called for.

I would like to ask you one question about El Salvador, because it has such a long history of violence and the present violence comes in the context of a civil war. I am convinced that the extremists on both the left and the right do not want a negotiated solution. They want to enforce their will by force, using violence on both sides.

And the problem that we are faced with is this: What is the alternative to the Duarte government? Looking at all factions down there, Jose Napoleon Duarte seems to be a man of good will, trying his best; that's what I hear from my friends at Notre Dame—and many of them say, "Yes, he is in a terrible situation, but what alternative is there?"

Are you contending that the present government is more violent than previous governments, and less interested in a return to peace with democracy?

Mr. NEIER. Senator, first let me say a word about President Duarte. I believe that President Duarte would like nothing better than to be able to restore human rights in El Salvador and to achieve control of the armed forces so as to protect human rights. President Duarte is also determined to resist the guerrillas trying to overthrow the present Government of El Salvador.

In my view, President Duarte is not in control. The armed services are in control.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he is the President of the junta and not of the Government, and that alone is a signal that he is not running the whole show, and we know that.

Mr. NEIER. I think that the human rights conditions contained in the Foreign Assistance Act—had they been approached seriously with an indication that this administration would really adhere to those human rights conditions would have helped to strengthen the hand of President Duarte in dealing with the very difficult situation that he faces with respect to the military. The fact that it was plain to everyone from the start that this certification would be made without a genuine effort to apply the principles of the Foreign Assistance Act deprived us of the opportunity to aid President Duarte in achieving control of the military.

VIOLENCE INCREASED SINCE OVERTHROW OF ROMERO GOVERNMENT

As to the way this Government of El Salvador compares with previous governments, the report that we issued last week indicates that the level of violence has gone up since the overthrow of the Romero government. The level of violence, that is, not in the course of military combat, but against civilians in other circumstances.

The report also indicates that it is not only the violence which is depriving the citizens of El Salvador of human rights, but that the Government of El Salvador has promulgated a series of decrees which have ordained serious deprivations of human rights.

The CHAIRMAN. I think my conclusion is that, though he is not in complete control, the conditions that Congress has laid down for continuing assistance strengthen his hand, give him something to work with. We have seen progress in the case that was dragging along to discover the murderers of six American civilians, including four churchwomen. We are now in a position in which I do not think we would be unless we had put that as one of the strong conditions.

So I think that it has strengthened his hand. Is it not possible that much of the violence comes from the right and left, which do not support the present junta or the election process, out there in the extremes beyond his control, and that they are trying to disrupt the whole process?

Mr. NEIER. I agree that it is beyond his control. But I do not agree that, with respect to the right, that it is beyond the control of the armed forces, which are the real Government of El Salvador.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no further questions. I would just like to thank you and commend you, Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee for holding these important hearings on the prospects for democracy in Central America and the Caribbean Basin.

There are elections scheduled in five countries during the next few months. The subcommittee hearings, I think, will shed light on the extent to which these elections will provide a basis for new stability in this area, one of the most volatile areas in the world today.

REVIEW ASPECTS OF PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION

And since the hearings were originally scheduled, the administration has transmitted the required certification for military aid to El Salvador and has decided to ask for increased security assistance for El Salvador. It is timely that our meetings are held this month, particularly to concentrate on reviewing in depth the election criteria required in the certification.

The full committee will schedule further hearings on February 8 to review the remaining aspects of the Presidential certification, so that we may thoroughly review the entire matter. But we certainly appreciate your holding these hearings this morning. They have been extraordinarily valuable and very timely indeed.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your comments. I hope that you will be able to meet with, if not here later in the day, with Mr. Valdivieso, who has been characterized as a rightist, and who is in favor of the elections. But it is going to be at the committee's pleasure whether he appears and makes his comments after the scheduled witnesses.

Senator Kassebaum?

Senator PELL. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, if I could have the attention of you both. Is Mr. Valdivieso an American citizen? Because I really believe we have not broken that tradition for the 16 years I've been on the committee, to the best of my recollection.

Senator HELMS. I know that he is a veteran in our armed services.

Senator PELL. But my question is, is he a citizen? Because—and the chairman can correct me—but I think in the last 16 years or 17 years we have had a policy, and I think we have had it for many years more than that, of only having American citizens.

Senator HELMS. I was going to say that, again, that that would be at the committee's pleasure. And at least we can meet with him informally.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the procedure that we have followed, Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. I thought I made that clear, that that would be at the subcommittee's pleasure.

The CHAIRMAN. I think members ought to have the ability to talk with any individual.

Senator PELL. But I do not think it should be part of the regular committee hearing. I think we should close the proceeding.

Senator HELMS. Exactly. That is what I intend to do.

Senator Kassebaum?

Senator KASSEBAUM. I just have a few brief comments. One, I am certainly supportive of the efforts to bring evenhandedness to an analysis of the human rights conditions in the countries which you have chosen to study. That is a laudable goal. It is a most difficult question.

But I think, as I pointed out earlier, the frustration of trying to understand what really is going on is an extremely difficult one when there are so many emotions involved in a longstanding struggle.

I am bothered a bit by the fact that you said you were only there for a brief period of time. Certainly I am sure it is not a place one would choose to stay for a long period. But how completely do you think that the work of the Commission can be done in just a brief period of time? It seems to me an extremely important responsibility that you have, to bring an evenhanded understanding of this struggle.

OUTSPOKEN CRITIC OF THE GOVERNMENT

Mr. NEIER. Senator, clearly one cannot get an understanding in so brief a period. I should point out, however, that many of my colleagues who are the authors of the report that we submitted spent longer periods of time in El Salvador, and that it is not by choice that I spent so brief a period. It is simply because of some concern for my own security.

I would not now go to El Salvador by myself in order to try to interview anybody with respect to the new declaration by the bishops that was quoted by Secretary Enders today. I would love to do it, but I would not.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Why?

Mr. NEIER. Because I would fear for my own security. I have been an outspoken critic of the Government of El Salvador and I do not think it would be safe.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But the bishops have lent support to the election. This would obviously be something that I would think the present administration there would be very pleased to have, that support. Why then would you fear for your life?

Mr. NEIER. Because of the critical comments that I have made about the Government of El Salvador and the level of violence against critics of the Government. I may be just a coward, but I do not think so. I would characterize it is being prudent.

Senator KASSEBAUM. In mentioning that the six top members of the Democratic Revolutionary Front were murdered, are you saying that you think just that alone is what precluded them?

Mr. NEIER. No. I think that any one incident is not responsible for their nonparticipation in the election. I think that incident in the context of the overall violence in El Salvador and the violence specifically directed against political opponents of the Government would make anyone hesitate to take part in an election and campaign openly, given the likelihood that they would be killed if they did so.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Given the attitudes there now on the part of both sides, do you not believe that they made a political determination?

Mr. NEIER. They may also have made a political determination. They may have many other motives of which I am not aware. But putting aside all of those other motives, it seems to me only sensible to do things that avoid getting you killed.

GUATEMALA ELECTION PRO FORMA

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would like to ask briefly about Guatemala, and I am sorry I did not have the opportunity to ask Secretary Enders about this. Did you go to Guatemala?

Mr. NEIER. I did.

Senator KASSEBAUM. And do you view Guatemala as being able to conduct an election?

Mr. NEIER. No. I think if anything Guatemala is worse than El Salvador. For one thing, there is no counterpart of President Duarte in Guatemala. The consequences of speaking out politically are at least as dangerous in Guatemala as they are in El Salvador.

Senator KASSEBAUM. So you not view the elections there as just pro forma?

Mr. NEIER. That is correct. I think that in the past the military has demonstrated that when it does not like the results of the election, it merely declares its own candidate the victor. And I have no reason to assume that anything else will take place.

I would only say that it just seems a shame that a country with a strong democratic tradition such as Costa Rica, which is in grave economic difficulty today, is not a beneficiary of the kind of aid the United States is giving to El Salvador. It would be wonderful if a democratic country that respects human rights, were the beneficiary of aid.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

Senator HELMS. Thank you.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, I have one more question.

Senator HELMS. Certainly.

WHAT CHOICE WOULD YOU MAKE?

Senator PELL. Mr. Neier, I know that Duarte is a very decent man and doing the very best that he can. He may be a feeble reed, but he is the only reed on which we can lean in that country.

But if you were in our position of deciding which way to go in the end, what would you do? Would you continue to support the military regime, to prop up the present regime which is mainly

under the military, with Duarte having a decent input, or would you let it go and let the leftwingers, guerrillas, Communists, and socialists—however you want to characterize them—take over?

Mr. NEIER. Senator—

Senator PELL. That is the real choice we face here.

Mr. NEIER. Speaking for myself—and let me say, I do not speak for my committee in answering that question. We address ourselves to human rights questions and not to the larger geopolitical question that you are asking me.

Speaking solely for myself, my view is that, while it is often appropriate to look at a series of evils and say, "This is the lesser of the evils and therefore I choose this," sometimes even what appears to be the lesser evil is so evil that one should have nothing to do with it.

I think El Salvador has descended to that point. I am sorry it has. I would love to opt for the lesser evil, but I cannot identify it in this situation. I would love to see us support President Duarte if he were in control. I do not believe he has any control. By not implementing the Foreign Assistance Act in a serious way we are depriving ourselves of the opportunity to give him some control.

Senator PELL. But you would agree that if we withdraw our support that he will end up getting tossed out?

Mr. NEIER. But it is not as if he is in. It is not as if he is in power now. He is merely the figurehead for a government that he does not control.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Neier.

The committee now welcomes Richard Scammon, chairman of the Elections Research Center in Washington, and Howard Penniman, Georgetown University and American Enterprise Institute. I was told this morning that between these two gentlemen there is a total of 79 years of professional experience studying elections throughout this Nation and worldwide. So we will ask you gentlemen to come forward.

I would further mention to my colleagues and to those gathered here that Mr. William Doherty of the American Institute for Free Labor Development in Washington was invited to appear on this panel, but was unable to do so. And I hope that the committee will be able to avail itself of Mr. Doherty's experience in Latin America at a time in the near future. We regret his absence.

Gentlemen, thank you for coming, and you may proceed in such order as you choose. And I would suggest that you may wish to summarize your prepared statements and then go to the questions.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD SCAMMON, ELECTIONS RESEARCH CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. SCAMMON. Senator, if I may, I will speak very briefly and ask my colleague Dr. Penniman to take up more of the substance, so we can be available for your questions.

Together, Dr. Penniman and I have been asked by the State Department, as electoral consultants, to go to El Salvador. We have so done, much as we went several years ago to Egypt and to Israel as consultants for the Department on possible electoral arrangements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and potential autonomy negotiations there.

Neither of us makes any pretense to be an expert on military affairs or counterterrorism or agrarian reform or the other problems which have been discussed here, among others. Our specialty, both of us, is elections, their management, their purpose, their validity, and so on.

I would think that in discussing with you today the potential elections for the 28th of March in El Salvador for members of the Constituent Assembly, based upon the conversations we had with all of the political parties, with the government, with our own diplomatic personnel in El Salvador, and particularly based upon conversations with the labor movement here and in El Salvador, that the general possibilities of holding the election are not difficult. They are not easy, but they are not difficult.

Administratively, certainly there is no bar to the holding of these elections. There is an electoral law in place. There is an administrative system in place. And there should be no great difficulty in holding them.

The basic obstacle, of course, becomes the ability of the State apparatus to carry out an electoral consultation in a circumstance of terrorism. There are instances of this in the past. Both Dr. Penniman and I were observers in the Vietnam presidential elections for President Johnson some years ago. He has observed elections, two sets of elections in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in Africa. I, as a member of the OAS mission in the Dominican Republic some years, for the election of a president in that country, as an observer at elections in Ulster in Northern Ireland, and in others.

But specifically in El Salvador, the use of an ink device to tint the finger, the inky pinky, so that you cannot repeat, is of course, as we understand the terrorists have said, an invitation to take a meat cleaver and chop it off. And how many voters you can intimidate in this way I have absolutely no idea.

In the Ulster vote, almost no Roman Catholics voted, but I believe mainly conviction rather than fear that they would get their kneecaps blown off by the IRA. You never can tell, unfortunately, in advance. No matter how good the apparatus may be for carrying out of these elections, the terrorism factor is a very real one. And how much this might invalidate or eliminate the legitimacy of such elections, I do not know.

Some maintain, as you know, Senator, that most of the elections to the House of Representatives this fall should be invalidated because less than half the American people will vote in them, not terrorized, hopefully, no inky pinky, no missing kneecaps. But they will not vote.

I will ask, if I may, Dr. Penniman to give more detail on our observations in El Salvador. And then both of us will be more than pleased to answer such questions as you or your colleagues may have.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Scammon.

STATEMENT OF PROF. HOWARD PENNIMAN, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. PENNIMAN. Mr. Chairman, when the citizens of El Salvador go to the polls on March 28, 1982, to elect delegates to a constituent assembly, they will be participating in no ordinary election. It will be an election that, if all goes well, can lead to a new and more democratic society. It will be an election carried out in the full view of

several hundred official and unofficial foreign observers and of dozens of newsmen whose confidence in the honesty of any election has seldom been great.

It will be conducted in spite of the threat of attacks by guerrilla forces [FMLN] financed and armed by outside organizations and governments that in the main are antidemocratic. The FMLN will not participate in the elections and threatens to cut off a finger of any citizen who votes. By contrast, the Salvadoran Catholic Bishops see the elections much more positively. While in the past they have expressed reservations about the conduct of the present regime, in their conference on January 22, 1982, they asked all Catholics to take part in the election which the Bishops see as "a hope, a possible beginning of a solution to the current crisis the country is facing . . . The deputies [elected] for the constituent assembly are going to amend the nation's constitution or give us a new one, which will be the foundation of the country's political, legal, and social order."

El Salvador has not had a long history of honest democratic elections although less than 20 years ago serious students of that country's politics argued that the major trends in the country's electoral system of the period included "a trend toward more responsible democratic elections; votes are counted with less fraud," and a lessening of "political activity of the military as a group although military men are still politically prominent as individuals."

That trend toward democracy, decreasing fraud, and decreasing political activity by the military was clearly broken in 1972 when virtually all observers agreed that massive fraud in the counting of votes reversed the outcome of the presidential elections, turning an apparently certain Jose Napoleon Duarte victory into a defeat. The scheduled elections of March 28, 1982, could mark an end to misconducted elections.

The 1982 election rules generally follow the traditional Salvadoran rules which are much like those of other democratic countries of Latin America, many European democracies, and Israel. Each of the eight qualified parties may offer lists of candidates in the nation's 14 departments. A party's list may include as many candidates and alternates as there are seats assigned to the department. The lists of candidates are published but do not appear on the ballots. Voters will cast their ballots for parties, not for individuals. Parties will receive a share of the seats in each department approximately equal to their share of the popular vote. Actual seats will be assigned to candidates in the order that their names appear on the winning party lists. Voters in each of the 8 lead populated departments will elect 3 delegates and their alternates. Voters in the departments of Usulután and La Libertad each elect 4 delegates and 4 alternates; San Miguel, 5; Santa Ana, 6; and San Salvador, 13.

The Salvadoran voting process is very simple. The ballots list the name and the symbol of each party offering candidates in a department. Before a voter is given a ballot, he must present an identity card [cedula de identidad personal]. After receiving a ballot, the voter enters the voting booth where he checks the name of the party he wishes to support, folds the ballot and drops it into the sealed ballot box. Immediately after casting his ballot, the voter's right thumb must be marked with a "very visible and indelible" ink to make clear to voting officials that he has cast his ballot and may not vote again.

The Central Election Committee [CCE] which is responsible for the administration of the election consists of three members with three alternates as prescribed by law. The Junta selected one member of

the commission, chose a second from among three persons suggested by the supreme court, and a third from three nominated by the political parties. The CCE names three members to boards or commissions at the departmental, municipal, and precinct levels. Under the general control of the municipal commission, the precinct boards actually are responsible for the conduct of the voting and the counting of the ballots on election day.

The new election law promulgated on December 18, 1981, provides for an Election Oversight Council poll watcher committee made up of representatives from the competing parties with authority to monitor the work of the election commissions at all levels. They are authorized to check registration lists, identity cards, attend all sessions of the commissions, propose new methods of assuring the purity of the electoral process, and so on. On election day the local councils will perform the functions of party poll watchers or scrutineers. They may check the credentials of each voter, watch the conduct of the voting process, and verify the count. Parties are faced with a burden as well as an opportunity since there are 261 municipalities in the country and there may be as many as 5,000 precincts or voting places.

The polls open at 7 o'clock in the morning and remain open until 6 o'clock in the evening unless the building is without electricity, in which case the polls close 2 hours earlier. As soon as the polls are closed, the ballot boxes are opened and the votes counted at the polling place. The precinct board prepares a report indicating the number of persons receiving ballots, the number of spoiled ballots, and the number of votes received by each party. The blank ballots in the box are listed as abstentions. The report is signed by the members of the board and by the party poll watchers. Any person objecting to the report must explain his objection in writing. The results are telegraphed to the Central Election Commission and certified copies are sent to the municipal councils which check every precinct report and sends them to the departmental commission and finally to the CCE.

Deputies are elected at large at the departmental level. The total vote cast for all parties in a department is divided by the number of deputies assigned to the department; the quotient is the quota or number required for the first assignment of seats to the parties. Each party is entitled to the number of deputies equal to the times its total vote is divisible by the quota. If, after the seats are awarded by this formula one or more is still empty, the seat or seats then go to the party or parties with the largest remainder. If no party receives a vote equal to the basic quota, then seats are assigned in the order of total vote received by each party. The 1982 rules make it somewhat easier than in the past for small parties to elect deputies.

The rules, if followed, can provide honest elections. The fact that votes are counted at the local level in front of poll watchers from each party should encourage an accurate count. This year the presence of large numbers of foreign observers and newsmen should also help assure the honesty of the process.

The El Salvadoran Government faces an extremely complex and difficult task in handling the 500 to 600 observers and media people who may descend on the capital. In Vietnam in 1967 American personnel, planes, etc., were available to help. In Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in 1979 Ian Smith's government and in 1980 the British and Commonwealth Governments ran most of the show. The Government of El Salvador can expect precious little outside help so they must arrange for hous-

ing, feeding, transportation, as well as briefing of observers concerning provisions of the election law, provision for administering the law, and discussing campaign and electoral developments. Briefings need to be given daily for at least 4 days before the election. Bilingual guides and interpreters traveling on buses and planes with observers are essential for answering questions on law, administration, and general information.

Observers from democratic countries in the OAS whose words will be taken seriously in Latin America can greatly assist all newsmen and observers if they prepare one or more reports immediately after the votes have been counted, commenting on the conduct of the election and the validity of the announced results. Such a report would have an impact for good or ill on the views of other observers. A favorable report signed by their representatives would serve at least some of the same legitimizing functions as the report of the Commonwealth countries provided after the 1980 Zimbabwe elections or of the OAS report on the Bosch-Balaguer election in the Dominican Republic in the mid-sixties. An unfavorable report would, of course, have the opposite effect. Because the problems of Central America and at this moment particularly those of El Salvador have been the subject of bitter ideological debates, we must recognize that even the most objective discussions of the elections will not be accepted by all, but analyses of democratic Latin American specialists may be taken seriously by serious reporters and observers.

Competitive elections rarely occur in authoritarian countries. Elections are sometimes cancelled—perhaps wisely—in wartime by respected democracies in Western Europe and elsewhere. Yet curiously, when El Salvador faces an election in 1982 that may be the most difficult one ever attempted in modern times, it is predictable that a minority of observers and reporters who have never witnessed real elections at home will demand that a weak, divided and guerrilla-ridden El Salvador conduct an impeccably administered and absolutely honest election. Some visitors will insist that the government protect them from all harm even as they criticize the presence of military personnel at the precincts that assures the integrity of the process and the safety of the observers.

The Salvadoran bishops spoke for many of their countrymen when they asked adults to vote on March 28, arguing that even with imperfections, the government produced by those elections will offer greater hope for the nation's future than rule by the terrorist and authoritarian FMLN and FDR with whom, according to the bishops, "only a small sector of the population sympathizes." Recognizing El Salvador's current difficulties, the bishops advised acceptance of the better of the only imperfect available alternatives.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. I thank you both. The mark of good testimony is that when Senators sit up here and write down questions they are going to ask you and then you answer them before we get a chance to ask them. That indicates the preparation that you have given.

As I understand it, both of you have studied elections all over the world since 1940?

Mr. SCAMMON. 1935 in my case.

GOOD CHANCE OF FAIR ELECTION

Senator HELMS. You have studied a lot of elections. But given all of the difficulties that you have alluded to in El Salvador, how does

the process there measure up? You have answered that in a sense. and I guess it cannot be answered with absolute definition.

But they have a reasonably good chance of having a fair election, is that correct?

Mr. SCAMMON. They have a reasonably good chance, but only provided there is not massive terrorist intervention with the electoral process. If you bomb out polling places and machinegun voting booths, sure, you will get a terrorized people away from the polls.

Moreover, even if you are entirely quiet on election day, which is what we more or less found in Vietnam, there was not overall violence on election day. But you go to an electorate which seems to have had a maximum 42 percent and you say, if you vote we will come in tomorrow night to your village and any man or woman with a red finger will have it chopped off, you really have to have a tremendous faith in the democratic process to go around the rest of your life with nine fingers.

And how much this will do, how effective this terror will be, it is very hard to say, particularly for those of us who are primarily election experts rather than experts in the psychoterror, if you want to call it that, of El Salvador. I just do not know.

My own guess and I think that of Dr. Penniman is that for a number of people this would represent a real difficulty. And I suggest, Senator Helms, it would represent a real difficulty in Raleigh, N.C. or in Providence, R.I. You know, people can be very strong democrats and still want to keep that odd finger. And if they believe the terror, and particularly if a few people are terrorized publicly in advance—for example, if you move the inhabitants of the town into the city hall and burn up all the voting forms while you are waving a machete over their head and throwing red ink around—I could see how a lot of people could be terrorized.

But I just do not know. And I think Dr. Penniman would agree that you would have to take the testimony of other people who know more about Salvador than we do before you could really answer that effectively.

Mr. PENNIMAN. The forms are there to make possible fairly honest elections. The presence of outsiders coming in to observe the process, representatives of the contending parties, the vigilance committees make it possible to hold honest elections. On the other hand, acceptable elections will be very difficult to hold if the guerrillas terrorize voters and observers.

Senator HELMS. Well, noting your figures, 1974 in this country of ours—I believe I am correct in my recollection that 38 percent of the people voted, and I do not recall anybody losing a finger.

But your testimony has been helpful to me and I am sure to other members of the committee.

Senator PELL?

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Where was this announcement made that the guerrillas would cut off the fingers of those who had ink on them?

Mr. SCAMMON. This was the threat that had been repeated to us as having been uttered by the guerrillas oftentimes in meetings where they had raided towns and gotten the forms together and burned them so that you couldn't vote, and tried to intimidate the local mayor from issuing new forms which would have permitted people to vote. The testimony came from party people, from the electoral commission people, from the staff of the embassy, and the labor movement people.

Senator PELL. But I have not seen it anywhere before.

Mr. SCAMMON. Nor have I.

Senator PELL. I have not heard of it before today, actually.

Mr. SCAMMON. Well, try it out with your people who were there.

Senator PELL. I would ask the staff if they could, to dig up evidence of this.

Mr. SCAMMON. It would be very helpful if you could find concrete evidence.

Senator PELL. Now, the other question I have is, you were probably here when Mr. Neier was testifying.

Mr. SCAMMON. Yes.

Senator PELL. What is your advice to us, your view? Do you think an election can be held with the threats that are being uttered on both sides, or do you think we would do better to more or less gloss over this election and maybe have even less than the disgracefully small number that bother to vote in the United States, and not pay much attention to it?

Mr. SCAMMON. Senator, what you are suggesting is that I take on your responsibility. You put it very well when you said, what do we do? It is like the editorial which I believe, Senator Helms, you quoted from the Washington Post.

Senator PELL. Forgive me. It is our responsibility, but I crank into it your advice, which I am asking for.

Mr. SCAMMON. You know, both Howard Penniman and I are at a disadvantage. We believe in elections. Our lives have been devoted to the study of elections. So we are probably proelection when you add it up.

I noticed, incidentally, that in the suppression in Poland, the first thing the Polish military government did was to cancel the local elections which were scheduled for February, the cancellation or postponement of elections, which as you know in this country we have never done. In all of the years of our history, every 2 years, the Congress has been elected. For what purpose, some people may ask the question, but at least it has been elected. [General laughter.]

ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO STEAL AN ELECTION

Now, under these conditions, I would rather go ahead with the election, admitting that it may be faulted, tainted, flawed. One big advantage you have here is that, as Dr. Penniman has pointed out, and as we saw when I was a member of the OAS mission in the Dominican Republic, and when we were in Vietnam, and when I was in Ulster, and when he was in Zimbabwe, Rhodesia, when you have a large number of foreign observers and press people, it is almost impossible to steal an election. You just can't. Oh, you may steal 20 votes here and 11 votes there, but it doesn't do you much good when you are trying to steal a whole State.

Senator PELL. But it doesn't prevent retribution afterward.

Mr. SCAMMON. No, it does not, and I would hope that the foreign observers will be maintained in El Salvador for a period of time to see whether or not this happens, although I must say one thing about an amputated finger. It is pretty obvious, and I don't think that the average voter is going to go out and deliberately cut off his own finger so that they can run around and say, look, they terrorized me. It is very true, but you know, this is one of the trials you run. I would much rather, Senator Pell, see the election tried, even though it might fail, even though there may be massive terror mounted against it, I would

rather see it tried than just to say, Pontius Pilate-like, we wash our hands of this, throw it away, let them fight it out.

Senator PELL. And even leave a nine-fingered citizenry.

Mr. SCAMMON. It depends how many will vote in those conditions, and it depends how realistic the threat is. Now, there are some who would say that such an enterprise by the guerrillas would very likely not be undertaken in fact because if it were done in any great numbers it would be so counterproductive from their point of view as to put them down about the level of the Marquis de Sade. Whether that has any real base or not, I don't think any of us could say, but again, I repeat, I would rather see an election operation, even under difficult conditions, go forward, whether it is in Poland, El Salvador, Namibia, wherever it may be, than to see it abandoned, because if it is abandoned, you simply go into the jungle.

Senator PELL. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Senator.

I believe it is true that notwithstanding all of the threats, which I had not heard about, either, the Salvadoran peasant union, UCS, released a letter last week supporting the election. Is that correct?

Mr. PENNIMAN. That is correct.

Senator HELMS. One final note, just for the record. You referred to the observers of the election. Who are they?

Mr. PENNIMAN. Well there are two types of observers. There are the observers who are the El Salvadorans, who are at the polls, as they are in this country, representing the parties on the Election Oversight Councils. These party representatives work at all levels from the national to the precinct. They can be there for the voting, the counting and so on.

Then there are official and unofficial observers from other countries. As I understand it, the Government of El Salvador has issued invitations to more than 50 countries asking them to send as many as three official observers to observe the election from beginning to end. There will be in addition some persons representing private groups who will come from this country and from other countries, to observe the election. Nearly all Latin American countries, I think, have been invited to send official observers. As I understand it, the Cubans and the Nicaraguans have not been invited but most other countries will be represented there, and it is from among the Latin American democracies that I think we are likely to get the most important and most useful advice as to whether this is or is not a fair and honest election.

Senator HELMS. Gentlemen, I am going to assume the privilege of possibly filing a written question or so that may occur to me after you have gone, and without objection, we will accord that privilege to any other Senator.

I do want to thank you for coming and for your testimony. It has been very helpful to the subcommittee.

Now we are going to recess in just a moment. First of all, I will ask unanimous consent that the proceedings of this morning's hearing and the one in December be printed.

Any insertions by Senators will be included.

I am going to recess formally this subcommittee meeting, and then ask Mr. Valdivieso to come up informally, just to talk with me, if nobody else wants to listen; the public is welcome to stay, and the media to stay, but with that understanding, we stand in recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, subject to call of the chair.]

APPENDIX

CUBA'S RENEWED SUPPORT FOR VIOLENCE IN THE HEMISPHERE

(A research paper by the Department of State)

PREFACE

Any formulation of U.S. foreign policy for Latin America and the Caribbean would be incomplete without in-depth analysis of Cuba's role in the region. Some of Cuba's international activities have received publicity and attention, but much has taken place out of the public view. While understanding the full range of Cuba's activities abroad is obviously essential for governments engaged in foreign policy planning, the general public is often uninformed about the nature and extent of Cuba's involvement in other countries. This study of Cuban activities in Latin America and the Caribbean is being issued in the interest of contributing to better public understanding of U.S. foreign policy and developments in the region.

The focus of this study is Cuba's activities in the Americas. It does not attempt to give a description of conditions in the countries in which Cuba is active, or to analyze why violent groups develop, but instead examines the degree to which Cuba is directly engaged in efforts to destabilize its neighbors by promoting armed opposition movements. Cuba is clearly not the sole source of violence and instability in the region, but Cuban activities militarize and internationalize what would otherwise be local conflicts. In a region whose primary needs are for economic development, social equity, and greater democracy, Cuba is compounding existing problems by encouraging armed insurrection.

This report describes Cuban activities that are either publicly known or can be revealed without jeopardizing intelligence sources and methods. Cuban involvement is not limited to the examples contained in this study.

SUMMARY

A country-by-country examination of Cuba's activities in Latin America and the Caribbean makes clear that Cuba has renewed its campaign of the 1960's to promote armed insurgencies. In particular, Cuba has stepped up efforts to stimulate violence and destabilize its neighbors, turning away from its earlier policy of strengthening normal diplomatic relations in the hemisphere.

Since 1978, Cuba has:

- worked to unite traditionally splintered radical groups behind a commitment to armed struggle with Cuban advice and material assistance;
- trained ideologically committed cadres in urban and rural guerrilla warfare;
- supplied or arranged for the supply of weapons to support the Cuban-trained cadres' efforts to assume power by force;
- encouraged terrorism in hope of provoking indiscriminate violence and repression in order to weaken government legitimacy and attract new converts to armed struggle; and
- used military aid and advisors to gain influence over guerrilla fronts and radical governments through armed pro-Cuban Marxists.

Unlike Che Guevara's attempts during the 1960's Cuban subversion today is backed by an extensive secret intelligence and training apparatus, modern military forces, and a large and sophisticated propaganda network. Utilizing agents and contacts nurtured over more than 20 years, the Castro government is providing ideological and military training and material and propaganda support to numerous violent groups, often several in one country.

Cuba is most active in Central America, where its immediate goals are to exploit and control the revolution in Nicaragua and to induce the overthrow of the Government of El Salvador and Guatemala. At the same time, Cuba is working to destabilize governments elsewhere in the hemisphere. Cuba provides advice, safehaven, communications, training, and some financial support to several violent South American organizations. In the Caribbean, Cuban interference in the post-election period has been blunted in Jamaica, but Grenada has become a virtual Cuban client.

Cuba's new drive to promote armed insurgency does not discriminate between democracies and dictatorships. And attempts by Cuba to destabilize governments occur in spite of the existence of diplomatic ties.

This long-range campaign is directed by the Cuban Communist Party which oversees far-flung operations that include secret training camps in Cuba, intelligence officers abroad, training programs for select foreign students, networks for covert movement of personnel and material between Cuba and abroad, and propaganda support.

Cuba's enormous investment of energy, money, and agents in this campaign would not be possible without Soviet help. Soviet assistance, now totalling over \$8 million a day, enables Cuba to maintain the best equipped and largest per capita military forces in Latin America and to channel substantial resources abroad. In return, Cuba usually is careful not to jeopardize ongoing government relationships in Latin America important to the Soviet Union.

The scope of Cuba's activities in the hemisphere has prevented Cuba from always keeping covert operations hidden. For instance, during 1981 alone:

- In *Nicaragua*, Cuba has quietly increased its presence to 5,000 personnel, including more than 1,500 security and military advisors.
- In *El Salvador*, Cuba's key role in arming the Salvadoran guerrillas was exposed and Castro admitted supplying arms.
- In *Costa Rica*, a Special Legislative Commission documented Cuba's role in establishing an arms supply network during the Nicaraguan civil war and found the network was later used to supply Salvadoran insurgents.
- In *Colombia*, Cuba was discovered to have trained guerrillas attempting to establish a "people's army."

Cuba's new policies abroad and its reaction to emigration pressures at home have reversed the trend in Latin America toward normalization of relations with Cuba. During the last 2 years, Colombia, Costa Rica and Jamaica suspended or broke relations with Cuba, Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador withdrew their ambassadors from Havana.

Cuban intervention is, of course, not the sole source of instability. The origins of occasional violent conflict in Latin America lie in historical social and economic inequities which have generated frustrations among a number of people. Sustained economic growth over the past 20 years and resilient national institutions, however, have limited the appeal of radical groups. But in some countries, particularly the small nations of Central America, dislocations resulting from rapid growth compounded existing tensions, leading to the emergence in several countries of radical movements, which often originated with frustrated elements of the middle class. Subsequent economic reversals have subjected already weak institutions to additional stress, making these countries more vulnerable to the appeals of radical groups backed by Cuba.

Cuba is quick to exploit legitimate grievances for its own ends. But its strategy of armed struggle is not based on appeals to the "people." Instead, Cuba concentrates on developing self-proclaimed "vanguards" committed to violent action. Revolutions, according to this approach, are made by armed revolutionaries.

Cuba's readiness to train, equip and advise those who opt for violent solutions imposes obstacles to economic progress, democratic development and self-determination in countries faced with growing economic difficulties. The spiralling cycle of violence and counterviolence which is central to Cuba's policy only exacerbates the suffering of ordinary people and makes necessary adjustments more difficult.

Cuba's renewed campaign of violence is of great concern to many countries, including the United States. Cuba should not escape responsibility for its actions. Exposing Cuba's efforts to promote armed struggle will increase the costs to Cuba of its intervention.

I. POLICIES

When it first came to power, the Castro regime had its own theory of how to spread revolution: to reproduce elsewhere the rural-based guerrilla warfare experience of Castro's 26th of July Movement in Cuba. In Che Guevara's words, the Andes would become the Sierra Maestra of South America.

Initial attempts to repeat Cuba's revolution elsewhere failed decisively. During the late 1960's, the Castro regime gradually reined in its zealots. Without abandoning its ties to radical states and movements or its ideology, Cuba began to pursue normal government-to-government relations in the hemisphere. By the mid-1970's Cuba's isolation in the Americas eased and full diplomatic or consular relations were reestablished with a number of countries.

But diplomacy proved unable to satisfy the Castro government's ambitions. First in Africa, and now in Latin America and the Caribbean, Cuba's policy has again shifted to re-emphasize intervention.

On July 26, 1980, Fidel Castro declared that the experiences of Guatemala, El Salvador, Chile, and Bolivia teach us that there is no other way than revolution, that there is no other "formula" than "revolutionary armed struggle."

Castro's statement was an attempt to justify publicly what Cuban agents had been doing secretly since 1978: stepping up support for armed insurgency in neighboring countries.

This study traces the development of this latest phase in Cuba's foreign policy.

Early failures—The original Cuban theory held that a continental Marxist revolution could be achieved by establishing armed focal points (*focos*) in several countries. Operating in rural areas, small bands of guerrillas could initiate struggles that would spread throughout the continent.

In 1959, Castro aided armed expeditions against Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. During the early and mid-1960's, Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia all faced serious Cuban-backed attempts to develop guerrilla *focos*.

In seeking indigenous groups with which to cooperate, the Cubans rejected the orthodox Latin American Communist parties, which they regarded as ineffectual. Instead, they lent their support to more militant groups dedicated to armed violence even when their Marxism was not fully articulated.

The Soviet Union was suspicious of Cuba's policy of inciting armed violence, preferring to work through established Moscow-line Communist parties. Disagreement over this issue was a serious point of friction for several years. Cuba denounced the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" as a fraud, arguing that it implicitly undercut the legitimacy of aiding "national liberation" struggles. At the 1966 Tricontinental Conference, Cuba sought to enlist North Vietnam and North Korea and create a more aggressive revolutionary internationalism.

None of the Latin American insurgencies fomented by Havana, however, aroused much popular support. The most severe blow to Cuba's policy during this period came in Bolivia in 1967, when Che Guevara's guerrilla band was opposed by both the peasantry and the Bolivian Communist Party.

After this maverick approach failed to establish a continental revolution, Cuban foreign policy moved into closer conformity with that of the Soviet Union. Castro endorsed the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and accepted Soviet views on East-West relations. Within the hemisphere Cuba generally conformed to the Soviet approach of fostering state-to-state relations with several Latin American countries.

The turn to Africa.—In the mid-1970's, Cuba renewed its penchant for direct intervention, not in Latin America, but in Africa.¹

—In Angola, 20,000 Cuban troops, supported by Soviet logistics and materiel, assured the supremacy of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which had the strongest ties to Moscow of the three movements competing for power after Portugal's withdrawal.

—In Ethiopia, the integration of Soviet and Cuban operations was even more complete, with the Soviets providing overall command and control, materiel, and transport for 13-15,000 Cuban troops fighting against Somali forces.

The Moscow-Havana axis.—These African operations gave evidence of Cuba's military value to the Soviet Union. In areas of the Third World where the Soviets were under constraints not binding on Cuba, Havana could portray its actions as an outgrowth of its own foreign policy of support for "national liberation movements."

Cuba's extensive and costly activities overseas would have been impossible, however, without Soviet aid. The Cuban armed forces, some 225,000 strong with new sophisticated weaponry from the Soviet Union, became a formidable offensive military machine. Soviet aid and subsidies to the Cuban economy have climbed to over \$3 billion annually, or about one-fourth of Cuba's gross national product. In December 1979, at a time when Soviet oil deliveries to Eastern Europe were being cut back and prices raised, Castro announced that the Soviet Union had guaranteed Cuba's oil needs through 1985 at a price roughly one-third that of the world market. The Soviet Union also pays up to 4 and 5 times the world price for Cuban sugar.²

¹ Cuba's military and political activities in Africa are intense and wide-ranging. Cuba still maintains expeditionary forces of at least 15,000-19,000 in Angola and 11,000-15,000 in Ethiopia. Cuba has military and security advisor contingents in a number of other African countries and in South Yemen.

² According to the World Bank, Cuba's per capita annual growth rate averaged minus 1.2 percent between 1960-78. Cuban economic performance ranked in the lowest 5 percent worldwide and was the worst of all socialist countries. Only massive infusions of Soviet aid have kept consumption levels from plummeting. Cuba today depends more heavily on sugar than before 1959. The industrial sector has been plagued by mismanagement, absenteeism, and serious shortages in capital goods and foreign exchange. The economic picture is so bleak that in 1979, and again in October 1981, the Cuban leadership had to warn that 10 to 20 more years of sacrifice lie ahead.

In return, Cuba champions the notion of a "natural alliance" between the Soviet bloc and the Third World in the Non-Aligned Movement. At the Cuban Communist Party Congress in December 1980, Castro explicitly endorsed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and defended the Soviet "right" to intervene in Poland. He also reiterated that Cuba is irrevocably committed to communism and to supporting "national liberation" struggles around the world.

Cuba's policies abroad are thus linked to its relationship to the Soviet Union. By intervening in behalf of armed struggle in Latin America, Cuba injects East-West dimensions into local conflicts.

II. METHODS

Even when pursuing an open policy in the 1970's of establishing normal diplomatic relations with a number of Latin American countries, Cuba retained its clandestine ties with remnants of the insurgents and other pro-Cuban elements in Latin America, providing asylum, propaganda, some training, and other support. Between 1970 and 1973 Cuba's security services moved arms and agents into Chile. At the same time, Cubans helped organize President Allende's personal security and trained many leaders of the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR).

Cuba's renewed campaign to promote insurgencies draws on these contacts and experiences and combines several different elements.

Sophisticated strategy.—Learning from Che Guevara's failure in Bolivia, Cuban doctrine now emphasizes the need to enlist support for armed struggle through advanced training of local guerrilla cadres, sustained aid and advice, and extensive propaganda activities. The *foco* approach of the 1960's—when a Cuban-sponsored team in the field was considered enough to spark insurrection—has given way to a more sophisticated strategy involving extensive commitments and risks.

Soviet support.—A major difference from the 1960's is that, instead of throwing up obstacles, the Soviet Union generally has backed Cuban efforts to incorporate non-doctrinaire groups into broad political-military fronts dedicated to armed struggle. Particularly in Central America, Soviet ties to local communist parties and Bloc relationships have been used to favor insurrectionary violence. For example, a senior Soviet Communist Party functionary traveled to Panama in August 1981, to discuss strategy for Central America with Cuban officials and leaders of Central American Communist parties. The Soviet Union has also used its extensive propaganda network to selectively discredit governments and build support for armed opposition groups.

Allowing Havana to take the lead in the hemisphere enables Moscow to maintain a low profile and cultivate state-to-state relations and economic ties with major countries like Brazil and Argentina.

Cuba, in turn, is generally cautious not to undercut the Soviet Union where the Soviets have established valued relationships. In Peru, for example, Cuba has been careful to exercise restraint to avoid prejudicing the status of the 300 Soviet officials there or jeopardizing the Soviet Union's arms supply arrangement.

Central control.—Most of the covert operations in support of this strategy are planned and coordinated by the America Department of the Cuban Communist Party, headed by Manuel Pinero Losada. The America Department emerged in 1974 to centralize operational control of Cuba's covert activities. The Department brings together the expertise of the Cuban military and the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) into a far-flung operation that includes secret training camps in Cuba, networks for covert movement of personnel and materiel between Cuba and abroad, and sophisticated propaganda support.

Agents of the America Department are present in every Cuban diplomatic mission in Latin America and the Caribbean—in at least five recent instances in the person of the Ambassador or Charge d'Affaires. America Department officials frequently serve as employees of Cuba's official press agency, Prensa Latina, of Cubana Airlines, the Cuban Institute of Friendship With People (ICAP), and other apparently benign organizations. When too great an identification with Cuba proves counterproductive, Cuban intelligence officers work through front groups, preferably those with non-Cuban leadership.³

Cuban military intelligence personnel selected for clandestine operations in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East go through an elaborate training program conducted by Cuban, Soviet, East German and Czech instructors in Havana with special sessions in surrounding cities. In addition to the language and customs of the area to which they are assigned, and typical intelligence operations such as infiltration procedures and photography techniques, the Cubans are instructed

³ Cuba maintains some front organizations set up in the 1960's. One of these, the Continental Organization of Latin American Students, still holds irregular congresses of student leaders from Latin America and the Caribbean (the most recent was held in Havana in August 1981) and publishes a monthly journal, which is distributed by the Cuban Government.

in handling explosives. To disguise their true occupation, the intelligence agents are also instructed in civilian skills such as automotive mechanics, carpentry and heavy equipment operation.

Armed struggle.—The new Cuban offensive relies heavily on violence. In outline, Cuba's strategy is to:

- Unite traditionally splintered radical groups behind a commitment to armed struggle with Cuban advice and material assistance;
- Train ideologically committed cadres in urban and rural guerrilla warfare;
- Supply or arrange for the supply of weapons to support the Cuban-trained cadres' efforts to assume power by force;
- Encourage terrorism in the hope of provoking indiscriminate violence and repression, and generalized disorder in order to weaken government legitimacy and attract new converts to armed struggle; and
- Use military aid and advisors to gain influence over guerrilla fronts and radical governments through armed pro-Cuban Marxists.

The application of this strategy is demonstrated in detail in the case studies that follow. It should be noted, however, that Cuba sometimes emphasizes certain tactics over others. In pursuing its longterm strategy, Cuba concentrates initially on building a network of loyal cadres. When local extremist groups are not capable of or committed to armed struggle, Cuba generally draws on them in support of active insurgencies elsewhere while developing their capacity and willingness for agitation in their homeland. In addition, foreign policy concerns may deter Cuba from promoting armed struggle in a particular country. For example, Cuba attempts to avoid activities which could jeopardize its relations with the Mexican Government since Castro seeks Mexico's support to avoid isolation in the hemisphere.⁴

Propaganda.—Cuba's extensive cultural exchange and propaganda activities are tailored to support covert operations and elicit support for armed struggle.⁵ For example, during the past year, Cubans have used Mexico as a base for coordination of propaganda on behalf of insurgents in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia. Radio Havana and other Cuban media recently have publicized Statements by Communist Party leader surging unity of the Chilean left, and calling for armed action to topple Chile's Government. Radio Havana has directed broadcasts to Paraguay urging the overthrow of the Paraguayan government.

Sports competitions, youth and cultural festivals, and special scholarships to Cuba provide channels to identify potential agents for intelligence and propaganda operations. In Ecuador, Cuban Embassy officers in Quito used their ties with Ecuadorean students to try to orchestrate pro-Cuba demonstrations when the Government of Ecuador threatened to suspend relations after Cuba's forcible and unauthorized occupation in February 1981 of the Ecuadorean Embassy in Havana, following its seizure by a group of Cubans seeking to leave Cuba.

Military training.—Witnesses and former trainees have described several camps in Cuba dedicated specifically to military training, including one in Pinar del Rio province and another near Guanabaco, east of Havana. The camps can accommodate several hundred trainees. Groups from El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, Colombia, Grenada, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti, Chile, and Uruguay have been trained in these facilities during the past two years.⁶

Recruits are normally provided false documentation (sometimes Cuban passports) by Cuban agents in third countries and are flown to Cuba on civil aircraft under cover as "students" or other occupations. Panama has been used as a regular

⁴ Although Cuba is not involved in actions directly threatening to Mexican internal stability, Cuba has taken advantage of Mexico's open society and its extensive presence there—Cuba's Embassy in Mexico City is its largest diplomatic mission in the hemisphere—to carry out support activities for insurgencies in other countries. Mexico is a principal base for Cuban contacts with representatives of several armed Latin American groups on guerrilla strategy, logistical support, and international activities.

⁵ Prensa Latina, the press agency of the Cuban Government, has field offices in 35 countries, including eleven different Latin American and Caribbean countries, and combines news gathering and propaganda dissemination with intelligence operations. Radio Havana, Cuba's shortwave broadcasting service, transmits over 350 program hours per week in eight languages to all points of the world. Cuba also transmits nightly medium-wave Spanish-language broadcasts over "La Voz de Cuba," a network of high-powered transmitters located in different parts of Cuba. In the Caribbean alone, Radio Havana's weekly broadcasts include 14 hours in Creole to Haiti; 60 hours in English, 3 hours in French, and 125 hours in Spanish. Prensa Latina and Radio Havana, in close coordination with TASS and Radio Moscow, regularly use disinformation to distort news reports transmitted to the region, especially those concerning places where Cuban covert activities are most intense.

⁶ Latin Americans are not the only trainees. In a May 1978 Reuters interview published in Beirut, Abu Khalaf, a leader of the military branch of El Fatah, confirmed that Palestinian agents have received training in Cuba since the late 1960's. Palestinian organizations have reciprocated by training various Latin American groups in the Middle East with Cuban assistance. Libya, which hosted a meeting of Latin American "liberation movements" January 25-February 1, 1979, also has trained some Latin American extremists.

transit point for Central and South Americans to and from military training in Cuba.⁷

Once in Cuba, trainees generally are taken immediately to the guerrilla training camps where they usually are grouped according to nationality and the organization for which they are being trained in order to promote a sense of cohesiveness and *esprit de corps*.

Training normally lasts 3-6 months and consists of instruction by Cuban cadres in sabotage, explosives, military tactics, and weapons use. Although military training is frequently tied closely to operational requirements (the M-19 guerrillas that landed in Colombia in early 1981 did so immediately upon completion of their military instruction in Cuba), witnesses report that political indoctrination is also included in the curriculum.

Many Cuban instructors are active military officers and veterans of Cuban expeditionary forces in Africa. Soviet personnel have been reported at these camps, but they apparently do not participate directly in the guerrilla training.

Political training.—Each year Cuba offers hundreds of scholarships to foreign students. All Cuban mass organizations operate schools in organizational work and indoctrination open to carefully selected foreign students.⁸ In addition, some 11,000 non-Cuban secondary school students, mostly teenagers, were enrolled in 1980 in 15 schools on the Isle of Youth alone. Cuba does not publicize complete foreign enrollment statistics, nor does it release the names of those trained. From the Eastern Caribbean alone, close to 300 students are currently in Cuba studying technical and academic subjects. The study of Marxism-Leninism is compulsory in many courses and military affairs is compulsory in some. When governments have turned down Cuban scholarship offers, as occurred recently in Belize and Dominica, Cuba has gone ahead and concluded private agreements. Local Marxist-Leninist groups with ties to Cuba play a major role in selecting those students who receive scholarships.

In sum, the infrastructure for Cuba's intensified revolutionary agitation in Latin America is a multifaceted yet carefully coordinated mechanism. The Cuban Communist Party, through its America Department, provides cohesion and direction to a complex network that consists of intelligence officers, elements of Cuba's foreign ministry, armed forces, mass organizations, commercial and cultural entities, and front groups.

This extensive apparatus is designed to support one objective: a systematic, long-range campaign to destabilize governments.

III. CASE STUDIES

The Cuban activities described in the case studies which follow must be considered to understand developments within the particular countries in question. However, the focus of the case studies is Cuban involvement in each country. Readers should therefore guard against assuming that the cases below provide a comprehensive picture of the general situation in the country where the events described have taken place.

CENTRAL AMERICA

NICARAGUA

In July 1979, internal and external factors converged to bring about the triumph of the anti-Somoza insurrection and the subsequent domination of the new Nicaraguan government by the Cuban-trained leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). These events provided a key test for Cuba's new mechanisms and strategy for promoting armed pro-Cuban movements in this hemisphere.

⁷ Public exposure in March 1981 of the use of Panama as a transit point for Colombian guerrillas trained in Cuba led to sharp criticism of Cuba by the Panamanian government. Panama imposed greater controls on activities of exiled Central and South Americans, and the transit of guerrillas through Panama appears to have ceased, at least temporarily.

⁸ Courses in agitation and propaganda open to foreigners include the Central Union of Cuban Workers' Lazaro Pena Trade Union Cadre School and similar courses run by the Union of Young Communists, the Cuban Women's Federation, the National Association of Small Farmers, and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. Even the Cuban Communist Party offers special courses for non-Cubans in party provincial schools and in the Nico Lopez National Training School, its highest educational institution. The Cuban press reported graduation ceremonies July 17, 1981, for this year's 70 Cuban graduates and announced that 69 foreigners had also attended advanced courses at the Nico Lopez school. Foreign student represented political organization from Venezuela, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Chile, Grenada, Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Sao Tome y Principe, and South Yemen. Official Cuban Communist Party newspaper, *Granma* labeled their presence "a beautiful example of proletarian internationalism." Courses of instruction at the Nico Lopez school, which is chaired by senior party leaders, include "political training for journalists," "political training for propagandists," economics, and ideology.

Opposition to Somoza's authoritarian rule in the late 1970's was widespread. The 1978 killing of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, publisher of Nicaragua's most respected newspaper "La Prensa," converted many Nicaraguans to the armed opposition of which the FSLN was the core; FSLN assurances on democracy and pluralism were accepted by newly allied political moderates and private businessmen. Internationally, sympathy for the struggle against Somoza led Venezuela, Panama, and Costa Rica aid to the insurgents, while Somoza stood practically without friends.

This environment enabled Cuba to disguise the extent of its support for the FSLN and avoid disrupting the then fragile alliances between the FSLN and other opponents of Somoza. Behind the scenes, Cuba played an active role in organizing the FSLN, and in training and equipping it militarily.

Cuba had provided some training and arms to the FSLN in the early 1960's. Until late 1977, however, Cuban support consisted mainly of propaganda and safehaven.

In 1977 and early 1978, a high ranking America Department official, Armando Ulises Estrada,⁹ made numerous secret trips to facilitate the uprising by working to unify the three major factions of the FSLN. Stepped-up Cuban support to the Sandinistas was conditioned on effective unity. During the XI World Youth Festival in Havana in late July 1978, the Cubans announced that the unification of the three factions had been achieved and urged Latin American radicals present at the meeting to demonstrate solidarity with the FSLN by staging operations in their own countries.

At the same time, Estrada concentrated on building a supply network for channelling arms and other supplies to guerrilla forces. International sympathy for the struggle against Somoza provided a convenient facade for Cuban operations. In preparation for the first FSLN offensive in the fall of 1978, arms were flown from Cuba to Panama, transhipped to Costa Rica on smaller planes, and supplied to Nicaraguan guerrillas based in northern Costa Rica. To monitor and assist the flow, the America Department established a secret operations center in San Jose. By the end of 1978, Cuban advisors were dispatched to northern Costa Rica to train and equip the FSLN forces with arms which began to arrive direct from Cuba. FSLN guerrillas trained in Cuba, however, continued to return to Nicaragua via Panama.

In early 1979, Cuba helped organize, arm, and transport an "internationalist brigade" to fight alongside FSLN guerrillas. Members were drawn from several Central and South American extremist groups, many of them experienced in terrorist activities. Castro also dispatched Cuban military specialists to the field to help coordinate the war efforts. Factionalism threatened Sandinista unity again in early 1979, and Castro met personally with leaders of three FSLN factions to hammer out a renewed unity pact.

When the insurgents' final offensive was launched in mid-1979, Cuban military advisors from the Department of Special Operations, a special military unit, were with FSLN columns and maintained direct radio communications to Havana. A number of Cuban advisors were wounded in combat and were evacuated to Cuba via Panama.

The operations center run by the America Department in San Jose was the focal point for coordination of Cuba's support. After the triumph of the anti-Somoza forces in July 1979, the chief of the center, Julian Lopez Diaz, became Cuban Ambassador to Nicaragua. One of his America Department assistants in San Jose, Andres Barahona, was redocumented as a Nicaraguan citizen and became a top official of the Nicaraguan intelligence service.

Castro has counseled the Sandinistas to protect their Western ties to keep the country afloat economically. But to ensure that the FSLN could move to dominate the Nicaraguan Government, Cuba has acted quickly to build up Sandinista military and security forces.

Since July 1979, Cuba has provided substantial military, technical, and political assistance. Some 5,000 Cuban advisors, teachers, and medical personnel work at all levels of the military and civilian infrastructures.¹⁰ Of this number,

⁹ Ulises Estrada was given his first ambassadorial post in Jamaica following the July 1979 victory of anti-Somoza forces (see Jamaica case study). He is currently Cuba's ambassador to South Yemen.

¹⁰ The very quantity of Cuban advisors has caused resentment among nationalist Nicaraguans leading to sporadic outbursts of anti-Cuban feelings. On June 3, 1981, the FSLN announced that 2,000 Cuban primary school teachers presently in Nicaragua would return to Cuba in July, at the mid-point of Nicaragua's academic year. The Nicaraguan Education Minister announced on June 18 that 800 of those departing would return in September after vacations in Cuba, while Cuba would replace the other 1200 teachers in February. By November 1981, however, all 2,000 Cuban teachers had returned to Nicaragua.

more than 1500 military and security advisors are actively providing military instruction and combat training, instruction in intelligence and counterintelligence activities; instruction on security protection for the FSLN leadership and advice on organization of the Nicaraguan police force. In addition, Nicaragua has received within the past year approximately \$28 million worth of military equipment from the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, and Cuba. This has included tanks, light aircraft, helicopters, heavy artillery, SAM's, anti-aircraft weapons, hundreds of military transport vehicles, as well as tons of small arms and ammunition.

Cuba presently is using Nicaraguan territory to provide training and other facilities to guerrillas active in neighboring countries. The Cuban Ambassador to Nicaragua and other America Department officials frequently meet with Central American guerrillas in Managua to advise them on tactics and strategy. Individual Sandinista leaders have participated in such meetings and have met independently with Guatemalan and Salvadoran insurgents. The FSLN also has cooperated in a joint effort by Cuba and Palestinian groups to provide military training in the Mideast to selected Latin American extremists. Some Sandinistas were themselves trained by the PLO, which maintains an embassy in Nicaragua.

Between October 1980 and February 1981, Nicaragua was the staging site for a massive Cuban-directed flow of arms to Salvadoran guerrillas. Arms destined for Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrillas continue to pass through Nicaragua.

EL SALVADOR

Before 1979, Cuban support to Salvadoran radicals involved training small numbers of guerrillas, providing modest financial aid, and serving as a political conduit between Salvadoran extremists and communists outside the hemisphere.

During the Nicaraguan civil war, Cuba concentrated on support for the FSLN. After the fall of Somoza, Cuba began intense efforts to help pro-Cuban guerrillas come to power in El Salvador. When a reform-minded civil-military government was established in October 1979, Cuba's first priority was to tighten the political organization and unity of El Salvador's fragmented violent left. At first, arm shipments and other aid from Cuba were kept low as the Cubans insisted on a unified strategy as the price of increased material support. To forge unity, Cuba sponsored a December 1979 meeting in Havana that resulted in an initial unity agreement among the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN), the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), and the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES), which had itself formed an armed wing at Cuban and Soviet insistence. In late May 1980, after more negotiations in Havana, the Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP) was admitted into the guerrilla coalition.

The new combined military command assumed the name of the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU). During this period, Cuba also coordinated the development of clandestine support networks in Honduras, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, sometimes using arms supply mechanisms established during the Nicaraguan civil war.

With unified tactics and operations now possible, Cuba began to assist the guerrillas in formulating military strategy. Cuban specialists helped the DRU devise initial war plans in the summer of 1980. The Cubans influenced the guerrillas to launch a general offensive in January 1981. After the offensive failed, guerrilla leaders traveled to Havana in February 1981 to finalize a strategy to "improve our internal military situation" by engaging in a "negotiation maneuver" to gain time to regroup.¹¹

Cuba provided few weapons and ammunition to Salvadoran guerrillas from its own resources, but played a key role in coordinating the acquisition and delivery of arms from Vietnam, Ethiopia, and Eastern Europe through Nicaragua.¹² After the unmasking of this network, Cuba and Nicaragua reduced the flow in March and early April. Prior to a guerrilla offensive in August an upswing in deliveries occurred. The arms flow continues via clandestine surface and air routes. In addition, the Cubans over the past year have established a network of small ships to deliver arms to Salvadoran insurgent groups.

Cuba also assists the Salvadoran guerrillas in contacts with Arab radical states and movements to arrange military training and financing for arms acquisitions. In September 1980, Cuba laundered \$500,000 in Iraqi funds for the Salvadoran

¹¹ A guerrilla document outlining this strategy was found in Nicaragua in February 1981. Guerrilla representatives later confirmed its authenticity to Western Europeans with the disclaimer that the strategy elaborately developed in the paper had been rejected.

¹² The Cuban role as arms broker to the DRU since 1979 has been documented in the Department of State's Special Report No. 80, "Communist Interference in El Salvador," February 23, 1981. In April 1981, when Socialist International representative Wischniewski confronted Castro with the evidence in the report, Castro admitted to him that Cuba had shipped arms to the guerrillas. In discussions with several Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) delegations at the September 1981 IPU conference in Havana, Castro again conceded that Cuba had supplied arms.

insurgents. In March 1981, the Salvadoran Communist Party Secretary General, Shafik Handal, visited Lebanon and Syria to meet with Palestinian leaders. Cuba also coordinates the training of a relatively small number of Salvadoran guerrillas in Palestinian camps in the Mideast.

Cuban training of Salvadoran guerrillas increased sharply in 1980 as Cuba concentrated on building a trained army able to mount major offensives. A typical three-month training program included courses in: guerrilla tactics; marksmanship and weapons use; field engineering; demolition; fortification construction; land navigation; use of artillery and mines. One observer reported seeing groups up to battalion size (250-500 men) under instruction, suggesting that some guerrillas trained as integral units.¹³

Cuba has provided selected guerrillas more intensive training on specialized subjects. A former FPL guerrilla who defected in fall 1981 reported that during 1980 he had received 7 months of military training in Cuba which included instruction in scuba diving and underwater demolition. Soviet scuba equipment was used. The group trained as frogmen called themselves "combat swimmers" and were told that their mission was to destroy dams, bridges, port facilities and boats.

Cuba also gives political, organizational and propaganda support to the guerrillas. Cuban diplomatic facilities worldwide help guerrilla front groups with travel arrangements and contacts. The Cuban press agency, Prensa Latina, has handled communications for guerrilla representation abroad. Cuba and the Soviet Union have pressed communist parties and radical groups to support the insurgency directly and through solidarity organizations with propaganda and facilities (office space, equipment, etc.).

The Salvadoran insurgents have publicly stressed the importance of solidarity groups. A member of the FPL, Oscar Bonilla, who attended the Fourth Consultative Meeting in Havana of the Continental Organization of Latin American Students (OCLAE), a Cuban front group, told Radio Havana in August 1981 that OCLAE: "has been the most important means of solidarity of all the peoples and has gotten us ready to form an anti-interventionist student front in El Salvador, Central America and the Caribbean . . . We believe that it is good to carry out immediate plans for actions which will permit us to stop an imperialist intervention in El Salvador. In this respect, the students of Latin America will have to confront and attack U.S. interests so that the United States will see how the Latin American and Caribbean student movement responds to an aggression by imperialism in El Salvador."

With Soviet assistance, Cuba has orchestrated propaganda to distort the realities of the Salvadoran conflict. Unattributed foreign media placements and efforts to organize protests against the Salvadoran government and U.S. policy, which have accompanied official propaganda, stress the theme of U.S. intent to intervene militarily in El Salvador.

Unfounded claims and accusations originated by the Salvadoran guerrillas are routinely replayed to a regional and world audience by Cuba's Radio Havana or Prensa Latina, then echoed by the official Soviet Press Agency, TASS, Radio Moscow, and Eastern European media. For example, a false report of a U.S. soldier killed in El Salvador that resounded widely in Cuban/Soviet propaganda during 1980 was traced finally to the Salvadoran Communist Party. This rumor was to support an even bigger lie: that hundreds of U.S. soldiers were in El Salvador, building U.S. bases, and herding peasants into Vietnam-style strategic hamlets.¹⁴

GUATEMALA

Castro has stepped up Cuba's support to Guatemalan guerrillas whom he has aided with arms and training since he came to power.

As elsewhere, Cuba has influenced divided extremist groups to unite and conditioned increased Cuban aid on a commitment to armed struggle and a unified strategy. During 1980, discussions about a unity agreement were held among leaders of the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), the Organization of People in Arms (ORPA), and the dissident faction of the

¹³ Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez tacitly admitted that Cuba was providing military training to Salvadoran guerrillas in an interview published in *Der Spiegel* on Sept. 28, 1981.

¹⁴ At the time these reports first appeared, the U.S. was providing neither arms nor ammunition to El Salvador. In January 1981 the United States responded to the Cuban-orchestrated general offensive by sending some military assistance and later sent American military trainers, whose numbers never exceeded 55. There are no U.S. combatants, bases, or strategic hamlets in El Salvador. TASS continues to report falsely that "hundreds" of U.S. military personnel are in El Salvador and participate in combat.

Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT/D). At the invitation of Sandinista leaders, representatives of the four groups met in Managua under strict security to continue discussions. In November 1980, the four organizations signed a unity agreement in Managua to establish the National Revolutionary Union (with revolutionary directorate called the General Revolutionary Command—CGR). Manuel Pineiro Losada, Chief of the America Department, and Ramiro Jesus Abreu Quintana, head of its Central American Division, represented Fidel Castro at the signing ceremony. Following the signing of the unity agreement, representatives of the CGR traveled to Havana to present the document to Castro. ORPA publicized the agreement in a communique issued November 18, 1980. All parties agreed it was significant that the unity agreement was the first such document signed on Central American soil.

After this unity agreement was concluded, Cuba agreed to increase military training and assistance. A large number of the 2,000 or more guerrillas now active have trained in Cuba. Recent military training programs have included instruction in the use of heavy weapons.

During the past year arms have been smuggled to Guatemala from Nicaragua passing overland through Honduras. The guerrilla arsenal now includes 50 mm mortars, submachine guns, rocket launchers, and other weapons. Captured M-16 rifles have been traced to U.S. forces in Vietnam. On June 26, 1981, Paulino Castillo, a 28-year-old guerrilla with ORPA, told newsmen in Guatemala that he was part of a 23-man group of Guatemalans that underwent 7 months of training in Cuba, beginning around February 1980. His group was divided into sections for urban and rural combat training in explosives and firearms use. To get to Cuba, Castillo travelled to Costa Rica from Guatemala by public bus. In Costa Rica a go-between obtained a Panamanian passport for Castillo to enter Panama. In Panama other contacts equipped him with a Cuban passport and he continued on to Cuba. Castillo returned to Guatemala via Nicaragua to rejoin the guerrillas. He later surrendered to a Guatemalan army patrol.

Guatemalan guerrillas have collaborated with Salvadoran guerrillas. In January 1981, the EGP, ORPA, FAR and the PGT/D circulated a joint bulletin announcing the intensification of their activities in support of the general offensive in El Salvador. The Salvadorans in turn have provided the Guatemalans with small quantities of arms.

Unity has not been fully achieved, as the four groups have not yet carried out plans to establish a political front group. The joint military strategy, however, is being implemented. The guerrillas have stepped up terrorist actions in an effort to provoke repression and destabilize the government. For example, the EGP took responsibility for placing a bomb in one of the pieces of luggage that was to have been loaded onto a U.S. Eastern Airlines plane on July 2. The bomb exploded before being loaded, killing a Guatemalan airport employee.

COSTA RICA

Cuba took advantage of Costa Rica's strong popular and governmental opposition to Somoza's authoritarian government and of Costa Rica's open democratic society to establish and coordinate a covert support network for guerrilla operations elsewhere in Central America. The apparatus was established during the course of the Nicaraguan civil war and maintained clandestinely thereafter. Costa Rica was well-disposed toward groups that opposed Somoza, including the Sandinista guerrillas. Aid provided by Panama and Venezuela was openly funneled through Costa Rica to the Nicaraguan rebels. Cuba, however, kept its role largely hidden.

A Special Legislative Commission established in June 1980 by the Costa Rican Legislature revealed Cuba's extensive role in arming the Nicaraguan guerrillas. The Commission determined that there were at least 21 flights carrying war material between Cuba and Llano Grande and Juan Santamaria Airports in Costa Rica.¹⁵

Costa Rican pilots who made these flights reported Cubans frequently accompanied the shipments. Although Cubans were stationed at Llano Grande, their main operations center for coordinating logistics and contacts with the Sandinistas was set up secretly in San Jose and run by America Department official Lopez Diaz. The Special Legislative Commission estimated that a minimum of one million pounds of arms moved to Costa Rica from Cuba and elsewhere during

¹⁵ The Commission's report was issued May 14, 1981.

the Nicaraguan civil war, including anti-aircraft machine guns, rocket launchers, bazookas, and mortars. The Commission also estimated that a substantial quantity of these weapons remained in Costa Rica after the fall of Somoza in July 1979.

The Special Legislative Commission concluded that after the Nicaraguan civil war had ended, "arms trafficking (began), originating in Costa Rica or through Costa Rican territory, toward El Salvador, indirectly or using Honduras as a bridge." Through 1980 and into 1981 traffic flowed intermittently through Costa Rica to El Salvador, directed clandestinely by the Cubans.

In the summer of 1979 the Cubans and their paid agent, Fernando Carrasco Illanes, a Chilean national residing in Costa Rica, (along with several Costa Ricans previously involved in the logistics effort for the FSLN) agreed to continue smuggling arms to Salvadoran guerrillas. The Cubans arranged for acquisition of some of the arms and ammunition remaining in Costa Rica from the Nicaraguan airlift to supply the Salvadoran insurgents.

This new Cuban operation was coordinated from San Jose, first from their secret operations center then later directly from the Cuban Consulate. The major coordinator, until his expulsion from Costa Rica in May 1981 following the break in consular relations between Costa Rica and Cuba, was Fernando Pascual Comas Perez of the America Department. Comas worked directly for Manuel Pineiro and had the cover title of Cuban Vice Consul in San Jose. Cuban agents made arrangements to store arms for transshipment to El Salvador, and to help hundreds of Salvadoran guerrillas pass through Costa Rica in small groups on their way to training in Cuba. Cuban operations have been facilitated by Costa Rica's three Marxist-Leninist parties, which have provided funds, safehaven, transportation and false documents.¹⁶

Terrorism had been virtually unknown in Costa Rica until March 1981 except for scattered incidents of largely foreign origin. The first Costa Rican terrorists made their appearance in March when they blew up a vehicle carrying a Costa Rican chauffeur and three Marine security guards from the U.S. Embassy in San Jose. In April, four terrorists from the same group were captured after machine-gunning a police vehicle. In June, the group murdered three policemen and a taxi driver. Costa Rican authorities have arrested some twenty accused terrorists and are continuing to investigate leads linking them to South American terrorist groups such as the Argentine Montoneros, the Uruguayan Tupamaros, Colombia's M-19 and to Cuba itself. Two of the accused terrorists are known to have received training in the Soviet Union.

Director of the Judicial Investigation Organization Eduardo Aguilar Bloise told a press conference August 12 that captured terrorist documents indicated that two Costa Rican peasants had been given "ideological/military training" in Cuba and returned to work in the Atlantic coastal zone of Costa Rica. The documents indicate that the two were in Cuba from 8-12 months—possibly in 1978—and were financed by the terrorist group known popularly in Costa Rica as "the family." Aguilar said he did not discount the possibility that others had been trained in Cuba.

While most of Costa Rica's Marxist-Leninist parties have advocated a peaceful line in respect to Costa Rica, one group with close ties to Cuba—the Revolutionary Movement of the People (MRP)—while disavowing responsibility for terrorist acts, has spoken of them as "well intentioned." Some of the arrested terrorists are known to have belonged to the MRP at one time. On November 5 the Office of National Security announced the discovery of a terrorist cell clearly connected with the MRP. Among the arms and terrorist paraphernalia confiscated was an Uzi submachinegun with silencer. Earlier, the authorities had confiscated a "plan for Guanacaste" from an MRP official which noted such objectives as "prevent the electoral process from developing in a festive atmosphere" and "the taking of power by the armed people." The head of the MRP has traveled many times to Cuba and Cuba has given training to other MRP leaders.

HONDURAS

Cuba provided paramilitary training to a small number of Hondurans in the early 1960's but relations with Honduran radicals were strained until the late

¹⁶ In a recorded interview broadcast by Radio Havana on June 16, 1981, Eduardo Mora, Deputy Secretary General of Costa Rica's Popular Vanguard Party (the Moscow-line traditional Communist Party, the least disposed to violence of the country's several Marxist parties and splinter groups) explained his party's position. "We establish ties with all revolutionary organizations in Central America. We have close ties and are willing to give all the aid we possibly can in accordance with the principles of proletarian internationalism because we believe that the struggle of the Central American people is the struggle of our own people."

1970's. Cuba then resumed military training for members of the Honduran Communist Party (PCH) and integrated them into the "internationalist brigade" fighting in the Nicaraguan civil war. After the war, PCH members returned to Cuba for additional training.

Since then Cuba has concentrated primarily on developing Honduras as a conduit for arms and other aid to guerrillas active elsewhere in Central America. In January 1981, Honduran officials discovered a large cache of concealed arms intended for Salvadoran guerrillas, which included M-16 rifles traced to Vietnam. Smuggled arms have continued to be intercepted.

While considering Honduras a useful support base for insurgencies elsewhere, Cuba is also working to develop the capacity for insurrection within Honduras. In the normal pattern, Havana has urged splintered extremist groups in Honduras to unify and embrace armed struggle. While holding back from levels of support given to Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrillas, Cuba has increased its training of Honduran extremists in political organization and military operations. Cuba has also promised to provide Honduran guerrillas their own arms, including submachine guns and rifles.

On November 27, Honduran authorities discovered a guerrilla safehouse on the outskirts of Tegucigalpa. Two guerrillas were killed in the resulting shootout, including an Uruguayan citizen. Nicaraguans as well as Hondurans were captured at the house, where a substantial arsenal of automatic weapons and explosives were seized. Incriminating documents, including notebooks which indicate recent attendance in training courses in Cuba, were also confiscated. One of those arrested, Jorge Pinel Betancourt, a 22-year-old Honduran, told reporters the group was headed for El Salvador to join Salvadoran guerrillas. Two additional guerrilla safehouses located in La Ceiba and San Pedro Sula were raided on November 29, and authorities seized sizeable arms caches, explosives and communications equipment. These arms may have been destined for use within Honduras.

THE CARIBBEAN

JAMAICA

In the late 1970's, Jamaica became a special target for Cuba. Fidel Castro and other Cuban officials developed close relationships with important members of the People's National Party (PNP) which governed Jamaica from 1973 until 1980. Cuban security personnel trained Jamaican security officers in Cuba and Jamaica, including members of the security force of the office of the Prime Minister. Cuba also trained about 1400 Jamaican youths in Cuba as construction workers through a "brigadista" program. Political indoctrination in Cuba formed part of this group's curriculum. A considerable number of these Jamaican Youths received military training while in Cuba, including instruction in revolutionary tactics and use of arms.

During this same period, the Cuban diplomatic mission in Jamaica grew in size. Most of the embassy staff, including former Ambassador Ulises Estrada, were Cuban intelligence agents. Ulises Estrada, who had served as a deputy head of the America Department for 5 years, had a long history of involvement in political action activities and intelligence operations, and went to Jamaica in July 1979, after playing a major role in Cuba's involvement in the Nicaraguan civil war.

Cuba was instrumental in smuggling arms and ammunition into Jamaica. A Cuban front corporation (Moonex International, registered in Lichtenstein, with subsidiaries in Panama and Jamaica) was discovered in May 1980 to be the designated recipient of a shipment of 200,000 shotgun shells and .38 caliber pistol ammunition shipped illegally to Jamaica from Miami. Jamaican authorities apprehended the local manager of the corporation as he was attempting to leave the country, in defiance of police instructions, on a private plane accompanied by the Jamaican Minister of National Security and Cuban Ambassador Estrada. The manager subsequently paid a fine of U.S. \$300,000 set by a Jamaican court.

In 1980, weapons were reported stockpiled in the Cuban embassy for possible use by Jamaicans during the elections campaign. M-16 rifles then appeared in Jamaica for the first time and were used in attacks against supporters of the opposition Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) and the security forces. Over 70 of these weapons have been found by Jamaican authorities. Some of the M-16's found in Jamaica have serial numbers in the same numerical series as captured M-16's shipped to Salvadoran guerrillas from Vietnam.

Ambassador Ulises Estrada was withdrawn from his post in November 1980, at the request of the newly-elected JLP government. In January 1981, the Jamaican

can Government terminated the "brigadista" program and recalled Jamaican students remaining in Cuba under this program. The government decided to maintain diplomatic relations but warned Cuba to stop its interference in Jamaican affairs. Cuba continued to maintain some fifteen intelligence agents at the Cuban Embassy in Kingston. On October 29, the government broke diplomatic relations with Cuba and cited Cuba's failure to return three Jamaican fugitive criminals as the immediate cause for this action. On November 17, the government publicly detailed Cuba's role in providing covert military training under the curtailed "brigadista" program.

GUYANA

In 1978, as many as 200 Cuban technicians, advisors, and medical personnel were stationed in Guyana. However, while claiming fraternal relations with Guyana's government, Cuba maintained contact with radical opposition groups. Guyanese authorities suspected the Cubans of involvement in a crippling sugar strike. In August 1978, five Cuban diplomats were expelled for involvement in illegal activities.

Cuban military advisors have provided guerrilla training outside Guyana to members of a small radical Guyanese opposition group, the Working People's Alliance. Five of the seven members of the Cuban Embassy are known or suspected intelligence agents.

GRENADA

Cuban influence in Grenada mushroomed almost immediately after the March 1979 coup led by the New Jewel Movement of Maurice Bishop. Bishop and his closest colleagues were Western-educated Marxist radicals, and they turned for help to Fidel Castro, who proved willing to provide assistance.

To allow close Cuban supervision of Grenadian programs, a senior intelligence officer from the America Department, Julian Torres Rizo, was sent to Grenada as ambassador. Torres Rizo has maintained intimate relations with Bishop and other People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) Ministers, such as Bernard Coard.

The Grenadian Government has followed a pro-Soviet foreign policy line. Cuban and Grenadian voting records in international organizations have been nearly identical, so much so that they alone of all Western Hemisphere nations have voted against U.N. resolutions condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Cuban aid to Grenada has been most intense in those areas which affect the security of its client government and the island's strategic usefulness to Cuba. Cuba has advisors on the island offering military, technical, security and propaganda assistance to the Bishop government. Many Grenadians have been sent to Cuba for training in these areas. Last year journalists observed Cuban officials directing and giving orders to Grenadian soldiers marching in ceremonies in St. George's.

Cuba is aiding the construction of a 75-kilowatt transmitter for Radio Free Grenada. Grenada's state-controlled press, enjoying a government-enforced monopoly, currently hews to a strict "revolutionary" line. Indications are that the new transmitter will continue this emphasis while providing facilities for beaming Cuban and Soviet supplied propaganda into the Caribbean and South America.

Cuba's largest project in Grenada is the construction of a major airfield at Point Salines on the southern tip of the island. Cuba has provided hundreds of construction workers and Soviet equipment to build the airfield. This airfield, according to PRG statements, is required to bring tourism to its full economic potential and will be used as a civilian airport only. Many questions have been raised, however, about the economic justification for the project. The Grenadian Government has ignored requests for a standard project analysis of economic benefits. The planned 9,800-foot Point Salines runway, moreover, has clear military potential. Such an airfield will allow operations of every aircraft in the Soviet/Cuban inventory. Cuba's MiG aircraft and troop transports will enjoy a greater radius of operation. The airport will give Cuba a guaranteed refueling stop for military flights to Africa.

Bishop himself has given an implicit endorsement of future military use of the airfield. A March 31, 1980, *Newsweek* report quoted Bishop's comments to a U.S. reporter: "Suppose there's a war next door in Trinidad, where the forces of Fascism are about to take control, and the Trinidadians need external assistance, why should we oppose anybody passing through Grenada to assist them?"

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

With its renewed commitment to armed struggle, Cuba's interest in the Dominican Republic has revived. Since early 1980, the Cubans have been encouraging radicals in the Dominican Republic to unite and prepare for armed actions. Cuban intelligence officials, like Omar Cordoba Rivas, chief of the Dominican Republic desk of the America Department, make periodic visits to the island.

The Soviet Union, Cuba and other Communist countries have mounted extensive training programs for Dominican students. In July 1981 the Moscow-line Dominican Communist Party (PCD) for the first time publicized the Soviet scholarship program. Some 700 Dominican students are currently studying at Soviet universities (principally Patrice Lumumba University) with another 75 in five other Communist states (Bulgaria, Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Romania). The PCD itself selects the more than 100 students who begin the Soviet program each year.

At the same time, the Soviet Union has been pressuring the PCD to unite with other extreme left organizations. The PCD and the pro-Cuban Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) receive funds from both Cuba and the Soviet Union and send significant numbers of their members and potential sympathizers for academic and political schooling, as well as military training in Communist countries. Cuba also has given military instruction to many members of small extremist splinter groups like the Social Workers Movement (MST) and the Socialist Party (PS).

SOUTH AMERICA

COLOMBIA

Since the 1960's Cuba has nurtured contacts with violent extremist groups in democratic Colombia. During the 1970's Cuba established full diplomatic relations with Colombia; Cuban involvement with Colombian revolutionaries was fairly limited although Cuba provided some training to guerrilla leadership. Many leaders of the April 19 Movement (M-19), including the founder, Jaime Bateman (who also attended a communist cadre school in Moscow), were trained in Cuba. Leaders of the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Moscow-oriented Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) also received Cuban instruction.

Cuban assistance to Colombian guerrillas was stepped up after the February 1980 seizure of the Dominican Republic Embassy in Bogota. A number of diplomats, including the U.S. Ambassador, were taken hostage by M-19 terrorists. As part of a negotiated settlement, the terrorists were flown on April 17 to Cuba, where the remaining hostages were released and the terrorists were given asylum.

During mid-1980, Cuban intelligence officers arranged a meeting of Colombian extremists attended by representatives from the M-19, FARC, ELN, and other Colombian radical groups to discuss a common strategy and tactics. The M-19 had previously held talks with the Nicaraguan FSLN on ways to achieve unity of action among guerrilla groups in Latin America. Although the meeting did not result in agreement by Colombian guerrillas on a unified strategy, practical cooperation among the guerrilla organizations increased.

In late 1980, the M-19 set in motion a large scale operation in Colombia with Cuban help. In November, the M-19 sent guerrillas to Cuba via Panama to begin training for the operation. The group included members who had received no prior political or military training, as well as new recruits. In Cuba the guerrillas were given three months of military instruction from Cuban army instructors, including training in the use of explosives, automatic weapons, hand-to-hand combat, military tactics and communications. A course in politics and ideology was taught as well. Members of the M-19 group given asylum in Cuba after the takeover of the Dominican Republic Embassy also participated in the training program.

In February 1981, some 100-200 armed M-19 guerrillas reinfiltated into Colombia from Panama by boat along the Pacific coast. The guerrillas' mission to establish a "people's army" failed. The M-19 members proved to be poorly equipped for the difficult countryside and the Cuba-organized operation was soon dismantled by Colombian authorities. Among those captured was Rosenberg Pabon Pabon, the M-19 leader who had directed the Dominican Republic Em-

bassy takeover, and then fled to Cuba. Cuba denied any involvement with the M-19 landings, but did not deny training the guerrillas.¹⁷

Cuba's propaganda support for Colombian terrorists was impossible to deny. When a group apparently consisting of M-19 dissidents kidnapped an American working for a private religious institute, Cuba implicitly supported the terrorists' action through Radio Havana broadcasts beamed to Colombia in February 1981, which denounced the institute workers as "U.S. spies." Radio Moscow picked up the unfounded accusation to use in its Spanish broadcasts to Latin America. The American was later murdered by the kidnappers.¹⁸

Colombia suspended relations with Cuba on March 23, in view of the clear evidence of Cuba's role in training M-19 guerrillas. President Turbay commented in a August 13 *New York Times* interview: "... When we found that Cuba, a country with which we had diplomatic relations, was using those relations to prepare a group of guerrillas to come and fight against the government, it was a kind of Pearl Harbor for us. It was like sending ministers to Washington at the same time you are about to bomb ships in Hawaii."

CHILE

After Allende's fall in 1973, Castro promised Chilean radicals "all the aid in Cuba's power to provide." Although Cuban officials maintained regular contact with many Chilean exiles, divisions among the exiles inhibited major operations. The Moscow-line Chilean Communist Party (PCCH), holding the position that revolutionary change could be accomplished by non-violent means, was critical of "left-wing forces" like the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) with which Cuba had close relations.

Throughout the 1970's, members of the MIR received training in Cuba—and in some cases instructed other Latin American revolutionaries. This training ranged from political indoctrination and instruction in small arms use to sophisticated courses in document fabrication, explosives, code writing, photography, and disguise. In addition, Cuban instructors trained MIR activists in the Mideast and Africa.

With its renewed commitment to armed struggle, Cuba increased its training of Chileans beginning in 1979. By mid-1979, the MIR had recruited several hundred Chilean exiles and sent them to Cuba for training and eventual infiltration into Chile. At the same time, members of the MIR who had been living and working in Cuba since Allende's overthrow began to receive training in urban guerrilla warfare techniques. The training in some cases lasted as long as seven months and included organization and political strategy, small unit tactics, security, and communications.

Once training was completed, Cuba helped the terrorists return to Chile, providing false passports and false identification documents. By late 1980, at least 100 highly trained MIR terrorists had reentered Chile, and the MIR had claimed responsibility for a number of bombings and bank robberies. Cuba's official newspaper *Granma* wrote in February 1981 that the "Chilean Resistance" forces had successfully conducted more than 100 "armed actions" in Chile in 1980.

By late 1979, the PCCH was reevaluating its position in light of events in Nicaragua, where the fragmented Nicaraguan Communist Party emerged from the civil war subservient to the FSLN. In December 1980, PCCH leader Luis Corvalan held talks in Cuba with Fidel Castro, who urged Corvalan to establish a unified Chilean opposition. During the Cuban Party Congress that month, Corvalan delivered a speech which sketched a new party line calling for armed struggle to overthrow the Chilean government and for coordination of efforts by all parties, including the violent left. In January 1981, Corvalan commended MIR terrorist acts as "helpful" and stated that the PCCH was willing not only to talk with MIR representatives but to sign agreements with the group. Several

¹⁷ Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez explained in an interview published in *Der Spiegel* on September 28, 1981, why Cuba had not denied training the M-19 guerrillas: "We did not deny this because in the past few years many people came to our country for various reasons to ask for training. We did not deny this desire. If a revolutionary for Latin America wishes to learn the technique and organization of resistance for his own self-defense, we cannot refuse in view of the brutal oppression. This also holds true for the Salvadorans."

¹⁸ The U.S. citizen killed, Chester Allen Bitterman, was working for the Summer Institute of Linguistics, a religious group which develops written forms of indigenous languages.

days after this offer, Corvalan signed a unity agreement with several Chilean extremist groups, including the MIR.

Until January 1981, when the new PCCH policy evidently had been ironed out and validated by the agreement for a broad opposition coalition, Corvalan's statements were issued from such places as Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Cuba, and Peru—but never from Moscow. Within two weeks of the agreement, however, Moscow showed its implicit approval of the policy change and began broadcasting (in Spanish to Latin America and to Chile in particular) PCCH explanations of the new policy and calls for mass resistance and acts of terrorism to overthrow the Chilean government.

Terrorist activities by MIR commandos operating in Chile have increased substantially during the past year. These have included increased efforts by MIR activists to establish clandestine bases for rural insurgency, killings of policemen, and a number of assassination attempts against high government officials.

ARGENTINA

The Cubans have a long history of association with, encouragement of, and active backing for terrorism in Argentina. The Cubans were linked to the two groups responsible for unleashing the wave of leftism terrorism that swept Argentina in the early and mid-1970's, the Montoneros and the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). Cuba backed these organizations with advice on tactics and instructions on recruiting operations and with training in Cuba in urban and rural guerrilla techniques. During the height of Argentine terrorism, in the early and mid-1970's, the Cubans used their embassy in Buenos Aires to maintain direct liaison with Argentine terrorists.

The Argentine terrorists were virtually defeated by 1978. In that year, Castro permitted the Montonero national leadership to relocate its headquarters in Cuba. Today, the Montonero top command, its labor organization, its intelligence organization, among other units, are all located in Cuba. The Cubans facilitate the travel and communications of Montoneros, supplying them with false documentation and access to Cuban diplomatic pouches. Montoneros have been among the Latin American guerrillas trained in guerrilla warfare over the past year in the Mideast as part of a cooperative effort between Palestinian groups and Cuba.

Following the move of their high command to Havana, the Montoneros made repeated attempts to reinfiltrate Argentina. In late 1979, small groups of infiltrators eluded detection and were able to carry out several terrorist actions, including four murders. Subsequent attempts by the Montoneros to infiltrate terrorists in early 1980 proved unsuccessful.

With Cuban support, Montoneros are active outside Argentina. Cuban-trained Montoneros were among the members of the "internationalist brigade" that Cuba supported in Nicaragua in 1979. This connection was highlighted when Montonero leader Mario Firmenich attended the first anniversary of the July 1979 victory, wearing the uniform of a Sandinista Commander. Montoneros have been active elsewhere as well. Montoneros largely staffed and administered Radio Noticias Del Continente, which broadcast Cuban propaganda to Central and South America from San Jose until it was closed by the Costa Rican Government in 1981, after war materials were discovered on its installations.

URUGUAY

After the failure of the urban insurgency organized in the early 1970's by the National Liberation Movement (MLN-Tupamaros), several hundred Tupamaros went to Cuba. During the mid-1970's, Cuba provided some of them with training in military and terrorist tactics, weapons and intelligence. Several of these former Tupamaros subsequently assisted Cuba in running intelligence operations in Europe and Latin America. Some participated in the Cuban-organized "internationalist brigade" that fought in the Nicaraguan civil war.

Cuba continues to provide propaganda support for the Tupamaros and the Uruguayan Communist Party. Radio Havana reported on June 30, 1981, that the leader of the Communist Party of Uruguay attended a ceremony "in solidarity with the Uruguayan peoples' struggle" at the headquarters of the Cuban State Committee for Material and Technical Supply in Havana. Pro-Cuban Uruguayan leaders are given red carpet treatment when they visit Havana and are usually received by at least a member of the Cuban Politburo.

IV. POSTSCRIPT

Cuba's renewed campaign of violence has had a negative impact on Cuba's relations with its neighbors. Cuba's policies abroad and its reaction to emigration pressures at home have reversed the trend in Latin America toward normalization of relations. Although the Castro government has developed close ties to Nicaragua and Grenada, Cuba finds itself increasingly isolated throughout the Americas.

Peru nearly broke relations and removed its ambassador in April 1980, when the Cuban Government encouraged Cubans eager to leave the island to occupy the Peruvian Embassy. After over 10,000 Cubans crowded into the Embassy compound, Castro thwarted efforts by concerned governments to develop an orderly departure program and opened the port of Mariel to emigration, also expelling many criminals and the mentally ill, and ultimately allowing over 125,000 people to leave under sometimes perilous conditions. But Cuba still refuses to issue safe conduct passes to the 14 Cubans that remain cloistered in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana today.

Cuba's neighbors were further shocked when Cuban MiG 21's sank the Bahamian patrol boat "Flamingo" on May 10, 1980, in an unprovoked attack in Bahamian coastal waters. Subsequently, four Bahamian seamen were machine-gunned while trying to save themselves after their vessel sank. Their bodies were never recovered. U.S. Coast Guard aircraft were harassed by Cuban MiG's while searching for survivors at the request of the Bahamian Government.

Relations between Venezuela and Cuba deteriorated badly in 1980, principally over the asylum issue, to the degree that Venezuela removed its ambassador from Havana. In November 1980, Jamaica expelled the Cuban Ambassador for interference in Jamaica's internal affairs and in October 1981, broke diplomatic relations. Colombia suspended relations in March 1981, over Cuba's training of M-19 guerrillas. Cuba's handling of an incident in which a group of Cubans demanding asylum forcibly occupied Ecuador's Embassy in Havana, prompted Ecuador to remove its ambassador from Cuba in May 1981. Also in May, Costa Rica severed existing consular ties with Cuba, expelling Cuban officials active in coordinating support networks for Central American insurgents.

Today, outside the English-speaking Caribbean, only Argentina, Panama, Mexico, and Nicaragua conduct relatively normal relations through resident ambassadors in Havana. Use of Panama as a transit point for Colombian guerrillas, however, led Panama to reassess its relations with Cuba, and resulted in sharp public criticism of Cuba's "manifest disregard for international standards of political co-existence" by a high Panamanian Government official.

